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portfolio of unremediated brownfields, the project has lost its visibility and urgency. Using interviews
with program stakeholders past and present and other materials, the thesis examines why the program's
political cachet waned and the problem narrowed to focus on real estate development apart from broader
disinvestment challenges. Using data from the Illinois Site Remediation Program and other Chicago
geospatial data, this thesis shows that the results of an incomplete Initiative were mixed, specifically the
geographic distribution of site remediation and the success of publicly initiated projects. The case of the
Initiative provides insight into the complexities of environmental, economic development and
redevelopment policy in the City of Chicago and why a truly "green" city is difficult to achieve. This
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scheme to a multi-faceted system that does not wait for investment, but shapes demand to guide clean-up
and redevelopment in the city.
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For unnumbered centuries of human history the wilderness has given way. The priority of industry
has become dogma. Are we as yet sufficiently enlightened to realize that we must now challenge
that dogma, or do without our wilderness? Do we realize that industry, which has been our good
servant, might make a poor master? Let no man expect that one lone government bureau is able-
even tho it be willing-to thrash out this question alone.
Aldo Leopold, 1925
A Plea for Wilderness Hunting Grounds
I was born in Chicago, and I've always loved the city. I'm not sure any more. I love it and I hate it
every day. What I hate is that so much of it is ugly, you see? And you really can't do very much
about it. I hate the fact that so much of it is inhuman in the way we don't pay attention to each
other. And we can do very little about making it human ourselves. What I love is the excitement of
the city. There are things happening in the city every day that make you feel dependent on your
neighbor.
Florence Scala, 1967
In Division Street: America, by Studs Terkel
A more thoroughly man-made city heightens our awareness of choice and responsibility and
requires a political process that is more than simply permissive.
Gerald Suttles, 1990
The Man-Made City
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1
Why Chicago and Why Brownfields
To get to the first LEED Platinum municipal building in the country from the Eisenhower
Expressway in Chicago, you drive north eight blocks on Sacramento Avenue through the neighborhood of
East Garfield Park, past entire blocks of vacant residential, commercial and industrial property. Located
at the western edge of the Kinzie Industrial corridor and the southeast corner of the Humboldt Park
neighborhood is the Chicago Center for Green Technology, a showpiece of the city's environmental
program and a brownfields "success story." In 1995, the City acquired the property from a bankrupt
waste recycling company that had been using the 17-acre site as an illegal dump. They spent $9 million
dollars and 18 months cleaning up the site, clearing hundreds of thousands of tons of debris. The city
rehabbed the small building on the site, creating a demonstration project for green building and
landscaping. Grants from the Department of Housing and Urban Development and the Department of
Energy helped support the redevelopment of the facility. The building has everything a green heart would
desire including charging stations for electric cars, ceiling tiles made from recycled newspapers, a rain
cistern, bioswales, and a green roof. It is home to some of the city's environmental offices, the city's
green jobs training program and public galleries. On the second floor there is a small exhibit about the
Chicago Brownfields Initiative. The irony of this exhibit in this place in particular is that it praises the
innovation of an environmental clean-up and redevelopment program that doesn't look like it has done
much good for the redevelopment of the East Garfield Park or Humboldt Park neighborhoods in which
the Center is located. The Center for Green Technology is a nice project, but it's difficult to know
whether we should see it as a seed of things to come in a disinvested neighborhood, or a $9 million
missed opportunity for a bigger policy and planning response. Does the green dot in the middle of so
many "brownfields" signal the difficulties that the city faces, its lack of vision, or both? We wouldn't
begrudge the City of Chicago the pride of a LEED-Platinum building and an innocent spot of green
boosterism, or would we?
Figure 1.1 The Chicago Center for Green Technology
This thesis concerns "brownfields," a multi-agency and multi-jurisdictional set of government
policies designed to address the clean-up and redevelopment of contaminated surplus land in the United
States since the early 1990s. Brownfields are an important point of study because they have been a
consistent channel for resources and an organizing framework for urban redevelopment policy in the
United States in the last 20 years, a time when there has otherwise been a void of federally-sponsored
urban policy and resources. The questions about the Chicago Center for Green Technology are questions
that could be applied to the entire undertaking of brownfields programming and policy in Chicago: Have
its clean-ups and redevelopment been the seed of more to come or missed opportunities? Has it achieved
a larger economic and environmental impact? Has it been equitable?
Chicago is an important case study for brownfields redevelopment strategies because it is the
third-largest city in America and thought to have one of the nation's best brownfields programs. It is also
a type: a city with an industrial land use history, suburbanization pattern and a particularly ugly brand of
racism and segregation shared by many other Northeast and Midwestern cities. The tools and policies that
are successfully employed and successful in the City of Chicago are relevant to many other cities. This
was the case 15 years ago, as a broad-based civic group came together as the Chicago Brownfields
Forum, and created and implemented a brownfields clean-up program that many other cities watched with
interest. They helped create a regulatory and incentive framework in which public and private entities
might voluntarily clean up and redevelop contaminated sites.
Because Chicago has seen such a high volume of sites remediated and enrolled in the state's
voluntary clean-up program and initiated scores of its own brownfields projects, it presents a rich sample
from which to draw conclusions about the utilization and outcomes of brownfields clean-up processes in a
major city in the United States. Every city can craft a narrative of the brownfields work that has taken
place there, but it is worthwhile to take an independent look at the record of all public and private clean-
ups in the city, something that this data set affords. The data can answer the question of whether clean-up
has occurred in certain areas of Chicago at the expense of others, and if public and private projects have
"cherry-picked" certain brownfields, as many suggest. It can explore what redevelopment outcomes have
occurred on remediated sites, and other characteristics that these sites share. It can help to analyze
whether publicly initiated projects have been systematic or successful at tackling the brownfields
program. It can try to analyze whether the brownfields policy system has put a dent in the "problem" at
all, and where work needs to be improved.
The politics, organization and rhetoric of the city's program are also worth exploring because the
program's size, profile and influence have shrunk in the last few years. Though critical to many "green"
projects such as smart growth, transit-oriented development, greenhouse gas emissions reduction and
green infrastructure, there is no targeted brownfields strategy within the city's planning department. How
did this celebrated brownfields initiative in a famously "green" city recede from view? Was it a
shortcoming in the program's planning stage, its implementation or in its overall framing of the problem?
Is this the natural evolution of brownfields programs, or does it present a real challenge to planning a
more "sustainable" city?
Many recognize that the brownfields "field" is at a crossroads fifteen years into its policies and
programs. Parts of it are working well and others don't work at all. Many agree that "the next challenge
is remediating the most contaminated sites in the most troubled neighborhoods."' Others suggest that a
focus on cities and municipalities is outdated and that the EPA and federal government should grant
greater authority and resources to private non-profits that might have the capacity and focus to undertake
brownfields redevelopment.2 Current staff at the U.S. EPA agree. "Being stuck in the past is a big
problem. What we did twenty years ago doesn't work anymore. We can no longer afford to do that.3"
What can the experience in Chicago teach government, community development practitioners and
environmental advocates as they plan to address new program challenges? Is there a normative
brownfields policy for a city?
Part of this "crossroads" stems from new pressures on cities. In the last several years, climate
change has been seen as a force that will re-shape cities: their transportation networks, their building
construction, their energy sourcing and their waste and storm water flows. This suggests an entirely new
view of a city's land. While Chicago has created a high-profile Climate Action Plan, its implementation
is another matter. The City has not addressed in finer detail how its underutilized and industrial land
might contribute to the goals of its Plan. Given Chicago's attention to the clean-up and redevelopment
through its Brownfields Forum and Initiative in the 1990s, Chicago's underutilized land should be better
integrated now into its Climate Action Plan and other environmental plans. In addition, the current
economic crisis also gives brownfields policies new urgency. A downturn slows all voluntary clean-up
projects4 and inevitably impacts the built environment, (whether through home foreclosures, shopping
center or plant closings) yielding more "brownfields." The Brownfields Forum and Initiative developed
during the economic growth of the 1990s. 5 Was it a policy for all economic climates? The current crisis
1 Howland 2007, 1022 Ducharme, Donna. Telephone interview by author.
3 Orr, Deborah. Telephone interview by author.
4 Worthington, Kimberly, Steve Colantino and Robert Colangelo. Telephone interviews by author.
5 Bennett et al. 2004, 3
presents an opportunity to think about the relationship of the city's economy to its land, what type of
growth the city wants to encourage, and the policy needed to encourage that growth.6
Methodology
This is a mixed method thesis that drew on telephone interviews with 32 public and private-sector
stakeholders in Chicago brownfields policy past and present. Many of these people were chosen because
of their involvement with the Chicago Brownfields Forum, and those people in turn suggested others to
interview. Interviews were open-ended, designed to facilitate discussion of the interviewee's involvement
with the Forum or their understanding of it and the direction that brownfields clean-up in Chicago might
take in the future. Primary documents from the Chicago Brownfields Forum and contemporary
newspaper articles also helped describe the trajectory of Chicago's brownfields policy and programs over
the last fifteen years. Though the Director of Chicago Brownfields Initiative was twice interviewed for
this thesis, the thesis did not access their reports, records or data. If the program is mischaracterized in
any way, it is for lack of more detailed understanding of their work.
This thesis also analyzes data from the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency (IEPA)'s Site
Remediation Program (SRP), to create a portrait of the 1047 brownfields investigations and clean-ups
voluntarily undertaken by the public and private sector in the City of Chicago since 1990. Though hardly
the only brownfields work being done in the region, this study looks only at clean-up and redevelopment
within the limits of the City of Chicago because of the concentration of brownfields sites in the central
city, a single regulatory and political environment, the availability of consistent information about other
variables in the City, and because the City was the initial focus on the program's development. That
being said, a regional approach to brownfields clean-up and redevelopment has great import and the case
of the Chicago metropolitan area warrants further study. Though I have anecdotal information about the
difference between Chicago's efforts and those of other communities in the region, a comparative study is
beyond the scope of this thesis.
6 Giannisis, Demetria. Telephone interview by author.
The SRP was chosen for this study because it is a large and detailed list of public and private
investigations and clean-ups for the City of Chicago. It is publicly available, can be downloaded from the
IEPA's website and is updated frequently. The SRP entries are geo-coded, and so can be compared with
other geospatial data provided by the City of Chicago and area planning agencies. It is important to note
that the SRP list presents significant bias, which the analysis takes into account. It reflects "voluntary"
investigation and clean-up, overrepresents owners or developers who plan to sell or develop the property
and seek the protection of a No Further Remediation Letter to facilitate bank financing or title transfer. It
overrepresents properties where high real estate values have driven redevelopment or reuse. The program
does not likely reveal minimally contaminated but active sites, where continuous industrial or commercial
owners or operators have undertaken capital improvements or clean-up, but for various reasons do not
participate in the state program. The SRP list is not a brownfields inventory; it cannot tell us where the
mothballed properties are and what sites continue to blight their neighborhood. But by analyzing where
clean-ups and redevelopment did occur, it helps to show the accomplishments and shortcomings of
brownfields policy in use in Chicago. The full list was downloaded in March of 2009 from the IEPA.
Records from the City of Chicago were selected and duplicate entries for each IEPA-identification
number were eliminated.7
This thesis uses Chicago's community area designations as units of analysis for SRP data.
Originally created in for the 1930 Census, Chicago's community areas reflected neighborhood history,
local identity, trade area, institutions and natural and artificial barriers.s Almost the same today as they
were in the 1930s, Chicago's 77 Community Areas are aggregations of adjacent census tracts, which
allows them to be used for analytical and planning purposes. To assess and compare Community Areas,
7 Illinois Site Remediation Program Database, http://epadata.epa.state.il.us/land/srp/, (accessed March 10, 2009).
The Site Remediation Program database identifies the status of all voluntary remediation projects administered
through the Pre-Notice Site Cleanup Program (1989 to 1995) and the Site Remediation Program (1996 to the
present).
8 Northeastern Illinois Planning Commission, "Chicago Community Areas."
http://www.nipc.org/images/CCAmap3.pdf (accessed 13 March, 2009).
this thesis relies on data from the 2000 Census, which though now very outdated, is useful for analyzing
brownfields work in Chicago as a midway point between the early 1990s and today.
Other outside GIS data that supported this analysis includes a building footprint file (with limited
attributes) and a parcels shape file, (stripped of any attributes). The analysis also considered the record of
tax reactivation parcels owned by the City of Chicago, 9 the 1990 land use classifications from the
Northern Illinois Planning Commission (now the Chicago Metropolitan Agency for Planning), 10 and the
location of infrastructure and geographic features in the city." Other data that this thesis was unable to
access that would have provided a stronger analysis to describe the "brownfields project" in Chicago
includes current land use zoning maps, more complete building permit data, and tax assessor records for
land parcels throughout the City of Chicago.
This thesis finally relies on early and recent brownfields literature to both give context for the
Chicago case and to suggest a future for the evolving brownfields policy system. It also draws on
existing plans for the City of Chicago and the Chicago metropolitan area to help illustrate new directions
for the program.
Chapter Overview
Chapter 2 clarifies what it means to talk about a local brownfields strategy and provides a short
history of brownfields programs with special attention to terminology and local policy functions and
critique. Chapter 3 presents a detailed history of Chicago's particular programs, focusing on the
pressures and trends that existed in the city at the time it initiated the Brownfields Forum. It also
characterizes the implementation of the Forum's recommendations, and the accomplishments and
shortcomings of the Initiative. Chapter 4 looks at the geographic location of all public and private SRP
9 City of Chicago. Department of Community Development. "City-owned Land Inventory."
http://egov.cityofchicago.org/citv/webportal/portalDeptCategoryAction.do?BV SessionlD=@@@@0305777159.1242836807@ @ @ @&BV En
einelD=ccceadehfleidjcefecelldffhdfif.0&deptCategorvOID=-
536898239&contentTvype=COC EDITORIAL&topChanneName=Dept&entitvName=Planning+And+Development&deptMainCategoryOID=-
536886120, (accessed 1 Apr 2009).
10 MIT Libraries. "MIT Geodata Repository." http://1ibraries.mit.edu/gis/data/repository/about.html (accessed 15
Feb 2009).
1 City of Chicago. Geographic Information Systems. "GIS Data." http://www.citvofchicago.org/gis, (accessed 15
Feb 2009).
brownfields investigations and clean-ups. It also tries to describe how the city's Initiative has undertaken
clean-up, and what it has achieved. It takes a closer look at three areas of the city with different
characteristics, all "outliers" in some way, to examine clean-up patterns and city policy at a finer scale.
Chapter 5 suggests future directions for Chicago's brownfields policy given its past success and failures,
and new pressures and opportunities facing the city's economy. Chapter 6 offers conclusions from this
study and areas for further research.
2
Cities and Brownfields
Though brownfields policy bridges a dizzying set of topics: land use and management, city and
landscape design, real estate development and finance, regional economics, equity and environmental
justice, public-private partnership, engineering, ecology and geology, this thesis evaluates the City of
Chicago's brownfields policies and programs. In order to give background to this case, this chapter will
provide a brief history of federal and state brownfields policy, discuss definitions and categorizations of
brownfields, and situate and assess the role of local government in the brownfields policy system.
Governments of all levels are interested in encouraging and undertaking brownfields clean-up because it
is an area of policy that can produce a wide variety of public goods - public health, environmental
protection, economic development, community preservation, smart growth, climate change, and
environmental justice.
Origins of State and Federal Policy
When we talk about brownfields, sometimes we are talking about a particular site, but often we
mean a portfolio of contaminated surplus land within a particular jurisdiction and the larger forces and
institutions that have created it: changes in industrial land use and transportation patterns, industrial
production shifts, suburbanization, disinvestment and weak environmental laws. In the simplest sense,
there are two components of brownfields, one environmental and one economic. The environmental
concerns any amount or type of contamination in a parcel's structures, soil or groundwater, due to
spillage, leakage or improper disposal of the inputs or waste from manufacturing, transportation, or
storage process carried out on that site. Contamination could also be caused by materials used in
construction or site preparation, or as a result of landfilling or illegal dumping on or near the parcel.
Colton and Skinner argue that the brownfields problem was really created in the latter part of the 20 th
century rather than any other part of industrialized history, given the sophistication and intensification of
chemical usage since the 1940s. 12 (The Hooker Chemical Company started dumping chemical waste at
the site of what would be the Love Canal disaster in 1942). 13 The economic concerns the set of factors
complicating the redevelopment of the land, including site assembly, infrastructure, the strength of the
market in the area, as well as inter-jurisdictional differences in zoning and other land use controls, tax
structure and incentives.
Land redevelopment is central to urban economics, and mature cities build and rebuild on
previously developed land (some more than others, depending on their age, land constraints, laws and
growth rates). However, the true genesis of the brownfields phenomenon in the United States - and the
dominant story for 10-15 years is federal environmental legislation. The effective origin of brownfields
policy is the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA - or
Superfund as it is commonly known), passed by Congress in December of 1980. Before this, state and
federal governments had been engineering strategies to clean up former manufacturing sites and landfills
(many having sat idled and obsolete for decades), since the 1970s. 14 However, the problem took on new
national urgency after infamous discoveries of severe toxic waste sites causing birth defects and illness in
the adjacent white middle class communities such as Love Canal, New York and Times Beach, Missouri
in the late 1970s. A large public outcry spurred federal action in the following years.
CERCLA was an attempt to secure clean-up of such catastrophic and expensive human and
environmental damage by establishing broad liability and financial mechanisms for clean-up. For that
reason it defined potentially responsible parties widely, including past and present owners and operators,
transporters, generators (anyone whose hazardous waste was known to make it into a landfill), lenders
that had been involved with a polluting company, and government entities that had acquired contaminated
property. It established a tax on chemical production that capitalized a Superfund Trust Fund (which
12 Bjelland 2004, 651
13 U.S. EPA (December 20, 1979) U.S. Sues Hooker Chemical at Niagara Falls, NY. Press Release.
http://www.epa.gov/history/topics/lovecanal/02.htm (accessed April 2, 2009).
14 De Sousa 2005, 313
gave the legislation its commonly recognized moniker.) The tax expired in 1995 and the Obama
administration has proposed to reinstate it by 201115. CERCLA also established the National
Contingency Plan (EPA protocol for response to hazardous substance releases) and the National Priorities
List (NPL) - a list of contaminated sites with the severity of Love Canal, which warrant federal attention,
legal action, and resources for clean-up. (The NPL is a list of a several thousand properties that has
changed only slightly over the years. The Lake Calumet Cluster sites were the only area in Cook County
ever proposed for the NPL, though they have never made the list.16) The immediate and far-reaching
legacy of CERCLA, however, was the broad liability scheme: strict, joint, several and retroactive.
CERCLA alarmed a lot of people over the next ten years as a storm of litigation ensued, even the most
lucrative projects were stalled, banks wouldn't lend to projects where land might be contaminated, and
companies had even more incentive to mothball properties. These conditions held no matter the level of
contamination at the site, which in many cases was minimal or undetermined.
Without CERCLA, many agree that there would be no brownfields programs as we know them,
as federal, state and local efforts emerged to mitigate its unintended consequence: a disincentive for
clean-up at less contaminated properties. A considerable literature is dedicated to the evolution of these
processes. Chris De Sousa frames the period between the passage of CERCLA in 1980 and the
Brownfields Act in 2001 in four stages according to a progression of government responses to the costs
and risks associated with brownfields: encounter, shuffling, awareness, acceptance and sharing.17
Congress first attempted reforms to CERCLA in 1986 and efforts at reform continue to this day.
Successful changes to CERCLA have included reducing liability for recyclers and financial institutions
that had made loans to potentially responsible parties in the 1990s, and adding financial incentives for
brownfields projects.18 CERCLA has been a work in progress for nearly thirty years, and is at the very
15 United States, Office of Management and Budget "Terminations, Reductions and Savings,"
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/TRS/, (accessed 8 May 2009).16 U.S. EPA, "National Priorities List Sites in Illinois," http://www.epa.gov/superfund/sites/npl/il.htm, (accessed 30
April, 2009).
17 De Sousa 2008, 20
18 Reisch 2004, CRS 4.
heart of tensions between pursuing financial penalties for pollution and promoting re-use, and pursing
environmental protection in the United States.
Recognizing early on that all contaminated sites were not the same, a variety of policymakers
sought to untangle a subcategory of less contaminated sites from CERCLA, which though not in direct
purview of the legislation, were nonetheless affected by it. Bolstered by the Clinton Administration, the
EPA introduced a Brownfields Action Agenda in 1995 under the authority of CERCLA, to clarify
uncertainties and liability and provide resources for investigation. It did not, however, provide funds for
clean-up. This Brownfields Action Agenda was a national reflection of the experimentation that had been
taking place in states and cities, places that started to notice there were a lot of these sites. Often the
people doing the experimenting were environmental lawyers or "Superfund staff' in state and regional
EPA offices.'19 Illinois was engaged from the very beginning, it was the second state to create a voluntary
clean-up program in 1989. The EPA has always been the primary federal agency shaping brownfields
policy and providing resources. Table 2.1 gives an overview of U.S. EPA-sponsored brownfields
programs over the years.
Table 2.1 U.S. EPA Brownfields and Related Programs 20
Program Dates Description
Pilot Grants Brownfields Action Awarded to 50 cities to investigate brownfields and
Agenda, 1995 plan for clean-up.
Showcase Grants Al Gore's Brownfields Effort to bring together resources of more than 15
National Partnership, federal agencies to address local cleanup and reuse
1997 issues in a more coordinated manner. The
partnership supported "Brownfields Showcase
Communities." 16 were selected in 1998 and 12
more in 2000.
EPA Brownfields Assessment 2002 - Present. Small Provide funding for brownfields inventories,
Pilots/ Grants Business Liability Relief planning, environmental assessments, and
and Brownfields community outreach. Can only be awarded to cities.
Revitalization Act
(SBLR)
Brownfields Job Training 2002 - Present (SBLR) Funding to establish environmental cleanup and
health and safety training programs for residents of
brownfields affected communities who are seeking
new skills and career opportunities. Can be awarded
to cities, non-profits, community colleges or other
19 Orr, Deborah, Joe Dufficy, Jim Van der Kloot. Telephone interviews by author.
20 U.S. EPA "Brownfields and Land Revitalization." Various Pages. http://www.epa.gov/brownfields/ (accessed 6
May 2009).
entities.
Revolving Loan 2002 - Present (SBLR) Funding to for government entities to capitalize
revolving loan funds to make low interest loans to
carry out cleanup activities at brownfields properties.
Clean-up Grants 2002 - Present (SBLR) Funding to carry out cleanup activities at
brownfields. Can be awarded to cities, private
companies or non-profit organizations.
Technical Assistance 2000 Awarded to help community groups understand site-
related information and participate in decision-
making throughout the cleanup of a Superfund site.
Targeted Brownfields Assessments Direct assistance for site-specific assessments to
communities that may not have a brownfields
program in place. Assessment work is conducted by
environmental consultants already under contract
with EPA.
Federal Facilities 2001 Works with other federal and state agencies to
facilitate the cleanup and reuse of the nation's
federal facilities, including Base Realignment and
Closure (BRAC) sites.
Underground Storage Tanks (UST) Legislation first passed in Prevents releases; cleans up leaks in over 600,000
1984 monitored tanks throughout the country.
Today there are a total of 23 federal agencies with policies that affect brownfields.21 Much of the
federal agency cooperation on brownfields began during the Clinton administration. Former HUD
Secretary Henry Cisneros recognized brownfields initiatives as urban redevelopment issues and
introduced a menu of programs in 1996 to support brownfields projects. Then secretaries Cisneros and
Browner of the EPA also signed a Memorandum of Understanding in 1996 for interagency cooperation. 22
Until this year, HUD had made annual Brownfields Economic Development Initiative (BEDI) grants to
cities. For example, in FY2008, HUD made 14 grants that averaged $2 million each.2 3 HUD continues to
make Section 108 Loan Guarantees, which allow cities to dedicate a portion of their community
development block grant as loans, or to guarantee other debt, to undertake large infrastructure projects.
21United States Congress House Committee on Government Reform 2006, 7
22 United States Environmental Protection Agency. "Memorandum of Understanding between the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency and the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development," (accessed 10
April 2009).
23 The Obama Administration's 2010 Budget proposes to cut the BEDI program, because its "purposes
are served through much larger and more flexible federal programs" such as other EPA programs and HUD's CDBG
funds, which are scheduled to be increased. United States. Office of Management and Budget, "Terminations,
Reductions and Savings," www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/TRS/ (accessed 8 May 2009).
HUD has also published brownfields redevelopment manuals for local government. 24 The Department of
Energy has also been interested in brownfields sites; seeing renewable energy, and especially solar energy
generation on brownfields (so-called "brightfields") as something to drive investment in the urban core.25
The Economic Development Agency also funds brownfields projects. Between FY2001-FY2006, they
provided grant assistance to over 200 private-sector-initiated projects throughout the country, averaging
$1.1 million each.26 The Brownfields Remediation Tax Credit administered by the U.S. Treasury, was
enacted in 199727 and is expected to generate $1.74 billion between 2006 and 2015.28
Brownfields programs, first added as an earmark in the federal Superfund budget in 1997, were
finally the subject of their own legislation, the Small Business Liability Relief and Brownfields
Revitalization Act, signed by George W. Bush in 2001. The Act solidified funding for four core
programs and to further clarified additional uncertainties around liability, especially for small purchasers,
as the program's name suggests. Between FY2003 and FY2007, Congress appropriated two thirds or less
of the $250 million authorized for the program each year.29 Any efforts to expand the program must
necessarily revisit first the issue of full funding for the program, and address the pressure for a "polluter
pays" solution to brownfields clean-up when possible. Many are hopeful that the Obama administration
will provide greater leadership for brownfields programs. The administration has appointed brownfields
advocates to executive positions in the EPA, including Mathy Stanislaus, an environmental lawyer and
24 United States Department of Housing and Urban Development "Brownfields Economic Development Initiative."
http://www.hud.gov/offices/cpd/economicdevelopment/programs/bediindex.cfm, (accessed 15 April, 2009).
25United States Department of Energy, (August 1999) "Energy Department Announces National Initiative to
Redevelop Brownfields with Renewable Energy," Press Release. http://epa.gov/brownfields/html-doc/brightfd.htm,
(accessed 15 April, 2009) Chicago was the first city to be the subject of this initiative..
26 United States Department of Commerce, Economic Development Administration. "Brownfields
Redevelopment." http://www.eda.gov/Research/Brownfields.xml, (accessed 15 April, 2009). The EDA funded
projects in Chicago's Back of the Yards Neighborhood.
27 United States Environmental Protection Agency. "Brownfields Tax Incentive."
http://www.epa.gov/swerosps/bf/bftaxinc.htm., (accessed 15 April, 2009).
28 United States Treasury. "Tax Provisions That Expire Through FY 2006 Proposed to be Extended."
http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/reports/tax31605.pdf, (accessed 15 April, 2009).29 United States Congress House Committee on Government Reform 2006, 6
chemical engineer who founded a non-profit to address brownfields in distressed communities of New
York City.30
A 2006 congressional report had a long to-do list for the EPA to improve performance of
brownfields programs: institute outcomes measures for grants, reward high-performing programs through
revolving loan funds, reauthorize and fully fund Brownfields programs, craft a brownfields tax credit (like
Low Income Housing Tax Credits and Historic Tax Credits) and tax-exempt redevelopment bonds to
generate equity for clean-up, clarify liability to get owners to move mothballed properties, expand
categories of eligible hazardous substances (lead and asbestos), make the purchase of environmental
insurance eligible for federal funding, raise the bar for low-performing state programs, and incentivize
more cooperation between the federal agencies that have brownfields programs. 31 These
recommendations, though valid, don't do much to address the fundamental goals and framework for the
program, which are the subject of this thesis.
Despite the strong role played by the U.S. EPA, much of the structure for investigation, liability
and remediation actually comes from the states. Most state environmental agencies have final authority
over clean-up, (which was first established through a Memorandum of Understanding between staff at
Region 5 of the U.S. EPA in Chicago and the Illinois EPA). Though state programs are varied, they have
codified a standard brownfields clean-up process by their regulations, and are the engine that drives the
majority of public and private clean-up processes in cities. Table 2.2 shows a stylized version of the
clean-up process and Chapter 4 will look more closely at the process for Illinois' SRP.
Table 2.2 How to Clean Up a Brownfield
Step Tasks
Phase 1 Environmental Assessment "All appropriate inquiry" assessment. Research
history of site use and current conditions,
outstanding liens, ownership status, tax titles, back
taxes. No site investigation.
Phase 2 Environmental Assessment On site investigation. Soil testing.
Phase 3 Environmental Assessment Depends on future use, site conditions, testing.
State signs off on plan for remediation.
30 New Partners for Community Revitalization. "President Obama Announces Nomination of NPCR Co-Director
Mathy Stanislaus to Key Administration Post." http://www.npcr.net/ (Accessed 1 April 2009).
31 United States Congress House Committee on Government Reform 2006, 46-61.
Remediation Site pollutants are removed, treated and means of
exposure are eliminated as specified in the
Remediation Plan.
Certification State's inspector signs off on clean-up job, issues
remediation applicant a No Further Remediation
Letter, which can be presented to a bank or filed
with deed to the property.
Beyond Environmental Regulations
Many have argued that brownfields policies at all levels of government in the United States are as
much defined by the economic forces acting on cities as by the stringencies of environmental laws; that
they are "the product of the interwoven geographies of industrial disinvestment and environmental
degradation." 32 There is a lot of evidence for this. The 1991 report "New Life for Old Buildings:
Confronting Environmental and Economic Issues to Industrial Reuse," (a call for a federal standardization
of what would become brownfields policy) determined that one of the four factors preventing reuse was
dramatic cuts in federal programs for local economic development in the late 1980s, among them
industrial development bonds and rehabilitation tax credits.33 The interest of multiple federal agencies in
brownfields programs is another indication. Also, brownfields programs started in states that were
dealing with acute industrial change. Statistical studies have found that the first recipients of the EPA's
pilot grants were poorer cities that had experienced economic decline while later applicants tended to
have less distressed economies.34
The pilot cities have significantly higher rates for persons with less than a high school education,
unemployment, employment in retail trade, transportation, and local government, poverty
(persons, families, female heads of households, and elderly), infant death, and serious crime, have
significantly lower rates for population change, manufacturing employment, self-employment and
median household income.35
Though Chicago was not in the very first group of pilot sites, it had been the early focus of federal
attention from the Region 5 Office of the EPA. Chicago's process was directly modeled on one that had
taken place in Cleveland, another Great Lakes city struggling with deindustrialization and
32 Bjelland 2004 636.
33 Bartsch 1991, 7
34 Solitare and Greenburg 2002
35 Ibid., 253-4
suburbanization. Pittsburgh, another city which had also seen its steel plants close up shop, has garnered a
lot of attention for brownfields redevelopment activities starting in the early 1990s. 36 The appeal of the
program to cities is often defined in terms of jobs and tax base and these are the most common success
measures used in evaluating programs. There is also somewhat of a regional subtext; the entity that
created the term "brownfield" and is still one of the fields' biggest advocates is the Northeast Midwest
Institute.37 The director of the National Brownfields Association and federal publications have described
brownfields as concentrated in the Northeast and Midwest where intense industrial development
occurred,38 though brownfields by definition (and especially Superfund sites) are just as often found in
rural and semi-urban areas in all regions of the country, as shuttered mines, landfills and military bases, as
well as sites of former industry.
What's in a Name - Framing the Brownfields Problem
Language and definitions are an important part of articulating the brownfields problem and
attendant policy solutions. The term "brownfield" came into use in the early 1990s, after the Northeast
Midwest Institute's Charles Bartsch reportedly used it at a 1992 conference. 39 In 1995, the EPA adopted
the definition of brownfields that they still use: "Brownfields are real property, the expansion,
redevelopment, or reuse of which may be complicated by the presence or potential presence of a
hazardous substance, pollutant, or contaminant."40 Only sites that meet this definition and criteria are
eligible for EPA brownfields funding. The 2002 legislation further defined brownfields to include sites
"contaminated by a controlled substance; contaminated by petroleum or a petroleum product excluded
from the definition of 'hazardous substance' or mine-scarred land."41 The former federal Office of
36 Hollander 2009, 118
37 Rafson 1999, 107. The Northeast Midwest Institute is primarily a lobbying group for the 18 states that make up
this region.
38Colangelo, Telephone interview with the author. United States Office of Technology Assessment, 1995, 4
39 Paull, Evans, Telephone interview by the author.
40 40 United States Environmental Protection Agency "Brownfields and Land Revitalization."
http://www.epa.gov/brownfields/ (accessed 6 May 2009).
41United States Environmental Protection Agency "EPA Targeted Brownfields Assessments-The Basics"
http://www.epa.gov/brownfields/facts/tba 0403.pdf, (accessed 15 April 2009).
Technology Assessment recognized an alternative definition that encompassed more than the
contamination: "Brownfields may also have redevelopment problems due to, for instance, poor location,
old and obsolete infrastructure, and other less tangible factors often associated with neighborhood
decline."42 The official definition is critiqued by others:
The legal definition of brownfields neglects to ask why the property needs redevelopment or
reuse in the first place. In short, it fails to consider the economic geographical context, that is, the
dynamics of urban growth and decline, industrial investment and disinvestment.43
Still, every discussion or study involving brownfields is still framed by these or another careful definition.
A brownfield is meant to evoke its inverse, a greenfield. The idea of brownfield development is
often framed as an alternative to exurban development on agricultural land, or "greenfields."
("Greyfields," too, are shuttered shopping malls or commercial strips.) Brownfields have long been
placed within the rhetoric and set of policies related to smart growth.44 The 1995 Chicago document had
this message: "The challenge is not to stop development but rather to harness its power. Development in
the right location and form is the key to healing the regional environment and enhancing the welfare of
the region's people."45 Much of brownfields policy (and private industrial development.46) has focused
on the complex and improbable task of making brownfields competitive with greenfields as development
sites. If policy and subsidy could just level the playing the field, development would flow back into the
city. Many describe the Chicago Initiative as doing just that.47 Brownfields as a "corrective lens" for
sprawl has been both evaluated (as tool for achieving smart growth, as an economic multiplier, and the
neighborhood and air quality impacts of the two types of development)48 and deemed a myth.49 As
discussed below, brownfields tools do exist within a legitimate set of tools for regional growth
management.
42 Office of Technology Assessment, 1995, 1
43 Bjelland 2004, 634
44 Frece 2008
45 City of Chicago 1995, 12
46 Reynolds, Fred. Telephone interview by author.
47 Characterized in De Sousa 2008, 98
48 Greenburg 2001; Persky and Wiewel 2000; United States Environmental Protection Agency. "Comparing
Methodologies to Assess Transportation and Air Quality Impacts of Brownfields and Infill Development"
http://www.epa.gov/dced/pdf/comparing_methodologies.pdf (accessed 23 March 2009).
49 Alberini et al. 2004, 9-10
Brownfields are also meant to suggest that redevelopment is possible. Joe Dufficy describes the
brownfields term as having the deliberate connotation of expected redevelopment.
People knew that when you used the word brownfield, you were adding an idea, a market
construct. It was something that public money could turn around; there was analysis to support
the gap. These were properties that had some potential.5 °
It is still hard to resist the intuitive of appeal of the term; brownfields are imbued and discussed
with very attractive virtues of recycling and making things new. The subtitle of the Chicago Brownfields
Forum's report was "Recycling Land for Chicago's Future," and many brownfields volumes and studies
have used the word "recycling" in their titles, another idea to achieve civic stature in the 1990s.
("Recycling isn't about cans and bottles," said the 1995 Chicago document, "It's a concept that applies
equally well to land."' '51) Artist Frances Whitehead, who is working with the Chicago Initiative, describes
brownfields as "redemptive." She says that "brownfields work is about revaluing something that others
view as spoiled." 52 Brownfields is a uniquely American term, but redeveloping contaminated land is
obviously not only an American phenomenon. European countries, for example, have a rich policy and
professional infrastructure dedicated to environmental remediation and redevelopment, often reinforced
by more aggressive public land control and objectives for redevelopment (and scarcer land.) Great
Britain set a goal that 60% of its new housing units should be built on "previously developed land." 53
As real estate deals, brownfields are difficult. Table 2.3 shows any number of reasons why
involvement with a brownfield might lower a developer's rate of return. As discussed below, most
policy has been designed to eliminate or lessen these challenges.
Table 2.3 Private Sector Challenges Associated with Brownfields Redevelopment (De Sousa 2008)54
Moderate-Severe Obstacles
Liability concerns
High remediation costs
Slow regulatory review process
Complex municipal land use policies
50 Dufficy, Joe. Telephone interview by author.
51 City of Chicago 1995, 12
52 Whitehead, Frances. Telephone interview by author.
53 Syms 2004, 11
54 De Sousa 31
Moderate Obstacles
Stringent remediation requirements
Uncertainty related to site-specific risk
Lack of government incentives
Obtaining project financing
Lack of knowledge/negative attitude on part of public
Lack of knowledge/negative attitude on part of
stakeholders
Low-Moderate Obstacles
More contamination that expected
Potential impacts to adjacent properties
High cost of insurance
Lack of information about history of sites
Lack of remediation or disposal options
Many academics and policymakers have attempted to establish brownfields typologies in order to
articulate such a large and amorphous concept. Wright and Davlin designated brownfields as Tier I, II or
III sites based on the viability of redevelopment. 55 Tier I brownfields are often large sites in strong real
estate markets and locations (along well-trafficked commercial corridors or in competitive industrial
areas), with limited contamination, or an amount which is compensated by project revenues. Clean-up
costs are less than the land value. Some have observed that the majority of brownfields "success stories"
are drawn from this category, that they constitute the market-driven low-hanging fruit, that they have
been "creamed." 56 Tier II and Tier III sites, by contrast, have more contamination, and have a difficult
size and few locational advantages. Tier III sites are the least attractive real estate. These are the upside-
down sites where the cost of remediation or demolition is far more than the value of a redeveloped site.
Simple urban economics operate at the site level: if the value of the redeveloped property with demolition
and clean-up does not exceed the value of the current property, even with modest subsidy, redevelopment
will not occur. As Tier I-III classification suggests, all sites exist along a continuum of marketability and
severity of contamination. 57 Marie Howland sets out a three-dimensional continuum of future use (which
55 Cited Greenburg 2000, 718 and in Gardner 2004, 141-143. This is not to be confused with the "Tiered approach to
corrective action" (TACO) whose "Tiers" designate the level of clean-up according to future use and levels of
contamination.
56 Greenburg et al. 2000 718-9 and Gardner 2004, 141
57 Bjelland 2004 636
often determines the manner and level of clean-up needed), alongside market demand and level of
contamination.
Other classifications hinge on the metropolitan location of brownfields, the processes that led to
their formation and the policies that are likely to govern their clean-up and redevelopment. In his study of
the Minneapolis-St. Paul metropolitan area, geographer Mark Bjelland classifies the "uneven geography"
of metropolitan brownfields in three ways, as Superfund sites, voluntary clean-up sites or sites of
economic distress. 9 Given that their severity of contamination might be a more recent phenomenon,
Superfund sites are rarely located in central cities, but more often in first ring suburbs, which were once
the edge of town. The second category, sites enrolled in the state's voluntary clean-up program, are
overwhelmingly located in the core cities and disproportionately concentrated along historic rail
corridors. (Chapter 4's study of Chicago largely concerns sites in this category.) Bjelland's final
category of "distressed tax forfeiture sites" aren't easy to measure, they don't show up on the voluntary
lists because they have not been cleaned up or entered into state records, but they are no less brownfields.
He found that tax-forfeited brownfields were 33 times as dense in the center city as in the rest of the
region.
Simply classifying brownfields by land use is helpful. Commercial, industrial, open space and
residential sites have very different standards for clean-up, and their own complicating factors.
Commercial and residential sites in poor neighborhoods are likely to have more negative externalities to
overcome than industrial sites in the same areas. 60 Brownfields funding and clean-up processes may be
more heavily used in areas of a city seeing changes in land use or undergoing transition from industrial to
residential, mixed use or recreational uses. The significant brownfields activity in the Near North, Near
South and Near West Side community areas in formerly industrial areas around the Chicago Loop are
examples of this.
58 Howland 2003, 369
59 Bjelland 2004, 643-658
60 Howland 2007, 97
Another useful categorization of brownfields focuses on corporate or public ownership. Despite
some loosening of CERCLA liability, many companies still mothball properties because if they were to
sell or redevelop such properties, they would be held accountable for expensive clean-up. Corporate
owners find it cheaper to pay taxes, keep up fences, and pay a guard. Many policymakers find these to be
the most high-impact and frustrating properties to deal with, without a policy mechanism that allows local
entities to "intervene with land being held hostage because of fear of future liability." 61 Many brownfields
likely fall into this category, "fully depreciated, non-operating and not publicly disclosed by their
corporate owner."62 Public ownership constitutes another category of interest. Cities have often acquired
brownfields through tax foreclosure. These Tier III sites fall into Bjelland's "extremes of economic
distress: tax-forfeited contaminated sites" category. 63 Whether or not cities or counties have an active land
banking policy, they are often found to be the owners of contaminated sites - and responsible for their
clean-up. Chicago continues to struggle with liability for clean-up and lack of resources to address it.64
Some have proposed a brownfields policy that hinges on ownership constraints.65
Another classification for brownfields used by researchers at National Center for Neighborhood
and Brownfields Redevelopment at Rutgers University is what they refer to as "temporarily obsolete,
abandoned or derelict sites" (TOADS.) TOADs are Tier III brownfields or "sites of distress" and defined
by their consequences:
"Contaminated buildings and land that can ruin the surrounding neighborhood by polluting the
local environment, by giving the impression to businesses and residents that the local
environment is dangerous, and by not being secured so that illegal activities occur on the site and
in other ways stigmatize the neighborhood so that no one wants to invest in it, and those who live
or work in it want to leave it." 66
They also are concentrated in certain types of places. A survey of New Jersey tax assessors found that:
61 Greenburg 2000, 730
62 Mueller 2005, 84
63 Bjelland, 646
64 Mueller 2005, 81 and Kimberly Worthington, Telephone interview by the author.
65 Adams et al. 2001
66 Greenburg 2000, 719
The 15 municipalities with the most severe TOADS have the poorest populations, the least
expensive housing, and the lowest proportion of white residents. They also are the jurisdictions
with the most residents (average 46,000).67
TOADs also suggest a necessarily link between brownfields policy and larger discourses and policy for
vacant land.68
Other definitions from the tradition of landscape design are also apt. Much has been written
about re-imagining vacant properties as greenspace and the meaning of "vacant lots" for the people that
use and experience these spaces. 69 Alan Berger's "drossscape" project is largely a redefining of
brownfields for designers and positioning of these types of "landscapes" with a broader design project
that includes decontamination. 70
Theories and definitions matter for brownfields, because they help measure the problem. Many
cities' discussion of their brownfields programs begins with some attempt at quantification of their
brownfields. Most generally refer to the EPA' s oft-cited (and fairly imprecise) estimate that there are
somewhere between half a million and a million brownfields in the United States.71 The scope of the
problem - different in every city -hinges on definitions. The United States Conference of Mayors,
which conducts a highly variable biennial survey of cities about brownfields, found in 2008 that of the
209 cities that responded, 188 estimated that they had a total of more than 24,896 brownfields sites, with
the average size of a brownfield site being 13.92 acres. All told, 176 cities estimated that they had 83,949
acres of brownfields. More than 150 cities also estimated 3,282 sites have been "mothballed." 72
Definitions and problem scale shape not only political support, but also shape the inventory, which
informs the creation and evaluation of city policy, which we will see complicates the Chicago case.
Brownfields projects are often what we recognize as other things - riverfront redevelopment, new
planned communities like Atlantic Station in Atlanta or urban CVS stores at the site of former gas
67 Ibid., 723
68 Bowman and Pagano 200, 561
69 Ibid.
70 Berger 2006
71 Meyers and Lyons 2000, 46 cite Bartsch et al. 1991; Edelsteinl988 with the 400,000 to 600,000 estimate, and
Simons 1998 with the estimate of over 1 million sites.72 U.S. Conference of Mayors 2008, 11
stations. Chicago's celebrated Millennium Park, (IEPAID: 0316325436, Remediation Agent: City of
Chicago, Department of Environment) might be the city's biggest "brownfield" redevelopment, the $475
million project capped and built over underutilized train yards and parking lots. If brownfields
encompasses so many ideas - and such a diverse set of sites that might not have much in common (for
instance, a former steel mill and a dry cleaners) other than needing to be cleaned up, it might be
counterproductive to use the term. It is at least imperative to define brownfields precisely (as many have
already done: TOADS, Tier I-III, and drossscape) according to the task, the economy or the jurisdiction.
It is important that the term brownfields be carefully used, especially when describing areas where there
are extremes of environmental contamination and disinvestment. Any policy should qualify
"brownfields" with more precise language should also reframe the program so expectations appropriate to
the type of site are articulated.
Function of Local Government Brownfields Policy
Despite the fact that federal and state governments give shape to brownfields policy and
programming through seed funding, technical support and liability relief, and despite the extent to which
the private sector operates in brownfields projects, it is local government that is the most invested in the
success of brownfields programs. They have the most to gain: redevelopment can improve the image and
economy of their community, and increase revenues in the form of property and sales taxes. Local
government is most accountable to the public, and tends to have the most money on the line, contributing
the largest amount of public subsidy to projects though either Tax Increment Financing (TIF), bonds or
tax abatement. 73F They have "invested" in brownfields projects at an equal or higher level than state or
federal government programs. Based on a survey of 121 brownfields projects in 52 Illinois cities, the
Illinois Institute for Rural Affairs found that for the largest projects, the average ratio per project of local
to state to federal contribution was roughly: 10 : 1 : 2. For the medium-sized projects it was 2 : 1: 2.5.7 4
An early survey of brownfields projects by the Council for Urban Economic Development found a total
73 De Sousa 2005, 314 and Kirshenberg 1997
74 Walzer et al. 2004, 25-6
ratio among all public contribution for 107 projects to be 4.6 : 3.3 : 1.75 Local government is most often
city government, but successful brownfields strategies have taken place at the county or regional level or
in the hands of another redevelopment authority. Many have credited the success of brownfields policy to
the high degree of cooperation between different levels of government.
The object of U.S. EPA's 1995 Brownfields Action Agenda was cities, and the city continues to
be the unit of focus for the primary federal brownfields programs. The US EPA has now made 1,450
government entities (cities, towns, regional councils, public authorities, states and tribes) to undertake
brownfields assessments. 76 The four core brownfields programs administered by the U.S. EPA primarily
target local government; though non-profit entities may apply for clean-up grants.77F Deborah Orr, who
organizes technical assistance for municipalities on brownfields projects in Region 5, describes the
brownfields project to local governments in this way:
We say to cities: Here's another responsibility you have. The federal government offers grants to
get you started, the state helps you make decisions through its voluntary clean-up programs. You,
then, as a municipality need to start to nurturing your land, so that it becomes a way of doing
business. F78F
Steve Colantino with the Illinois EPA discusses how the towns and cities across the state come to work
on brownfields:
Communities along natural waterways want to regain their waterfront, so must deal with existing
industry or its legacy, what they used to turn their back on. There are cities dealing with
expansion where that small plant on the edge of town is now in the middle of town. There is
every scenario imaginable, some are proactive, and some not. Some are moved by the
environmental fears, and others, the economic blight staring them in the face. In others it is the
little old lady that lives next to the abandoned gas station that keeps calling the Mayor to do
something about it.79F
City government interest in brownfields is perhaps best symbolized by the U.S. Conference of
Mayors (USCM), which made brownfields one of its signature policy areas in 1998 (under the then-
leadership of Chicago's Mayor Daley), and has dedicated staff and attention to it for over ten years, with
75 Council for Urban Economic Development 1999, 3.
76 United States Environmental Protection Agency, "About Brownfields and Land Revitalization."
http://epa.aov/brownfields/, (accessed on 6 Apr 2009).
77 Ibid.
78 Orr, Deborah. Telephone Interview by author.
79 Colantino, Steve. Telephone Interview by author.
brownfields still one of its nine program foci. In addition to advocacy, the USCM has performed a
research and information function, conducting biennial surveys about brownfields inventories and helping
cities define and articulate their needs for brownfields program implementation. Similarly, the
International City/County Management Association has published a series of brownfields guides and co-
sponsors an annual brownfields conference with the U.S. EPA. Countless academics and think-tanks
have published articles, white papers, manuals and publications aimed at defining and improving local
brownfields policy. The following discussion reviews some of the roles that a city government might
undertake in brownfields policy and the tools at their disposal.
Program Planning - The U.S. EPA gives planning a central role for cities in brownfields policy
by making assessments grants its primary tool. The U.S. EPA only makes these grants to cities, which
many brownfields advocates see as a problem. 80 The inventory process that these grants are supposed to
facilitate is necessarily shaped by politics, everything from the parties involved to the processes and
information systems used, to the properties that ultimately make a list. The inventory also shapes the
policy and strategy that the city operates within.8 ' Planning functions can also include generating
stakeholder support, setting policy, establishing and maintaining data, and creating an overall marketable
community.82F A planning role might also include a role for ensuring equity and environmental justice,
classifying and prioritizing sites, and fashioning job training programs for environmental clean-up.
Another important part of planning is setting benchmarks and criteria for a city's own policy,
something that is less common, but that brownfields scholars like Chris De Sousa have advocated.83 Table
2.4 illustrates how public and private stakeholders have ranked outcomes measures in De Sousa's
surveys, with both giving greatest weight to economic measures.
80 Ducharme, Donna. Telephone interview by author.
81 Leurig 2007
82 Rafson 1999, 53
83 De Sousa, 43
Table 2.4 Public and Private Stakeholder Evaluation of Potential Brownfield
Performance/Outcome Measures. (De Sousa 2008) 84
Performance/Outcome Measure Average
Economic factors Overall Public Private
Increases the local property tax base 4.0 4.0 4.0
Influences local property values 3.6 3.8 3.3
Public costs per private redevelpoment dollars leveraged 3.4 3.4 3.4
Influences local economic activity and income 3.3 3.5 3.5
Land acres or building area developed 3.1 3.2 3.0
Number of jobs created/retained 3.0 3.0 2.9
Contributes to local business 2.9 2.9 2.9
Number of "living wage" jobs created 2.9 2.9 2.8
Public costs per job created 2.8 2.8 2,9
Impacts on local unemployment 2.7 2.9 2,9
Puts a new business on the site 2.5 3.0 1.9
Draws on local enterprises for inputs 2.4 2.6 2.6
Environment
Reduces risks posed by contaminants 3.6 3.6 3.7
Enhances the aesthetic image of the local community 3.3 3.6 2.9
Improves regional environmental conditions by min. greenfield development 2.9 3.1 2.5
Prevents pollution and reduces waste 2.8 2.6 3.0
Provides infrastructure for public transit, walking and cycling 2.7 2.6 2.9
Supports ecosystem functions 2.7 2.7 2.6
Makes polluters pay for remediation costs 2.7 2.7 2.6
Protects/preserves biodiveristy 2.6 2.5 2.8
Is energy efficient 2.4 2.2 2.7
Involves "green" building features (renewable/recycled materials) 2.4 2.3 2.4
Raises densities in comparison to typical development 2.3 2.2 2.4
Social and Community
Allows for some level of local control over the project 3.1 2.8 3.4
Enhances quality of life 3.1 3.2 2.9
Improves the conditions of low-income population 2.8 2.8 2.9
Fosters community cohesion 2.8 3.0 2.6
Strengthens community capacity 2.8 2.7 2.9
Physically conforms to community desires 2.7 3.1 2.3
Involves coordination among multiple stakeholders 2.5 2.5 2.6
Involves an open consultation process 2.5 2.5 2.6
Permits equitable access to housing or employment 2.4 2.6 2.1
Considers a regional impact 2.4 2.3 2.5
Reduces local crime rate 2.3 2.3 2.4
Provides an opportunity for training 2.0 1.7 2.5
Involves a mixture of land uses 2.0 2.2 1.8
Ascertaining the right benefits to measure is tricky. Marie Howland observes about brownfields
programs, that "the most interesting questions and long term outcomes are the most difficult to model."85
This is part of the reason cities default to popular and accessible measures of jobs and property taxes.
84 De Sousa 2008, 43-4.
85 Howland, 97
Bacot and O'Dell recommend the U.S. EPA facilitate standardized reporting across cities and states
around indicators such as property size, tax relief, end use, return on investment, amount of public and
private investment and soil or groundwater contamination.86
Land Use Controls -Brownfields redevelopment is shaped by a city's land use policy. Any land
use policy or plan necessarily applies to brownfields. This includes the flexibility and coherence of a
city's zoning code, its processes of planned development review, its powers of land acquisition, tax
foreclosures or eminent domain, and its ability to hold land in trust or for future development. Many
mention the City of Chicago's 1997 ordinance prohibiting the drilling of wells and consumption of
groundwater within the limits of Chicago (a recommendation of the Brownfields Forum) as having
brought about more clean-up than any other financial or regulatory incentives combined. Following this
ordinance, clean-up only had to address contamination in the soil, not the more complex calculations and
extensive clean-up addressing groundwater contamination.8 7 While the environmental costs of this
decision might be questionable, it lowered the threshold for and cost of clean-up throughout the city.
Owner & Developer of Last Resort - Much of brownfields policy has focused on city ownership
and clean-up of properties, because a municipality was thought to be safer from liability exposure under
CERCLA, would have access to lower cost debt financing, and could achieve lower project returns.
Chicago has pursued clean-up and development of several dozen properties in this manner. Many have
noted that this function is less important to the private sector than originally thought. Empirical results
are ambiguous, it may be easier to attract developers if a site has been publicly owned, but public transfer
brings with it stipulations about the project, bidding, labor or use requirements as well as time delays and
loss of control that the private sector may seek to avoid.88 (Cities have not been immune from liability;
Chicago has delayed tax reactivation acquisition of certain properties because the Department of Justice
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started enforcing liability against municipalities. 89) A public authority or a non-profit remains the most
viable developer for open space projects.
Finance - The same studies of private developer preferences have found much stronger support
for some form of public subsidy to support private brownfields projects, though preferences vary with
developer size and experience. 9° Evans Paull, who directs brownfields lobbying for the Northeast-
Midwest Institute, explains that it is local financing, from large sources such as TIF Districts and bond
financing, that makes brownfields projects possible, though TIF works best when vertical development is
committed, closing a gap of up to 50-80% of a committed project's financing. 91 Financing brownfields is
often a matter of repacking and expanding the uses of conventional city development funding pots, or
finding "new missions for old workhorses."92 These may include TIF funding, community development
block grants (through HUD's Section 108 loan guarantee), general obligation bonds, local surcharges or
settlements from environmental litigation. Cities also have the authority to set up state and federal
incentive districts such as enterprise and empowerment zones that offer a variety of financial incentives.
Cities can also establish more innovative financial tools, such as linked deposit programs with banks, and
public shared risk financing pools. They can also offer property tax deductions for brownfields: the City
of Chicago and Cook County cut their industrial and commercial property tax rates by more than half for
redeveloped brownfields.
Local Capacity & Technical Assistance - Local capacity is tied to the functions discussed above -
identifying sites for an inventory, crafting effective financing, expediting permitting and brokering or
completing development - and such functions are critical to achieving brownfields redevelopment. 93 The
ability to compete for funding, market brownfields properties and connect brownfields to other planning
and development efforts takes savvy, connected and proactive staff.94F Staff also need to be
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knowledgeable about how to handle deep-seated economic development challenges, to repair lack of
trust, communication and organization among parties.95 Many have also noted that those cities that most
need to undertake brownfields clean-up have the least amount of local capacity to undertake
comprehensive economic development planning.96
Policies for Controlling Metropolitan Growth - As discussed above, brownfields have always
been framed within the context of combating suburban sprawl, perhaps without as much critical
assessment as needed. Effective redevelopment and environmental clean-up processes helps all cities in
a region to grow sustainably together. As part of a region, a city must know its brownfields inventory
and be able to communicate its opportunities and challenges with the rest of the metropolitan area. A
good example of this is the Chicago Metropolitan Agency for Planning's brownfields planning for its
regional 2040 Plan. The agency offers technical assistance and information to take hundreds of
communities in its 6-county metropolitan area Chicago metropolitan area through the brownfields
inventory and planning process as part of their overall community master planning. 97
Evaluation and Critique of Local Brownfields Policy
Many note that the brownfields literature related to local policy has been notably uncritical:
focusing on enthusiastic case studies at the expense of social science research about returns on public
investment, critical evaluations of public role, geography, market analysis, outcomes measures, and
theory.98 Brownfields literature has come up short in determining success measures. The EPA even
found that its own outcomes measures emphasized economic development over the public health and
environmental protection concerns central to the agency. 99 This isn't to say that there hasn't empirical
work on policy. Many studies have tried to establish the public benefit generated by brownfields: the
extent to which brownfields policy reduces risk, preserves habitat, raises property values, creates jobs,
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restores the tax base, improves community perceptions, and reduces crime. There has been a significant
literature critiquing the assumptions and shortcomings of brownfields policy. Discussed below are some
of the primary lines of critique for local brownfields policy, many of which are interrelated.
Competing Goals - A commonly cited observation about brownfields policy is Linda McCarthy's
theory that it promotes "dual land use" expectations for the public sector.1" The first set of expectations
center on raising returns and reducing barriers to development for the private sector, whether liability,
property transfer, site control and title problems, bureaucratic delays, uncertain clean-up standards,
availability of funding, complicated regulatory schemes. Many of the federal, state and local strategies
described above are meant to address such barriers, and continue to innovate toward this end. 10' The
second expectation concerns a larger bundle of public goals: "wider community efforts to achieve
environmental and health protection, improved public safety, targeted jobs and training, central city
revitalization and reduced suburban sprawl," which requires longer time horizons, patient demand-side
work, sustainability planning, and meaningful community participation. 10 2F The tension between making
brownfields redevelopment easier for private developers versus protecting the environment and public
health, as well as tackling larger structural issues often leads to trade-offs, and many cities focus on the
former at the expense of the latter.
Not Poverty Policy - While brownfields may be found in distressed communities, simply
cleaning them up is not going to reverse the fortunes of those living around them, will not necessarily
provide them with better opportunities and jobs. According to Marie Howland,
Although there is no question that contaminated properties sustain the patterns of poverty that
plague disadvantaged people, brownfields redevelopment is not a rescue program for
disadvantaged individuals as purported. Brownfield redevelopment is about what makes financial
sense.103
This is ironic, because much of brownfields rhetoric has focused on "putting jobs back" and
meeting the needs of those who live in brownfields communities. While not an elegant restoration of
100 McCarthy 2002
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economic opportunity that some might imagine, the U.S. EPA's Job Training Grants have attempted to
train low income and low skilled workers for the jobs that brownfields clean-up generates, and capture a
small amount of economic gain for poor communities. This is not to say that brownfields clean-ups
cannot reverse disinvestment in poor neighborhoods, improving public health and quality of life, and may
in some way reverse the flow of wealth and resources back into these places. Brownfields are still a
means of sharpening an environmental justice and community empowerment focus:
How can vulnerable or distressed populations, those who often have the fewest tool and skills to
make brownfields redevelopment work [achieve clean-up] and keep the benefits of regeneration
in their communities? Do brownfields programs empower communities to address their
environmental and economic stresses? 104
This thesis suggests that an environmental justice and equity objective must be embedded in a local
government's brownfields policy. The Chicago Brownfields Forum listed this as one of its principles as
well.
Tools Need Work - Many evaluations focus on the improvement of existing brownfields
programs and aim to remove the barriers to redevelopment that McCarthy describes. For instance, many
clean-up projects don't have the start-up capital to undertake predevelopment environmental testing and
remediation to satisfy lending requirements. Public subsidy is inadequate, inefficient or
counterproductive; 05 and clean-up expenses, including assessment; remediation and demolition are
sometimes half the project costs. Some suggest new financing tools to fill project gaps, such as selling
securitized shares of brownfields investments that shield investors from liability' 6 or putting a lucrative
publicly-owned site out to bid with a fairly unattractive one.' 07 Remediation techniques continue to
become more sophisticated and find new ways of containing, cleaning or re-using contaminated soil.
These innovations fuel the brownfields trade literature and conferences.
No policy or priority for difficult sites - As mentioned above, there is strong pressure for public
brownfields programs to focus on sites where the market is strong and contamination is limited (so-called
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107 Worthington, Kimberly, Telephone interview by author.
Tier I sites) where only small public subsidy is needed to catalyze redevelopment at the site and the
surrounding area.108 These sites provide the "the unique opportunity to solve multiple problems
concurrently and to offer a lot of benefit for minimal public investment."' 09 A lot of people were sold on
the idea that change would come cheap if CERCLA' s cloud of liability and uncertainty could be lifted.
U.S. EPA pilot projects often put forward their most viable sites in inventories and built programs around
them."10 Those who organized Chicago's pilot certainly admit to this, if they were merely trying to prove
that these sites could be redeveloped. They took care find the most viable properties. "We're shooting for
quick turnarounds," the Chicago Sun-Times quoted Department of Environment Commissioner Henry
Henderson as saying, "We're asking: How do we make investments within a community that have an
immediate effect with new jobs?""11' In this way, one might also argue for a Tier I policy that favors sites
in strong markets, to leverage the most benefit and private contribution for the use of taxpayer dollars.
On the other hand, one might argue that Tier III sites should be a priority for public policy and
investment, to correct market failures and stanch the negative externalities associated with blighted and
shuttered sites, often when surrounding neighborhoods are poor and experiencing other forms of
disinvestment. 112 To pursue a policy around Tier I sites at the expense of a Tier III policy, and "poses
serious public policy issues," says Nancy Green Leigh.
It serves to widen the inequality between the most depressed neighborhoods where the low-to-no
market value properties are most likely to be found, and the neighborhoods experiencing
revitalization and brownfields clean-up. 113
Local brownfields policy is left to resolve this tension. Certain factors shape it, as Marie Howland
describes:
Generous public funding and creativity can make this trade-off less complicated, but scarce public
dollars and the political need to show job creation results often lead planners and policy makers to
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decide to clean less contaminated sites in areas with more redevelopment potential. 1 4
As discussed in Chapter 3, the Chicago Forum's principles reinforced both a Tier I and a Tier III policy,
and the Initiative pursued implementation of both in a rather undifferentiated way. Kimberly
Worthington relates that even recently, the former Department of Planning and Development effectively
dictated that the Department of Environment pursue a Tier I policy, by requiring any projects seeking
funding to specify an end use and quantifiable benefit in jobs or tax dollars. Region 5 EPA staff sees a
hole here:
It's frightening that there is no national program to deal with weak-market sites. There are no
programs; everything is designed for future transactions. No one's coming to those sites, and
what is the EPA doing? Nothing.1 15
Sites Can't Be Addressed In Isolation -Local Brownfields policy that focuses only on site clean-
up and redevelopment without considering surrounding areas is counterproductive. 116 Contamination,
which is a barrier at the site level, is an overstated barrier: studies find appropriate price discounts on
contaminated parcels. 117 Contamination is eclipsed by more serious concerns that come from the area
around the site.
Possible positive and negative spillovers from redevelopment of a property beyond that
property's boundaries and such larger neighborhood issues such as poor infrastructure, crime,
poverty and failing schools typically remain secondary concerns in brownfields discussions. 1 8
Beyond this, chances are if there is one brownfield on a block in a large city, there's another one nearby.
The U.S. EPA funds area-wide pilots for brownfields assessments and clean-up, though these are not
promoted heavily through their core grant programs. Studies have found that such an area-wide strategy
makes projects more financially attractive, creates a market for new uses, creates an economy of scale for
infrastructure improvements, clean-up contracts or environmental insurance and creates a integrated
planning framework that takes advantage of the opportunities provided by brownfields. 119 As with
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changing area demand, some suggest that brownfields strategies be coupled with area-wide investments,
such as transportation improvements. 120 Because it tried to leverage TIF districts to make infrastructure
improvements in areas around brownfields, City of Chicago had somewhat of an area-wide strategy early
on. But to focus on infrastructure isn't enough. Fred Reynolds, vice president at a Chicago real estate
firm that works with brownfields, observes that instead of the city pumping money into the clean-up and
improvement of brownfields in distressed neighborhoods. They would be better off pumping "off-site"
money into the neighborhood, improving housing stock, infrastructure, quality of life and the "business
climate" and only then would industrial redevelopers follow. 121
Brownfields experts like Robert Colangelo of the National Brownfields Association, Evans Paull
of the Northeast Midwest Institute and Christopher De Sousa of the University of Wisconsin -Milwaukee
and Susan Kaplan of the Universtiy of Illinois Chicago all cite a promising future for sustainble green
development on brownfields, to "raise the bar" and build better quality projects.F'22 F As with the
Chicago Center for Green Technology, to focus on green building alone assumes that sites are attractive
for redevelopment at all and misses a larger sustainbility discussion about land use and redevelopment in
the area around them.
New Uses & New Demand - Some "new demand" shifts arise naturally, as industry has receded
from the central city, and downtown riverfronts and historic warehouses have been redeveloped for
residential, commercial or recreational uses. But this demand does not follow in all places. Related to an
area-wide strategy, most acknowledge that weak market demand complicates many brownfields, and
negates the effects of subsidies. This view takes into account Bjelland's and others'argument that the
forces that created brownfields were shifting metropolitan and regional economies, and a lack of new
demand for land. Lavea Brachman suggests, too, that there is a "brownfields glass ceiling" for cities, that
a city will never tackle all of the brownfields it has. Demand just will not meet supply. 123 Chicago (to say
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nothing of Gary or Cleveland) has thousands of empty residential and industrial acres that it can't begin to
redevelop or manage. A focus on new sources of demand and land use is important for this reason.
Following the work done by Bill Richardson as Secretary of Energy, a policy discussion has developed
about the use of brownfields for renewable energy, as the use requires minimal clean-up and is not as
much driven by the usual real estate market considerations. 124 While wind and solar generation may be
more efficient at larger rural brownfield sites (like decommissioned mines) than at smaller urban sites,
many have proposed or are experimenting with generating solar energy on brownfields. A "brightfield" is
being proposed for a particularly distressed parcel in West Pullman. 125 There is also interest in planting
former brownfields for carbon sequestration. Brownfields can also satisfy local infrastructure demand for
"green infrastructure." Freight or passenger transportation investments could be targeted to increase the
value of entire brownfields areas. 126 U.S. policy and regulations create demand for reuse of brownfields.
Chapter 5 will examine new demand drivers in Chicago in greater detail.
Hyperbole or a Distraction from "Stickier Issues"? - A less formal, but common critique of
Brownfields programs is that they are overrated.' 27F What looked like a silver bullet to some in the 1990s
to fix the ills of metropolitan development and environmental policy is today a bit tarnished. Practitioners
speak of brownfields fatigue, some city planners think the idea is ancient history; developers admit that'd
they've lost interest in attending brownfields conferences. The City of Chicago's brownfields program is
an understaffed initiative in a regulatory department, that has not found a way to work effectively with the
city's planning department. Although the shadow cast by CERCLA has been mitigated and developers
are largely comfortable working with brownfields, the impact of the programs isn't proportional to the
amount of attention lavished on brownfields over the last twenty years. And it's not just a matter of
having a fully funded program. With hundreds of thousands of sites, no one ever expected to solve the
brownfields problem. Stakeholders and policymakers understood Lavea Brachman's brownfields "glass
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ceiling" from the beginning - and managed any expectation that brownfields would solve larger
problems. This was true in Chicago, which was careful in the language of its initial report not to overstate
the capability of the program. At worst, the brownfields discussion has been a distraction from addressing
more serious issues of disinvestment and segregation. Just as smart growth conversations rarely bring up
painful metropolitan and racial divides, neither does brownfields policy discussion. Outside of
environmental justice questions, references to "crime" and "social ills," and recommendations for
community participation, nobody talks candidly about poverty, race and brownfields, which are all
relevant to the Chicago case.
Local brownfields policy assets and leverage points
While brownfields, as popularly codified and understood in the last fifteen years, have proved
inadequate for more difficult brownfields, local governments should not throw the brownfields baby out
with the bathwater. Local brownfields policy provides tools and other assets upon which cities can build.
Human capital and technical sophistication - A veritable industry has developed around
environmental clean-up in the last fifteen years and many private firms, municipalities and non-profits
have become skilled at cleaning up brownfields. Though modest, the National Brownfields Association
estimates that there are 10,000 jobs in the United States in the brownfields "sector." 128  As mentioned
above, there has been considerable work to leverage brownfields as skilled jobs for disadvantaged
workers, the EPA has made 98 job training pilot grants since 1998. A Chicago non-profit, OAI, Inc.
(Office of Applied Innovation) has been the three-time recipient of the US EPA's job training grants, that
form the basis for GreenCorps, the City's green jobs training program. Brownfields also have a place on
the list for the fashionable U.S. Green Building Council's LEED rating system. (Though, unfortunately a
study of 38 first-generation buildings LEED projects in the US found that only 3 of 38 buildings were
128 National Brownfields Association, "What is a Brownfield?"
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allocated points for brownfield redevelopment, including the Chicago Center for Green
Technology.)F 29F
Broad political support - Brownfields programs (even as urban policy) enjoy enormous
popularity, name recognition and federal support among both political parties. 130 Though nowhere near
the size of the earmarks for other programs, the 2009 American Reinvestment and Recovery Act provided
$100 million for brownfields programs as "shovel ready" projects. This allowed regional EPA offices to
fund grant applications that they had deferred in recent funding cycles.131
Compatibility - Brownfields programs work well when paired with other larger planning efforts.
Case studies of brownfields and transportation projects find opportunities to leverage transportation for
direct brownfields clean-up funding, improvement schedules, new planning relationships and new
amenities. 132 Part of the strategy of Flint's well-known Genesee County Land Bank was to change state
law to give blanket brownfields designation to all their properties and to bundle clean-up dollars for area-
wide investigation and remediation.133F Brownfields policies have a place within larger land
revitalization programs.
Revisiting Tier III Policy: Greatest Policy Challenges Become Opportunities - A more targeted
and effective Tier III policy is, again, what many recognize to be the "next challenge" of the brownfields
project. The questions posed by brownfields programs can be considered a powerful asset. The "glass
ceiling" of brownfields properties forces cities to try to reimagine their form and economies in a more
creative way. Beyond the glass ceiling, are Tier III sites. This is the part of brownfields policy that needs
the most innovation, where there is a "paucity of programs."F 34F To use Bjelland's framework,
Superfund-scale and state voluntary clean-up programs at work in cities have their own resources,
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timetables and jurisdictions. The extent to which a clean-up and revitalization plan for Tier III and sites
of distress require planning, intergovernmental cooperation and deep knowledge of a city and region's
current and future landscape and economy should make them the priority for local government. While
the literature abounds with stories of cities that have creamed their brownfields and picked the low-
hanging fruit, why not concentrate on the top of the tree?
While a mixed policy might have been appropriate when the project was unproven, as we will see
in the next chapters, the real estate market now makes clean-up possible at less contaminated areas in
strong markets and other economic development incentives, such as TIF, fill a financial gap when there is
vertical development. Given this, cities moving forward should focus planning and strategy on Tier III
sites. While this does not preclude public planning or subsidy for stronger market sites, especially when
the end use isn't vertical development (as in a park or green infrastructure) or complicated site assembly
is entailed, public policy should be explicit about where it spends its brownfields resources and staff
hours. Chicago, for example, highlighted in its 2003 Showcase Community publication only sites in
distressed neighborhoods, while it had undertaken a number of projects in affluent neighborhoods like
Lincoln Park or Mount Greenwood. Many that I interviewed "condoned" the Chicago Brownfield
Initiative's use of limited staff on its stronger sites, because it helps facilitate development - any of which
is precious to a city. They haven't been "creative" (formulated Tier III policy) because there are still so
many sites that have value. A Tier I strategy can't be applied everywhere, simply shepherding a site
through the state clean-up processes or facilitating public subsidy doesn't begin to address the challenges
in a distressed area. Chicago dropped nearly $30 million dollars without a master plan in West Pullman
and little happened.
Justin Hollander shines a light on the "TOADS" subcategory of brownfields in a recent book. He
examines Tier 1-III trade-offs in his examination of four large, obsolete and contaminated properties in
Pittsburgh. He explains that the City of Pittsburgh purchased and undertook master planning for two sites
in more challenging areas, while passing over the opportunity to buy a shuttered steel mill in a poorer
community of color, because it "had negative value." Though they subsequently undertook two major
neighborhood planning efforts designed to "empower" the latter community and shape development in
the area, serious concerns about environmental justice and equity remain in Pittsburgh given this case. 135
An explicit policy for categories/tiers of brownfields and areas might have led to a better brownfields
program and more equitable outcomes in Pittsburgh and in other places with similar stories.
For this reason, a city should formulate a specific Tier III policy, and undertake appropriate
planning, secure deeper or creative subsidy, engage non-profit developers, and act "creatively" for its
contaminated and distressed areas, if not to the exclusion of all other sites - at least for a majority of its
projects and for a larger proportion of its staff time. A city should set public benchmarks and
percentages: for instance, 60% of its subsidies or 50% of its staff time will be spent on areas that fit
criteria of "brownfields of economic distress." A city should also report on its progress accordingly.
These conversations are happening, the Northeast Midwest Institute wrote a paper for the EPA in
December 2008, the "Brownfields Redevelopment Toolbox for Disadvantaged Communities." It
recognizes that a "Tier III" policy is different and an imperative for local government, and recommends
several strategies, including an "ombudsman," creating an inventory, undertaking strategic planning with
communities, undertaking market studies and acknowledging market realities in planning. A city ought
to also make use of land banks for both industrial and residential property, not just to acquire and hold
land, but to bundle and cross-collateralize it for clean-up using TIF or similar public financing tools.13 6
While city policy should employ integrated brownfields tools, it should let go of the idea that
brownfields programs are more than just tools or that there is anything other than patient work, candid
communication and constant cooperation and creativity to change the paradigms of uneven development
and land use. What no one should lose is the hope that local policy work could change things - a hope
that the Chicago Brownfields story illustrates.
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Chicago Leads the Way
The Chicago Brownfields Initiative is known for its efforts in the early 1990s, widely recognized
as one of the first models of a city brownfields strategy. The story of their successful pilot, public
planning process, regulatory changes, and incentives has been recounted over the past fifteen years, in
newspaper and magazine articles, trade publications, white papers, and handbooks. It is the textbook
case: Rafson's 1999 "Brownfields: Redeveloping Environmentally Distressed Properties" (McGraw-Hill),
draws almost exclusively on Chicago's experience.
The Initiative even published its own story in 1995.
Why write it again? The case deserves another look in order to
answer current questions about the program and on the eve of
another brownfields policy "shift" to root recommendations in
a critical study of the Chicago program's history, policy
formation, leadership and plan. This chapter argues that
although the Brownfields Forum initially achieved success,
and the execution and institutionalization of the municipal
program was bumpy, there were also larger systemic failures
that were presaged shortly after the end of the Brownfields Figure 3.1 Forum Report and Action Plan
Forum. The Initiative's current challenges are a symptom of these larger systemic issues. Chicago
applied what ultimately turned out to be a narrow solution to a wide problem. There was a lack of spatial
planning for brownfields, (at the regional, city and block scales), no strategic brownfields inventory, no
proactive city-wide land and redevelopment policy in a vast city where the economy has outgrown its
built environment, and where there is both significant wealth and severe disinvestment. A consideration
of these deeper issues would have given and could still give the Initiative greater power.
The development of the Chicago Brownfields Initiative in 1993 occurred at the intersection of
several policy areas and themes, and such an intersection of interests may be what made it such a success.
Chicago's program could be characterized as emerging in response to Superfund, to achieve clean-up, not
through liability, but through shared public and private efforts. It was also an effort to the combat the
"idiotic sprawl on rich Illinois soil," 137 a tool for industrial retention and economic development, a city
beautification efforts, a civic process, and a very strong example of public-private partnership and
intergovernmental cooperation. It was a perfect marriage of challenge and energy among state and
regional environmental activists, community groups, attorneys, real estate developers, environmental
engineers, and city leaders compelled to prove a new model.
In considering the evolution of the Chicago Brownfields Initiative, it is useful to consider three
phases from the time of the early 1990s until today. The first, the "Forum," lasted from about 1993 -
1996 and was characterized by experimentation, advocacy and demonstration. During the next six years,
the "Showcase" period, the City spent money on brownfields, and a lot of it, nearly a million in EPA
Showcase grant dollars, an additional $4 million from the City budget, TIF funding, and the $74 million
from the HUD Section 108 loan. Since 2003, in the "Technical Assistance" phase, the Brownfields
Initiative has mostly focused on processing the sites that come through other departments, working with
developers and community based organizations pursuing projects, and working with a few communities
on their brownfields sites, as in West Pullman and keeping up with EPA grant funding cycles.
The Local Context at the Beginning: Rust Belt, Green Machine & Fighting for a City
It is well known that industrial readjustment preoccupied Chicago and many northeastern and
Midwestern cities (in no small part signified by the moniker "rust belt") in the 1970s and 1980s. It is
therefore impossible to consider the brownfields efforts (which in the early 1990s, focused on industrial
137 Henderson, Henry. Telephone interview by author.
sites) apart from deindustrialization and city efforts to mitigate its effects. Chicago's involvement with
the program was justified by and inextricably linked to the retention production jobs and its industrial
policy. The City of Chicago still frames the purpose of the Inititiative "to create jobs and generate tax
revenues through industrial redevelopment, thereby improving Chicago's environmental and economic
health."' 38 In Chicago, city planners had been concerned with the loss of industry to the suburbs since the
1940s. 13 9 But by the 1980s what had transpired was a shock. It could be measured in multiple steel plant
closings and dramatic statistics. Illinois lost 286,100 manufacturing jobs from 1979 to 1984, roughly
22.5% of all jobs in the state. Between 1985 and 2010, manufacturing jobs in the Chicago area were
forecast to drop 36% to 383,00014° These losses could also be measured in disinvested neighborhoods,
failing small business and in acres of vacant industrial property (or so-called brownfields). The City of
Chicago in the 1990s was under extraordinary pressure to "fight back against further degradation and to
move huge parcels from dereliction to productivity." Henry Henderson pointed to the steel mill sites:
U.S. Steel went from employing 40,000 people in the mid-1970s 4 1 to a single security guard in the
1990s. Wisconsin Steel, Acme, LTV (Republic Steel), International Harvester had also employed tens of
thousands of people. To this date, only the LTV site has been redeveloped, as the Ford Supplier Park.
The inevitability of industrial decline in the "city of the big shoulders" has been contentious. 142
Decades before Chicago was remaking itself as "green," city leadership and downtown business elites
sought to transform the economy of the industrial city in the 1960s and 70s through downtown residential
and office real estate development. Part of this strategy included re-zoning of what was thought to be
obsolete industrial land near the downtown Loop. This led to the rapid displacement of production firms,
which planners were shocked to find out did not relocate, but folded, resulting in the loss of good jobs. A
political movement emerged to support local producers, supported by studies that showed the "true costs"
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of rezoning and industrial decline. In 1979 the Economic Development Commission implemented its
Chicago Plan, which created industrial parks in five locations and financing for those who were located or
opened up there: the Stockyards; Lake Calumet area; Western and California south of 26th Street; Pulaski
Road and Chicago Avenue, and Goose Island, on the Chicago River between North and Chicago
avenues. 143 The city established Local Industrial Retention Initiative (LIRI) groups to bridge industrial
support programs to firms throughout the city, and because local leadership would have more investment
and import in undertaking planning. 1" This policy was first institutionalized during the mayoral
administration of Harold Washington and later supported by current Mayor Richard M. Daley.145 By
1993 when the Brownfields program was starting, Director of Planning and Development Valerie Jarrett
committed to the brownfields program in the interest of industrial retention and assigned Donna
Ducharme to the project, who had been working on industrial retention policy with the non-profit LEED
Council for over a decade.' 46
The concern with deindustrialization had a corollary in metropolitan sprawl. "Between 1970 -
1990, Chicago metropolitan regional population increased 4% while the urban land area mushroomed by
46%."F 47F Though residential sprawl and industrial decentralization was certianly caused by changes in
transportation and demand for low-density industrial (and residential) locations, among other complicated
factors, there was a sense that Superfund was fueling the industrial exodus and abandonment of the urban
core. 148 The cycle of deterioration and abandonment motivated policymakers along with the loss of city
jobs and tax base.
The Brownfields Initiative can be characterized as stemming from the convergence of two major
policy areas that Mayor Richard M. Daley has emphasized: economic development and quality of
environment. The brownfields effort began four years into his now 20-year adminstration. He supported
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industrial retention efforts as Mayor, despite his reluctance to endorse industrial retention policies during
his failed campgain for Mayor in 1983 and fears that once in office he would be beholden to real estate
developers. 14 9 Deborah Orr describes the brownfields problem as "hitting a nerve," in Chicago, and that
nerve was Mayor Daley, who was "looking at his city as dying." 15 Over the past two decades, it has
been Mayor Daley's well-known ambition to rebrand Chicago as the "greenest city in America." From his
first moments in office, Mayor Daley's signature goal has been beautification of the city, from
landscaping to towing the thousands of abandoned cars that plagued the City. 151 The City has had high-
profile staff dedicated to an environmental agenda, with policies that have included green building codes,
planting thousands of trees, and reducing stormwater runoff through landscaping and green infrastructure
ordinances, plans for "green alleys," a water plan, an environmental agenda and an ambitious climate
change plan. The Mayor's most notorious demonstration was to "green" the very roof of City Hall. 152
The Economist called him the "Green Machine in 2002." 153 Many credit the brownfields program to
Mayor Daley. In addition to its alignment with his priorities, it fits with the Daley mythology of
collecting the urban world's most progressive innovations and challenging his staff to implement them in
Chicago. Program leaders recount that the Mayor saw extensive reuse of industrial land in Europe and
wished to apply the concept in Chicago. Regardless of where the impetus first came from, the efforts
would not have gone as far as fast as they did without the powerful Mayor's early "rhetorical embrace" 154
and enthusiastic leadership. Others also relate that the Forum's open and powerful civic planning process
was possible and influenctial precisely because the Mayor was new, and that similar processes might not
be possible today, given the power that the Mayor wields.
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EPA staff are also quick to emphasize that community support for and participation in the
program was rooted in the city's strong community of non-profits. 155 Deborah Orr points especially to
the environmental community that: "Wants a vital city and holds panels and discussions to push this.
They are always asking, why can't Chicago do this?" Chicago has been home to community building and
justice struggles for well over a hundred years: the settlement house movement, the labor movement, the
Industrial Areas Foundation, the fight over segregation of and then the reform of severly mismanaged
public housing, the urban campaign of the Civil Rights Movement, the Nation of Islam. It was ground
zero in 1972 for protests against red-lining, and the formation of Shorebank as one of the country's first
community development financial institutions. In recent years, there have been prominent public
demonstrations for immigration reform. In the early 1990s, Chicago had a strong, though not always
aligned, infrastructure of environmental justice organizations that had been fighting landfills and
incinerators around Lake Calumet for thirty years, community development organizations that had been
reinvesting in low income communities for fifteen, and a set of organizations supporting industrial
retention for over ten.156 According to the 1991 Northeast Midwest Report, a push for brownfields-type
programs really came from the outside. The Chicago Association of Neighborhood Development
Organizations had been pressuring the city to issue economic development bonds for site acquistion and
clean-up to spark industrial redevelopment.' 57 The support of a private foundation was also key. The
MacArthur Foundation gave the city a grant to run the Brownfields Forum process, giving the initiative
both indepedence and credibility.
If the decentralization and erosion of federal support for cities gave way to such localized
responses to urban development as community development corporations and Tax Increment Financing
districts, the Brownfields Initiative is consistent with this pattern. Jim Van Der Kloot describes the
brownfields Initiative that Chicago put together as a "small government" and entreprenuerial program,
with a project manager who managed the pilot's money like it was her own. Joe Dufficy characterized
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the brownfields efforts as a free market response to Reagan-era policies that left development to the
market. The Chicago Sun-Times quoted Henry Henderson and Mayor Daley in 1996 describing a
program that "puts a real incentive into the private sector [and]...requires no investment by local
government." 158
"An Intense Time" 159
The human capital and leadership for the Brownfields Initiative came from both the City and the
Region 5 office of the United States Environmental Protection Agency (U.S. EPA). Those interviewed
joked that a friendly debate raged for years about who really started the program, when in truth, both
deserve credit.160 The six-state region of the U.S. EPA headquartered in Chicago spans the Great Lakes
states of Minnesota, Wisconsin, Illinois, Michigan, Indiana and Ohio. Its staff, who worked with many of
the cities most affected by deindustrialization and most confounded by the disincentives posed by
CERCLA, started to define and chip away at the problem. According to Deborah Orr, "The group here in
Region 5, found the whole idea of this was hitting the City of Chicago."161 The Chicago process was
modeled directly on a process held in Cleveland a few years before. 162 Many state EPA offices started
their own programs to facilitate private clean-up, with Illinois beginning in 1989. Their colleagues at the
U.S. EPA have said that Jim Van der Kloot and Joe Dufficy had more to do with the creation of
brownfields programs than anyone else in the country. 163F Both men still work for the Region 5 Office of
the U.S. EPA at the time of this writing.
Environmental attorney Henry Henderson was another catalyst. Henderson, who had drafted the
ordinance to create the the city's Department of Environment in the early 1990s, became its first
Commissioner and stayed for 7 years. The new Department of Environment focused on "defending the
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city." Strategies to counter and prosecute illegal dumping (a lot of which was taking place as contractors
paid off public officials) preoccupied the new Department of Environment around this time. Brownfields
was a coterminous project, dumping was occurring on abandoned property, and a viable strategy to
address this seemed to focus on returning the land to productive use. 164
Having worked closely with the U.S. EPA as an environmental lawyer, Henderson approached
the US EPA's regional administrator about loaning out his staff to the City through the Intergovernmental
Personnel Act. Jim Van der Kloot, then 36, was assigned to the Department of the Environment. The
original arrangement had been for him to work at the city for just 6 months, but he stayed for 3 years,
from 1993 to 1996. Van der Kloot recounts that his directive was "fuzzy," to combine environmental
clean-up with economic development. He and Henderson followed the lead of other areas: a regional
report by the Cuyahoga County Planning Commission and one from the state of Virginia's public policy
discussion on sprawl. They laid out their logic: development in the region would continue to sprawl to
undeveloped areas on the region's fringes so long as it was so difficult to acquire, clean-up and finance
vacant properties in the city. They set out to test these ideas, that if they could identify and overcome
these barriers to redevelopment, they could restore the balance of development in the city. They
organized their work along three lines: a demonstration pilot, the policy forum and economic analysis.
Henry Henderson persuaded the MacArthur Foundation to make their $250,000 grant. MacArthur's
urban policy officer at the time, Rebecca Riley, agreed to "adopt" the department to "create a success in
good government." 65
The Pilot - Bang for their Buck
The most crucial part of the Initiative was to test the logic that if public financing could provide
for environmental testing and clean-up to resolve uncertainty, then private businesses would be free to
invest in that location, to start or expand a business. Henry Henderson had persuaded the Mayor's Office
and the Budget Director to give the program $2 million in general obligation bonds as seed money. At
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that point, there was no public money anywhere else for brownfields. They were "putting themselves on
the ground with very high level resources," and so thought seriously about what to pursue. They pulled
together an interdepartmental working group of city staff (Law, Environment, Buildings, Planning and
Development and the Mayor's Office) to advise them in how to spend the money to serve both
environmental clean-up and economic development. Everyone had a different conception of what would
make a good project. The focus on the industrial corridors came from the Department of Planning and
Development. City real estate, environmental and buildings attorneys weighed in. Those who came from
the Superfund program believed the sites would have to be much smaller in scale. The working group
decided that pilot sites ought to have managable budgets, uncomplicated site ownership and
redevelopment interest. They screened a limited number of sites and arrived at five with a range of
conditions. Jim Van der Kloot thinks that the small pilot that originated from a task force was important
and that had they opened up site selection and program design to a larger process and focus groups they
couldn't have moved as quickly as they did, and may not have had the successful results. They were
explicit about the "Tier I" policy in program materials; sites chosen had "the best combination of
environmental factors and redevelopment potential." 166 They intended the $2 million to pay for testing at
all five parcels and clean up of at least two. One site was found to have no contamination and the other
four were remediated for $850,000.F 167F
The work on the pilot sites (See Appendix 1) assisted private firms in four of the five cases. The
work produced two parking lots, one warehouse and two redevelopment sites. What is interesting to note
is that aside from their location in an industrial corridor, and a discussion of their immediate neighbors, is
that the pilot projects (both in written descriptions and in the recollections of planners) didn't consider the
larger area context of the properties. Still, the projects seemed to stabilize the surrounding areas and
increase the confidence of manufacturers. Reporting the benefit in jobs (239, plus 950 saved) and tax
166 City of Chicago 1995, 8
167 Ibid. and Rafson 1999, 100
revenue ($337,000), seemed like a high return on investment. 168 Van der Kloot and others were elated:
they had proved the logic. The City's Budget Office loved the project.
Changing the Atmosphere, the Laws and People's Minds
The Brownfields Forum was the second piece of the three-part program, a convening of
stakeholders to make recommendations and policy changes and build an constituency for the brownfields
program. It was an unprecedented public planning process, and those involved knew they were forging a
new path. Chicago began by interviewing leaders in Cleveland about their process (and learned, for
instance, not to send all the lawyers to the same working group.)F 69F
Jim Van der Kloot explained that as much as changing regulations, their project was to change
the atmosphere for Brownfields redevelopment and to "change people's minds." The MacArthur grant
helped hire Clean Sites, Inc., an environmental non-profit to be the Forum's neutral convener, which was
key. This was Chicago, the city of machine politics, where process is often a "fiction" and they had to
show participants that the process was real; they had to do more than "invite their buddies." Therefore,
city formed an initial steering committee to define the issues and outline an inclusive list of who should
be invited, including over 21 different types of people who touched brownfields-type transactions. They
wanted to change the perception that the brownfields program was a closed process run by the same
players. There was some controversy at the time that there wasn't enough representation from organized
labor, others saw it more that labor opted not to participate. Organizers regretted that Forum participants
"representing" low income neighborhoods were clearly not residents. By and large, most recognized it to
be a positive and productive process. The head of Open Lands, a parks and ecological preservation
organization in Chicago, told Van der Kloot that the Brownfields Forum was the most inclusive planning
process that Chicago had ever had. There was also a high level of trust, especially from environmental
groups. Van der Kloot posits while other cities' environmental groups butted heads with brownfields
programs, and kept them from moving forward, this wasn't the case in Chicago. Environmental groups
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were involved early; they helped design the program, and knew that they would be listened to. Staff from
the Center for Neighborhood Technology came in to talk with the Department in the planning stages of
the Initiative and were candid about what was bad policy and what would engender opposition: building
housing (and especially affordable housing) on formerly contaminated land (which Chicago had a painful
history of doing), and building new industrial facilities that weren't sustainable and clean. The Forum
took these recommendations to heart.
The 100 participants that the steering committee identified were first interviewed about
Brownfields issues before the Forum began. Its first event in December 1994 was a 2-day seminar,
complete with briefing book, to "achieve a common understanding of brownfields complexities." 170
After the initial seminar, the participants organized into six work groups (legal and regulatory
impediments, environmental risk assessment methods and communication, financial incentives and
barriers, cooperative approaches for redevelopment, economic impact of brownfield versus Greenfield
development and brownfield prevention). These six groups met to draft recommendations that they
would share with the entire Forum when the group reconvened in May. At the May meeting, the Forum
sorted the 63 recommendations among nine project teams (Communications, Nonprofit Capacity, City
Capacity, Streamlining Regulations, Encouraging Private Investment, Improving Public Financing,
Seeking Community Input, Preventing Pollution, Influencing Regional Planning) that moved forward
with implementation.
In the end, 130 people stuck with the process for nine months. Having decision-makers was key,
said Henry Henderson. Cross-disciplinary engagement was powerful as well, said Jim Van der Kloot: the
career environmental justice lawyers talked to the engineering consultants. "They realized that they
shared the same concern for clean-up standards and off-site contamination. They could arrive at results
that were acceptable to all parties." The MacArthur grant also supported three graduate students (two
urban planners and a lawyer), who were each assigned to working groups, took extensive notes and
organized their recommendations into papers. The Forum used these notes and products to develop the
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Final Report and Action Agenda, published in November 1995, just under a year after the process began.
In just one year, the Forum had set an ambitious agenda and high degree of accountability for the
program, and yielded a variety of creative recommendations. The Final Report was a conscious attempt to
share the model that they knew were developing as much as presenting a well-articulated policy plan.
The Report also gave context for the Pilot and Forum, as well as detailing the final recommendations and
action steps. The Program's Nine Implementation areas and guiding principles are shown below, and
some read like recommendations that might govern brownfields policy today and still constitute a
resource for the Initiative to draw on.
Table 3.1: Recommendations & Principles of the Chicago Brownfields Forum, 1995 (author's
paraphrasing) 171
Recommendations & Actions
THE FOUNDATIONS
1. Improving Communications: Changing the psychology about the projects, compiling a public
database of sites, partnering with Chambers of Commerce and engaging in dialogue with
businesses. Communicating among various branches of government.
2. Building Non-profit capacity - Using non-profits as one stop information centers, catalysts, links
to other business support services and educational institutions. Getting buy-in of foundations.
3. Building City government capacity - Creating new legal tools to enable city to clean-up and
acquire property. Identifying funding sources, staffing resources and reducing municipal liability.
PROMOTING REUSE
4. Streamlining regulations. Making the state's voluntary clean-up program the primary channel for
public certification. Clarifying groundwater standards, tightening State's MOA with Federal
EPA. Tiered approach to clean-up, developing regulations related to engineered controls, working
to resolve clean-up for orphan sites or neighboring sites.
5. Encouraging private-sector investment - Numbers don't work, especially in distressed
neighborhoods. Creating a state lending pool and state insurance pool. Pre-development funds
most essential. Educating lenders and developers about process, and giving them guidelines.
Tieing brownfields clean-ups to the Community Reinvestment Act.
6. Improving Public Financing - Creating a local pooled loan fund, federal captial attraction
incentives, and tax deferred contributions fund for site remediation at end of a plant's useful life.
Encouraging the passage of pollution prevention tax credits, HUD grants and loans to cities, and
EDA funding. Public redevelopment funding should be repackaged. Stopping incentives for
greenfields, encouraging tax base sharing, restricting TIF for blighted areas only. Making
competitive state funding available. Using empowerment zone incentives because zone has
signficiant brownfield acreage. Giving priority to jobs and pollution prevention in brownfields
funding. Investigating future funding sources: impact fees or sales taxes on new commercial
development, general obligation bonds, utility revenues, surcharges on water, waste, landfilling,
hazardous waste generation, legal awards, and tax incentives such as credits, exemptions, and
abatement.
'
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7. Involving Communities - Getting communities to participate early so that their input can be
meaningful without being burdensome to developers. A good participatory model has a financial
commitment that plans get developed, extensive outreach and ongoing efforts to build community
support, press coverage that keeps people informed and demonstrates progress, outreach to
alderman, strong project management team representing diverse interests, funding for competent
staff to manage process, and assurances to the community that there will be no new
contamination.
LOOKING AHEAD
8. Advocating for Pollution Prevention - Tie public funding to pollution prevention: encourage self-
reporting, lower penalties, more flexible, performance-based approach, phase-out hazardous
chemicals. Get organized labor involved.
9. Influencing Regional Planning - transportation policies help create market conditions that make it
worthwhile to mothball or abandon urban plants and site industrial development even further
from older communities. Regional coalition building - Metropolis 2020 Plan to shape transport
policy. Watch the exurban arterials. Educate public -readjust their perceptions of cost/benefit.
Better zoning and land use policy.
FRAMEWORK OF PRINCIPLES
1. Healthy communities through participatory planning.
2. Balancing public incentives for brownfield redevelopment.
3. Engaging private sector and expanding the market.
4. Cooperation and public-private partnership.
5. Public funding should have a preference for places that would otherwise not be redeveloped,
disadvantaged areas with environmental justice conerrns, where brownfields connect and catalyze
other development, create and retain jobs, maximize public benefits.
6. Attracting environmentally sound industries.
7. Acknowledging that brownfield cannot solve all the city's environmental, economic devleopment
and social problems, but that it is only one important component of a comprehensive strategy.
8. Broader integrated strategies where contamination is widespread (viable, longterm, area-wide
development).
9. Standards tailored to various land use options (consider community-wide issues)
10. Scale up from pilot experience and tests of innovative tools.
11. Industrial redevelopment is the priority - or whatever reuse options meet community
development goals.
What is interesting to note is the extent to which the Forum's principles anticipated what would
be the complexities of brownfields redevelopment in Chicago, and what would appear in critiques of
programs across the country. The ideas were all there - broader integrated strategies where
contamination was widespread, brownfields as one component of a larger strategy, city capacity and
public finance, a regional strategy, a preference for public involvement with Tier III sites, public-private
partnership, participatory planning. The Initiative didn't falter for a lack of a sound foundation in the
Action Agenda. It might have been useful, even though the Brownfields Forum ended after three years,
to have continued to meet periodically to judge the city's success what are still very relevant action areas.
Those who were involved with the Forum still speak of it with respect. Said Donna Ducharme:
"It was highly successful. It really provided a new model and had a huge impact on state laws." Said
Steve Colantino of the Illinois EPA:
It was an unprecedented collaborative effort that has never been repeated. Though talked about,
it has never been duplicated. Instead of encircling, everyone was above the line, looking down
and willing to do something. Chicago was at the right place at the right time, with state and
regional EPA offices located there. The EPA had proactive disposition towards this new thing
called brownfields as something different than Superfund mentality. It was recognized as a really
unique point in time in the environmental industry. Those that participated and others have
understood that significance.
Even to the eyes of someone like then-PhD student Dan McGrath, who admitted skepticism of "politics in
motion," said of the Forum:
It was a learning experience about how a major metropolitan government was trying to coordinate
and be a change agent on a very serious issue facing the regional economy. The level of
leadership was high, it was real and collaborative. I felt like I had kind of a front row seat to
major policy shift.
Supporting Research - Doing the Math
The third leg of the Initiative's stool was economic analysis, "connecting economists with
bankers and developers...to design two research projects." 172 Henry Henderson engaged local academics
to prove that it was good policy to put public money towards brownfields clean-up. Both projects were
based at the University of Illinois at Chicago's Center for Urban Economic Development (CUED) and
were supported in part by the MacArthur Foundation. The first project was undertaken by Dan McGrath,
a PhD student in economics, whose independent research interest was "getting to the bottom of
brownfields" and using urban economic theory to do so. His work became "the decision-making tool to
assess redevelopment potential of candidates for public investment"' 73 and his dissertation. By analyzing
100 industrial land sales in the City, and controlling for over a dozen variables, he found he could isolate
the discount for perceived environmental contamination with each property, whether redeveloped or in
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current industrial use, at an average of $1 million per acre, which was only slightly higher than observed
environmental clean-up costs in the market. This "value differential" could be overcome when future
revenues of a redeveloped site were high enough to offset the cost of clean-up and demolition, or with the
infusion of public funding in the right cases. McGrath showed that environmental clean-up was in fact
happening, that there was a strong industrial land market, especially on the west side and the north side
and around O'Hare Airport. He recommended that the city help finance these projects, but that their
money would be most efficiently spent on "Tier I sites" in stronger markets where redevelopment
potential, for the parcel and those around it, was stronger. The "capital hurdle" may seem obvious now,
but at the time the whole prospect was in question, and McGrath's answer was that brownfields were a
good public investment.
McGrath also recounts that an interview about his research with the Chicago Defender, the city's
leading African American newspaper in April 1996, led to the headline: "Study: Race a Key Factor in
Industrial Redevelopment: Sites in Black Communities 20% Less Likely to be Redeveloped."' 74
McGrath's intended message was that it was not contamination keeping properties from being
redeveloped, but the Defender ended up calling the Brownfields Initiative a smokescreen for the long
persistent racism in the city's land use and development patterns. City leadership was infuriated and
McGrath wrote a letter to the paper clarifying the findings of his study. Real estate economics and
sensational community newspapers aside, this story illustrates the extent to which the Forum was not
positioned to address, and even reactive toward, the difficult questions of race and uneven development,
which in Chicago are particularly pronounced along a north-south divide.
The other project was undertaken by two faculty based at the CUED, Wim Wiewel and Joe
Persky. Their charge was to look at the postive externalities of brownfields redevelopment, and the
hidden social and environmental costs of greenfield development. Their study modeled siting both a
manufacturing plant and a large office builing each employing 1000 people in the inner city, the inner
suburbs and an outlying greenfield. In general, they found ways to quantify the fact that siting a project
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on a brownfield saved public resources in the form of auto pollution, accidents, and congestion. It was
also likely to use less land. It stemmed housing abandonment and protected neighborhoods. It had a
slightly higher multiplier effect because jobs on brownfields were likely to employ the unemployed and
likely heads of households. 175 Their study became their a larger project examining the effects of firm
loss on central city economies.
Implementation
The tools that federal and state brownfields programs rely on to this day were made in Chicago.
After the Forum had completed its Action Plan, the nine "implementation" teams for each project area
continued to meet. Regional EPA staff went back to their offices to address the barriers that Forum
participants identified and had arisen in pilot projects. The IEPA went on to convene additional focus
groups of a dozen people each, bankers, environmental lawyers, real estate lawyers, private consultants.
They refined the state's private voluntary clean-up program in response to private sector concerns. The
state and regional offices of the EPA worked to ensure brownfields clean-ups overseen by the IEPA
would be released from federal CERLA liability. It was redundant and inefficient for the federal
government to override the state's authority, when the state was capable of fully assessing the degree of
contamination and satisfactory clean-up, especially for less contaminated sites. Joe Dufficy is credited
with creating the legally defensible, standardized release from liability that would become Illinois' "No
Further Remediation" letter. He is also credited with engineering the Memorandum of Agreement
between the IEPA and Region 5 of the U.S. EPA, which set a precedent for other voluntary programs, and
for creating prospective purchaser agreements that protected an acquiring entity with a Federal covenant
not to sue. 176
City staff also got to work. The Department of Environment found ways to make lenders more
comfortable with brownfields projects and sent out information packages to them.177 Because municipal
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liability was a concern, the Law Department drew up a guidance document clarifying municipal liability
so that the City would not be held liable for clean-up of any properties that it acquired "voluntarily," and
could proceed to acquire problem properties and initiate clean-up. This laid the groundwork for planning
staff to later land bank industrial property. The Mayor also got to work, encouraging the county to enact
deep property tax abatements for brownfields clean-ups and shepherding the ordinance that prohibited the
use of groundwater within the city limits, which lowered the threshold for clean-up throughout the city.
He took leadership on brownfields to the U.S. Conference of Mayors, of which he was President at the
time.
Before the end of the Forum, participants ended up fighting the City's own lobby in Springfield
over legislation to establish a privatized voluntary clean-up program. Without talking to Forum
participants, the Department of Intergovernmental Affairs drafted legislation with the Illinois
Manufacturers and Chemical Associations to create a program where liability protections and clean-up
certification was carried out by private consultants. Their proposal was modeled after Ohio's voluntary
clean-up legislation. Forum participants distrusted the lack of authority and control in that program, and
many went to Springfield to lobby against the legislation, which ultimately failed. In retrospect, Ohio's
state voluntary clean-up program's site enrollment was smaller and slower than Illinois' SRP, which has
over 4,000 sites currently enrolled. 178
Media
The media coverage of the Chicago program reflected many of the issues and tensions of the
brownfields project addressed in Chapter 2, the initial problem solving, the hope, the tension between
environmental protection and safety and redevelopment, the importance of intergovernmental
cooperation, the different brownfields typologies, and the "glass ceiling," the idea that there would always
be an oversupply of brownfields.
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Part of the work of the Forum was to develop a story about the potential to be unlocked in
brownfields, and they cultivated the support of local and national newspapers.F 179F This was successful.
There was dense reporting on brownfields in the local press in the 1990s and the 1998 Report found that
significant media coverage of brownfields meant that the Forum had accomplished much of its public
relations agenda. The city was able to demonstrate to its own constituents and an international audience
that there were viable strategies to clean-up contaminated properties and restore them to productive use,
and that often the perception of contamination was as much a barrier as any toxins in the soil. 180 They did
this at a time when developers and other municipalities were unfamiliar the tools that brownfields
programs offered. The first article about brownfields in the New York Times described the "common-
sense" Chicago case, as it zeroed in the problem "in Northeast and Midwest cities."'81 By 1995, the EPA
was financing its Brownfields Pilot grants nationwide, which the New York Times described as 50
"Chicago-style" demonstration projects to explore cleanup methods. The article estimated the number of
Brownfields in the Chicago metropolitan area at 2,000 and profiled the 600-acre lakefront former South
Works Steel Plant, where USX was negotiating an estimated $8 million clean-up, which would result in a
clean site worth as much as $80 million, given its strategic lakefront location.
The first incidents of local press coverage occurred around the time of the Forum's report in late
1995. The media that played on the good news that the City had found, featuring stories of skeptical
reporters dragged out to former dumpsites and brownfields by a beaming Henry Henderson, to find what
"flies in the face of the stereotype of a city unraveling...and sites surrounded neighborhoods that, despite
their problems, still have businesses, schools and churches, new bungalows and tended homes." F182F It
covered Mayor Daley's mention of brownfields in the context of the region's economic vitality. F183F The
media covered groundbreakings at remediated sites, the lobbying work that Mayor Daley was doing with
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the Illinois delegation184 and on behalf of the U.S. Conference of Mayors to expand federal resources for
brownfields. It covered the County's passage of property tax abatements for brownfields projects. F 85F
There was extensive coverage in 1996 of the scandal and prosecution of public officials for taking bribes
in connection with large illegal dumping schemes. It covered Clinton Administration brownfields
announcements of a brownfields tax incentive and profiled the USX site. It covered the opening of a
Baptist church on a former brownfield in 2005 that the church had cleaned up over the course of 6
years. 186
It got to the glass ceiling. In May 1996, the Chicago Sun-Times reported on the differing levels
of clean-up and expense for schools and homes versus commercial or industrial development. 187 In an
accompanying article that day, the City reported on the fast turnaround of the smaller sites, and the
reasons why larger parcels would take longer to clean-up. "It's cheaper, faster and more profitable to
clean up a small dump next to a candy factory that wants to expand, for example, than to revamp
hundreds of acres of abandoned industrial land in South Deering in the Lake Calumet area - tracts far
tougher to market." F' 88 It itemized the barriers:
With larger parcels, property owners often are hard to track down. If they are found, sometimes
millions of dollars can be spent in legal fees as government works through the courts to get the
owner to clean up the site. City and state governments don't have the hundreds of millions
necessary to take over these projects when no owner can be traced. And a site must be unusually
contaminated to qualify for federal Superfund dollars. City officials concede it will take years to
address even 100 of the contaminated sites, let alone 1,000 or 2,000. But, said Chicago's assistant
planning commissioner James D. Bower, "Without involvement on the public side these sites
would sit there for the next 50, 60, 100 years untouched. 89F
In September 1996, a Chicago Sun-Times article focused on the twelve Superfund sites in the
Chicago suburbs at various stages of cleanup and noted that none of the toxic dumps on the Southeast
Side made it on to the Superfund list. The article reported that the EPA doesn't give these sites a high
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priority because they don't contaminate the Lake Michigan, the source of the area's drinking water. It
quoted local environmental activist Hazel Johnson, as saying that "If we were white, we wouldn't have all
these problems, Superfund sites go mostly to white people, not blacks." 19 Other articles have covered the
fortunes and misfortunes of the industrial TIFs established to work alongside brownfields programs. 191
There has also been significant coverage of brownfields activities in the region as well. In 1995,
the US EPA selected 36 municipalities in suburban Cook County for a pilot project to test regional
approaches to facilitating brownfield reuse over a 200-square mile area. The South Suburbs have
developed an aggressive brownfields development program. In 2006, City of Chicago, the City of North
Chicago and the Village of Robbins each received $200,000. Robbins was unique, as reported by the
Chicago Defender, "more than half of Robbins' land parcels are either owned by the municipality or are
tax-delinquent and vacant, many of which were considered brownfield sites."' 92 Efforts in Aurora, Lake
County, and Waukegon in particular have also been highlighted. There has been no recent coverage of
the Chicago's Brownfields Initiative itself in the city's two daily newspapers; since 1996 in the Chicago
Sun-Times, and since 1997 in the Chicago Tribune. Crain's Chicago Business had an article about
Superfund liability in February of 2008 that mentioned Chicago's brownfields programs.
Institutionalizing the Program
While the Forum didn't only meet to set city policy, the city had a large role to play in carrying
out the brownfields program. The Forum specified that the Department of the Environment and the
Department of Planning and Development would house the permanent Brownfields Initiative, and the
Department of Environment would play a "Brownfields Forum Clearinghouse" function. 193 The
Department of Environment planned to have five staff members dedicated to working on brownfields
clean-ups. The Department of Planning and Development proceeded to work on brownfields in the
context of redevelopment policy and industrial retention strategies. The 1998 report found that the
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Department of Planning and the Department of Law had limited staff dedicated to brownfields projects,
though the Forum had recommended that both departments dedicate staff to brownfields work.
The resources that the program would use to initiate more projects like its pilot were uncertain at
first. At the end of the Forum, City staff had asked the MacArthur Foundation to continue to fund the
program, but MacArthur declined. Though the Brownfields Forum had created a lot of buzz at the city
level, the funding prospects for federal brownfields programs in the mid-1990s were uncertain. The
federal Brownfields Action Agenda was announced as the Forum was finishing up, but only provided
funding for assessment, not for clean-up and any other support. It looked like resources might come from
other federal agencies. Chicago leaders were in communication with Henry Cisneros and Andrew Cuomo
at HUD and Bill Richardson at the Department of Energy. 194 The Chicago Budget Director approached
the Department of Enviroment about designing a program for a HUD Section 108 loan. Jim Van der
Kloot and others drew up plans spend a proposed $20 million, but learned in 1996 that the city had
secured a staggering $74 million. To Van der Kloot and others involved, the grant required far too much
growth, and City hadn't planned appropriately for it. With the $2 million pilot, they were managing the
money themselves, a scarce amount that they had fought hard for, and flying under the radar. With $74
million, it was a lot harder to control. Jim Van der Kloot suggests that spending small amounts a little bit
at a time might have been a much more effective strategy. Kimberly Danna, who works for the regional
HUD office concurs. Section 108 is intended to be used for income-producing projects, that Chicago
didn't get the projects that helped them repay the loan, and now their debt service is large. 195 The City's
2003 report cites its "ambitious project" as a lesson:
Borrowing against development can be a bigger financial risk than the environmental one. The
clock immediately starts ticking on the time to develop and create jobs, generate property tax, and
repay the loans. Indeed, some sites have big risk profiles, but the City views these cleanup and
development efforts as the right thing to do. 19 6
194 Henderson, Henry. Telephone interview by author.
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The city, was one of sixteen areas designated as a Brownfields Showcase communities by the Clinton
Administration in 1997, making it eligible for $691,000 in grant funding.197 The City designated these
funds toward the assessment of thirty properties, "rather than allocating all of the money toward
assessment and cleanup a few sites." 198
Jim Van der Kloot went back to the EPA in 1996. Donna Ducharme also left in 1996.
Subsequent staffing for brownfields programs at the Department of Environment and Planning and
Development was unstable. Because the program had a high profile, people wanted to work in it, but had
less of an understanding of and commitment to its goals. Staff tended to turn over quickly and the
program suffered. Those who came from institutions outside the city government had been more free to
experiment and challenge conventional thinking, and for this reason, were ultimately resigned to their
eventual departure. Many acknowledge that there were city staff at different points who truly held the
program together and moved it forward, including David Reynolds, Jim Bower in the Planning
Department and key people in the Mayor's Office. Jim Bower worked to establish the industrial TIFs in
hopes of supporting brownfields redevelopment.
The Department of Environment's Brownfields Initiative today is much smaller than called for by
the Forum and isolated from the development and decision-making efforts in city government, and from
the planning that takes place in what are now the Departments of Zoning and Land Use Planning and the
Department of Community Development. They provide technical assistance to developers and to city
departments that must manage or remove environmental contamination in various projects. They do not
have capacity for broader planning or strategy, but still focus on creating additional incentives for difficult
properties at the project level: bundling upside-down sites with lucrative sites for developers to acquire,
and more efficient clean-up: further clarifying municipal liability for city-acquired properties, disposing
of contaminated soil within the city. They still have a good relationship with the IEPA and Region 5
office and are optimistic about new models of industrial development, such as eco-industrial parks to
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further drive brownfields re-use. Rather than identifying new funding, they are paying off past debts;
$1.74 million of the city's CDBG award goes to pay off the Section 108 loan. 199 The City has frozen all
TIF funding for brownfields clean-up in districts that aren't generating any increment.
The Department of Environment's 2009 Budget only lists two positions dedicated to brownfields
(of 77 total) and a budget of $5.9 million (of a total $57.8 million.)200 Though the City's $400 million
budget deficit is likely partly responsible for such cuts, the program had seven staff members dedicated to
Brownfields in 2008. Their budget was smaller in 2008 curiously, $2.28 million (of a total $54.8
million), though this may reflect grant funding cycles as much as the Department's budget. According to
the City's 2009 Budget Summary, the Brownfields Initiative "evaluates, cleans up and provides for the
redevelopment of properties for city projects; provides professional project management, technical advice
and support for other city departments and agencies, manages the shoreline protection project, manages
Recycling and FOIA requests."
Henry Henderson and Donna Ducharme both suggest that the city government's culture explains
the mixed brownfields redevelopment results, especially for large steel sites like USX and Wisconsin
Steel, as a function of Chicago's series of governments at the Department of Planning and Development,
the Department of Environment, the Chicago Transit Authority and the Parks Department. All of these
"little governments" are overseen by the Mayor, each led by a director who for their tenure wants to
achieve their own distinct initiatives, and not necessarily continue the projects of their predecessor. A
challenge for the brownfields program has been adapting its goals of repurposing and reinvesting in land
to the values and priorities of successive Commissioners and agency heads, which now focus on the 2016
Olympics and reducing greenhouse gas emissions.
Beyond this, pure power over development is in operation. The dissolution of the Chicago
Association of Neighborhood Development Organizations (CANDO) serves as a cautionary tale for the
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challenges faced in institutionalizing public and political brownfields programs. CANDO was the non-
profit that provided brownfields training to Chicago CDCs and was heavily supported by the City of
Chicago. It lost its funding and folded after butting heads with a new city Planning Director.201 No
significant economic development program keeps its independence in Chicago. Reflecting on the
political origins of the industrial retention policies that Joel Rast describes in his book Remaking Chicago,
Larry Bennett says:
The current Daley administration's corporatist mode of economic development implementation-
much dependent on contracting with local organizations-can also be viewed as a political
strategy to reduce dissent in a city whose loyal opposition has long been not a political party but
instead a loose network of activist political outsiders, community-based organizations, and
progressive-minded civic organization and foundation staff.202
Evaluating the Initiative & Lessons for the Future
The Forum and early Initiative were a good example of a strong planning process. The Forum
had the buy-in of top level decision-makers, the commitment of a broad group of stakeholders, action-
oriented projects, and an independent convener. The relationships formed there continued to yield
cooperation on other outside initiatives long after the Forum was over.203 When the Forum started, there
was "no market for contaminated industrial property, and they restored that." 204 They resolved issues for
projects that had a developer. "Those projects happen now, there is a market." 20 5 When Clean Sites
interviewed 35 participants three years after the completion of the Forum to determine the outcomes of
many of the Action Agenda items, a lot had been accomplished. The 1998 report described an expanded
City program, a more-engaged private sector, a more educated public, a better legal and regulatory
framework. There was a shift from environmental challenges to development challenges, with access to
capital (in the predevelopment phase especially), site assembly and control topping the list. Preventing
pollution," "influencing regional planning," and recommending things like regional tax base sharing were
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more long term (and complicated) goals and likely beyond the scope of one city's Brownfields program,
though no less rightfully considered by the Forum and included in its recommendations. They could
point to new approaches for regional transportation planning or private Brownfields insurance pools as
signs of progress. They agreed that the Forum's work was finished and the group did not need to
continue to meet. They had also run out of funding, and the MacArthur Foundation didn't renew the
grant.
It was clear that the City was pursuing a Tier I policy. Program leaders knew, according to Joe
Dufficy, that their conception of brownfields were sites that "had potential." He acknowledges that less
has happened on south and west sides of Chicago:
People really knew that if you looked at all vacant properties, there was never going to be enough
public sector resources to flip them, so they focused where they could get something going. It's a
different calculus. The transactions that weren't moving in 1992 still aren't moving." 2 6
They were in fact explicit at the beginning of the Initiative about its inability to solve the city's larger
problems:
Brownfields redevelopment cannot solve all the city's economic development and social
problems. Brownfield initiatives should be viewed as one important component of a
comprehensive strategy for revitalizing urban communities and coordated with other local, state
and federal planning and policy efforts. 207
In these principes, there were elements of McCarthy' s "dual land use policy," preference for projects that
could show benefit, preference for aid to private developers, while maintaining an expectation that
brownfields might have a larger impact. The Forum report shone its light on the city's most disinvested
areas:
The brownfield and potential brownfields of most concern to the city are located in distressed
neighborhoods where property values are low and poverty, high crime rates and other social
problems contrbute to a cycle of decline. These sites will not be redeveloped privately without
some sort of government intervention. 208
A lack of area-wide spatial planning is also striking in the Brownfields Action Plan. It was a
sound policy plan, but not a geographic one. It intended to focus on brownfields on a site by site basis.
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While it acknowledged that it was dealing with difficult sites in "disadvantaged areas" it didn't examine
the nature and the dimensions of the problem it was trying to solve. There also seemed to be a lack of
context and area-wide consideration for the pilot sites. Three were within two miles of each other, in the
unraveling areas of East and West Garfield Park.
The Chicago Brownfields Actions Projects Progress Report in 1998 that followed interviews with
stakeholders determined that in many ways the case was closed, people were comfortable with
brownfields deals, they were easier - there was more of a climate for considering brownfields as part of
the metro's smart growth strategy. Infill development had "great currency." 20 9 The 1998 Report also
identified lingering problems that remain to this day: lack of inventory and information, land assembly
and acquision, interdepartmental relationships, start-up costs, problems with brownfields in distressed
areas. Many of its findings sound familiar over ten years later:
"DPD views its major capacity issues as land assembly, site control and staffing...A database has
not been developed of publicly available environmental and development data on sites with a
history of industrial use or environmental problems. Forum members disagreed about the need
for such a database. Disagreement continues...The other department that support brownfields
work do not always give brownfields high priority.. .Financing site investigations, market
surveys, and other predevelopment costs is still a major barrier for many economially marginal
brownfield sites...Many lenders still will not make brownfields loans, and lending - and
development in general - continues to be more difficult in distressed communities. Brownfields
sites in distressed neighborhoods are even more difficult to redevelop than other brownfields." 210
With no policy emerging to address the lingering problems, they would undermine the very purpose of a
public program, while the private sector would take care of stronger sites.
EPA officials who have worked in severely disinvested cities with an inventory of brownfields far
larger that Chicago's dismiss the City as not being "creative" and more aggressive on brownfields
redevelopment because they haven't had to be. Today the Chicago area's industrial base is still strong;
land prices often high, the region has the largest and most diverse manufacturing economy of any region
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of the United States.2 1 1 Its role as a transportation hub remains strong.212 "When you have enough
industrial real estate deals going, you make sure those deals go through. You have limited staff and
capacity and you're going to dedicate staff to assist market-drive cases, to developers and landowners."2 13
The Director of the National Brownfields Association focuses on the industrial real estate market as well.
"A robust real estate market and strong liability relief has led to a lot of redevelopment." 214 One might
argue that the Brownfields program metamorphosized into much more powerful forces for sustainability
and economic justice in Chicago, and dwelling on the brownfields term and history only masks this. The
region has had some success with smart growth:
A lot of the dreams of smart growth have been built: town centers along commuter rail lines, and
there has been a tremendous amount of infill housing. When we started this process, there were
no industrial or housing starts in the city. Today, 40% of the housing starts in the region are in
the City of Chicago. There has been significant industrial redevelopment. 215
It isn't clear, however, that many of these things would have happened on their own, and what a stronger
more coordinated brownfields program could have accomplished.
In the end, the bureaucratization of the program came up short. It failed to institutionalize
programs in a way that would endure the inevitable regimes and executive control of Chicago
government. But in other ways, the program didn't fit market realities throughout the city. The program
got into trouble when it defined and codified its program as a real estate development one, when many of
the challenges the city faces are insurmountable as real estate problems. The program knew all along that
brownfields alone wouldn't be enough to turn around sites: "For communities to reap the full benefit of
brownfield cleanups, multiple city resources need to cooperate to 'close the loop' that links enviornmental
remediation, predevelopment and redevelopment activities."2 16
211 World Business Chicago. "Chicago Manufacturing...A story of constant change."
http://www.worldbusinesschicago.com/Portals/0/infocenter files/manufacturing.pdf (accessed 13 Apr 2009).
212 Chicago Metropolis 2020, (December 2004) "Metropolis Freight Plan, Delivering the Goods."
http://www.chicagometropolis2020.org/documents/MetropolisFreightPlan.pdf (accessed 13 Apr 2009).
213 Furio, Brooke. Telephone interview by author.
214 Colangelo, Robert. Telephone interview by author.
215 Van der Kloot, Jim. Telephone interview by author
216 City of Chicago 1995
While Chapter 4 will analyze the remediation and redevelopment that has taken place in various
areas of the City, the case of the Chicago Brownfields Initiative over the last fifteen years shows that the
City has operated within a Tier I policy on a site by site basis, with the greatest criteria for project
assistance being ease of redevelopment. The city was still touting a Tier I strategy in 2003 - that sites
should be prioritized by ease of acquistion, availability of funding, complexity of cleaning and
redevelopment potential and timing. 217 It has also operated without a brownfields inventory, a spatial
plan or a comprehensive area-wide approach for undertaking brownfields work. The Chicago case
illustrates the difficulties of not having a Tier III strategy in a city with a large number of Tier III sites.
The Chicago case shows that even with substantial resources to address brownfields projects and wide
discretion to use them, a lack of planning and criteria to guide public spending is bound to result in a lack
of discernable impact.
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A Closer Look at Clean-up & Redevelopment
There has never been an outside evaluation of the Chicago Initiative's investments nor of all
private-sector brownfields redevelopment within the city.218 This chapter uses spatial data to evaluate
both public and private investigation and clean-up. It examines whether the Chicago case fits the pattern
observed in other voluntary clean-up programs: remediation driven by the private real estate market,
uneven geographic distribution of clean-ups, cherry-picked public projects, and failure to more
fundamentally address larger environmental, economic justice and smart growth objectives through its
policy. It uses the city's seventy-seven community areas and their attributes, the city's natural features,
and land-use zoning and development incentives to describe where clean up has occurred. It also
examines the extent to which redevelopment was an outcome of site investigation and remediation. It
finally uses case studies of three areas throughout the city with differing brownfields typologies.
Though the city has attempted a more equitable and even geographic distribution of brownfields
projects, and has achieved this in part though an industrial strategy, this chapter finds that public
investment in clean-ups and redevelopment in Chicago has been unsystematic, site-specific, driven by
reuse, with no coherent approach to sites in distressed areas. Moreover, the acreage represented by public
and private Brownfields clean-ups is only a fraction of the total amount of vacant land in the city.
Illinois Site Remediation Program
As discussed in Chapter 3, the State of Illinois was the second state in the country to begin a state
voluntary clean-up program, the Pre-Notice Site Clean-up program, in 1989. The program became
218The 1998 Forum did suggest, however, that the Initative analyze industrial building permits and values over time
to understand "long term trends" and "to know which brownfields projects do no move forward, to fine tune
brownfields advocacy and policy planning." (City of Chicago 1998, 18)
known as the Site Remediation Program (SRP) in 1996 after it was revised to relax liability standards. 219
The SRP, a fee for service program, is self-sustaining and does not compete for general funds in the
state's budget each year. (The IEPA's current work on brownfields has been limited to the SRP. Capital
budget shortfalls at the state have shelved the IEPA's municipal assistance programs. The IEPA has only
ever targeted municipalities for brownfields funding and technical assistance.) Through the SRP,
developers or responsible parties work with state staff to investigate properties according to state
standards and complete a level of satisfactory clean-up. To complete their Phase 2 Assessments,
applicants present development plans, samples, site maps, and propose remedial objectives and final use
of the property. Once the work is finished, the applicant completes a Remedial Action Completion
Report and Plan Specification, has a licensed professional engineer sign off on the plan and the state
issues the applicant a No Further Remediation Letter. Fees to enroll, to cover SRP oversight services, and
to receive the Nor Further Remediation Letter, start at about $5,000. There are approximately 2,000 sites
pending at any given time in the SRP.220
As of March 2009, there were 4,148 unique sites currently enrolled in the SRP. The seven-
county Chicago metropolitan area 221 accounts for the vast majority of sites in the state, 72.7% or 3,016
clean-ups. This makes sense, given the region's intense industrial development and its high land values.
Though Chicago has only 6% of the land area in the seven-county region, it had 34.7% of the region's
clean-ups. The 1,047 unique SRP located within the City of Chicago account for a quarter of all
investigations and clean-ups in the state.222 Chicago's sites are 44% of the sites in Cook County, though
the city only accounts for only 24% of the county's land area. Of the sites in the City of Chicago, 614
(58.6%) needed to complete clean-up and have been issued a no-further-remediation letter from the state.
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administered through the Pre-Notice Site Cleanup Program (1989 to 1995) and the Site Remediation Program (1996
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SRP: Mostly Private, Small, Commercial and Industrial, North, West and Close to Downtown
Remediation Agent - Of the City's 1,047 entries, 903 (or 83%) were undertaken by the private
sector. 144 (13.8%), were carried out by the City of Chicago. Of these, The 68 sites were enrolled by the
Department of Environment (DOE), which represent dedicated redevelopment projects undertaken by the
city. The remaining 76 public SRP sites were undertaken by City sister agencies: the Parks Department,
the Department of General Services, Aviation, the Public Building Commission, the Chicago Public
Schools and the Chicago Transit Authority, to address sites of the City operations and facilities. The City
enrolls all the sites that it remediates in the Site Remediation Program. Given this, the 68 Department of
Environment sites (6.5% of all clean-ups in the City) constitutes a fairly small number of public
redevelopment projects and the extent to which the SRP is a private-sector-driven and private-sector
serving program. (See Table 4.1 and Figure 4.1 for a summary of clean-up location totals.)
Table 4.1 Illinois Site Remediation Program Totals, 1989-2009
No. of Percent Percent Percent
Unique Percent of of of Percent
Sites of State Metro Cook Chicago of NFR
Total State Sites 4148 -
Total 7 Counties 3016 72.7% -
Total Cook 2381 57.4% 78.9% -
Total Chicago 1047 25.2% 34.7% 44.0% -
Total City-Remediated 144 3.5% 4.8% 6.0% 13.8%
Total DOE-Remediated 68 1.6% 2.3% 2.9% 6.5%
Total NFR 614 14.8% 20.4% 25.8% 58.6%
Total Residential 290 7.0% 9.6% 12.2% 27.7% 47.2%
Total Ind/Comm 324 7.8% 10.7% 13.6% 30.9% 52.8%
The first SRP site enrolled in the City of Chicago was the Interlake Landfill in the Calumet area
in August of 1990. Figure 4.1 shows the frequency of unique properties enrolled by year (and
brownfields "phase" discussed in Chapter 3) in Chicago, both those carried out by the DOE, other city
agencies and the total. The program didn't begin to really take off until 1996-1997, likely due to the
Chicago Brownfields Forum and related reforms. The city performed most of its clean-ups between 1997
and 2003, the years that it had funds from the EPA showcase grant and the Section 108 loan. The city's
program "peaked" in clean-ups in 2002, while the total SRP entries peaked in 2005. The number of public
and private clean-ups dropped in 2006 and 2007. In this way, brownfields clean-ups track with other real
estate, as values in general peaked in 2005 in the most recent cycle.
Figure 4.1 Frequency of Clean-ups by Year in the City of Chicago (See Appendix for Table)
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Size - The mean of the land acreage associated with all Chicago SRP sites is 4.68. The mean
acreage associated with all public sites is 6.07 and the mean acreage of DOE remediated sites is 6.98.
This variation suggests the disproportionate number of small sites handled by the private sector.
Excluding 66 sites for which no acreage is recorded, 51% of the private sites are less than one acre in size.
Of all city and DOE sites, 35% and 39% of the respective sites under one acre. (A typical Chicago
residential block, net of streets and alleys, is about 3.4 acres.223 A residential lot is about 0.07 acres.) This
suggests that the public sector is likely to handles larger, more difficult acreages.
Land Use - To determine the general land use characteristics of remediated sites, the number of
sites were sorted as to whether they were located on land zoned commercial, industrial, residential or
vacant (non-wetlands) in 1990. The results are shown in Table 4.2. All remediated sites were rather
evenly split between commercial and industrial sites at 37% and 36% each. Over ten percent were vacant
parcels and just over nine percent residential. The Department of the Environment had an equal split
between sites zoned industrial, commercial and vacant in 1990 (around 28-30%), while the total of all
sites cleaned up that were vacant in 1990 was 10% - suggesting that City policy has shown a preference
for restoring vacant sites to productive use. Because protected planned manufacturing districts account
for about half of the land area in industrial zoned corridors, and that an additional 25% of industrial land
in the city is outside of industrial corridors, 224 it cannot be assumed that the 385 industrially zoned sites
all had an ultimate industrial use, it is likely that zoning changes and special use permits have allowed for
commercial and residential uses, especially in "transition" community areas around the downtown core.
Without access to more recent zoning records, it is difficult to know such outcomes.
There are 24 industrial corridors within the city, designated districts that are represented by local
groups active in planning with industrial businesses and other stakeholders to make improvements and to
focus on marketing the district. The smallest is 0.13 square miles; most are less than 1 square mile. The
two largest are the Stockyards at 2.3 square miles and Calumet at 6.5 square miles. The 14 planned
manufacturing districts in the city, which are a protected subset of the industrial corridors.225 Though
industrial corridors cover 11% of the city's area, they represent 26% (281) of the Chicago SRP sites. If
one looks at all sites enrolled in the SRP on land zoned industrial in 1990, they accounts for 37% of all of
the Chicago clean-ups. Similarly, 12% of the City's land area is zoned commercial, and 36% of the
223Chicago Metropolitan Planning Council. "Zoning in Chicago."
http://www.metroplanning.org/Zoningguide/zoning chicago.html (accessed 27 Feb 2009).
224 Ducharme, Donna. Telephone interview by author.
225 Thesis was unable to access shape files for Planned Manufacturing Districts.
clean-ups took place on this type of land. This suggests equal preference for commercial and industrial
sites over residential or vacant sites and even though early policy was geared towards industrial retention
these have not constituted a large majority of clean-ups. This is further striking when considering that
standards for industrial clean-up are often less stringent and that, relatively speaking, it is less challenging
to redevelop in industrial area, as proximity to other contaminated properties in an industrial district,
doesn't reduce the value of neighboring properties.226 Commercial sites, however, haven't been evenly
distributed. Nine of the ten communities with ten or more commercial clean-ups were located on the
north or west sides of the city. (See Appendix 4.)
Table 4.2 All Chicago Remediated Sites by 1990 Land Use (NIPC)
Land Use (1990) Number Percentage Number Percentage
of Sites of City of DOE of DOE
Total Sites Sites
Industrial 385 36.8% 21 30.9%
Commercial 375 35.8% 18 26.5%
Vacant Excl Wetlands 109 10.4% 18 26.5%
Residential 95 9.1% 6 8.8%
TCU Excl Interstates 46 4.4% 2 2.9%
Institutional Excl Cemeteries 24 2.3% 2 2.9%
Open Space 6 0.6% 0 0.0%
Cemeteries 2 0.2% 0 0.0%
Water 2 0.2% 0 0.0%
Wetlands 2 0.2% 1 1.5%
Expressway 1 0.1% 0 0.0%
Total 1047 100.0% 68 100.0%
Other geographic features related to current or past industrial or commercial land use may also
determine the location of SRP sites. The following table shows the number of SRP sites within 1000 feet
of the following features and their relative proportion of all clean-ups. It is interesting to note that half of
all waterfront clean-ups in the city are clustered around the north branch of the Chicago River. Railroad
lines are a good proxy for historical industrial land use in Chicago, as its industrial development was
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linked to railroad growth. The large proportion of clean-ups near rail lines reflects this. Finally, it is
interesting to note the share which are close to CTA rail lines, a feature that creates land value particularly
on the dense north side of Chicago.
Table 4.3 Infrastructure and Natural Features and SRP clean-up
Feature Number of Percentage
SRP sites of total SRP
within 1000
feet
North Branch 41 4%
of Chicago
River
Expressway 57 5%
All waterfront 77 7%
CTA Line 129 12%
Railroads 200 19%
General Look at Community Areas - The fifteen community areas with the most clean-ups are
listed in Table 4.4 and shown in Figure 4.2. In general, these areas surround the City's industrial
corridors. Most are located on the north and west Sides of the City. These community areas might be
categorized in three ways: affluent, industrial or transition. The first category have income and housing
values above the city median, have a whiter population and that have seen a large amount of real estate
investment in general, (Near North Side, Lincoln Park, Lakeview, West Ridge & Belmont Cragin). The
second category could be generalized as poorer communities of color that have about a third of their land
zoned industrial: West Town, South Deering, Humboldt Park, Austin, New City and North Lawndale.
(Belmont Cragin also has a high percentage of industrial zoned land.) A hybrid consideration of the two
might be considered "transition" communities, where booming residential and commercial development
(and gentrification) on formerly industrial land has caused a high enrollment in the SRP program in the
last twenty years. These communities are the Near West Side, Lower West Side, Near South Side and
Logan Square. Four downtown community areas: the Loop, Near North, West and South sides all added
population in the 1990s, having lost population in the preceding forty years.
Table 4.4 Community Areas with Highest Number of Clean-ups
Area Number Type Percent Average Median Pct Percentage
of Sites Zoned Home Income White of Sites
Industrial Sale (City City:
1990 Price Median: 43.23%
(2000 38,625)
Census)
Near West Side 63 Transition 24.69% 204,411 29,588 29.63% 6.02%
Near North Side 47 Affluent 22.11% 625,692 57,811 72.91% 4.49%
Logan Square 39 Industrial 24.82% 16,024 36,245 51.21% 3.72%
Lower West Side 33 Transition 22.54% 109,264 38,915 61.05% 3.15%
West Town 33 Industrial 41.37% 271,194 27,763 40.52% 3.15%
Lincoln Park 31 Affluent 15.31% 518,063 68,613 88.73% 2.96%
Near South Side 30 Transition 13.94% 335,101 34,329 26.76% 2.87%
South Deering 28 Industrial 27.81% 75,629 34,789 21.17% 2.67%
Lakeview 26 Affluent 10.08% 392,967 53,881 19.90% 2.48%
Humboldt Park 26 Industrial 34.58% 95,270 28,728 86.03% 2.48%
West Ridge 25 Affluent 4.38% 109,937 41,144 60.87% 2.39%
Austin 25 Industrial 30.34% 189,474 33,663 6.22% 2.39%
Belmont Cragin 23 Affluent 31.04% 81,706 43,159 61.15% 2.20%
New City 23 Industrial 49.85% 147,258 25,647 35.50% 2.20%
South Lawndale 22 Industrial 33.00% 105,201 32,320 30.58% 2.10%
Given that SRP activity may follow heavy industrial land use or strong real estate market-community
areas, we can also take a closer look at clean-ups by total land use zoning across community areas.
Because of Chicago's policy focus on industrial areas and their likelihood of contamination, we might
expect that brownfields work has been concentrated in communities with large industrial coverage.
Brownfields literature finds that most clean-up occurs in areas that might be older, have past or present
industrial land use and currently have a strong real estate market and current pressures for
redevelopment.228
227 Bennett et al. 2004, 3-4
228 Bjelland 2004
Figure 4.2 - The 15 Areas with Highest Number of Clean-ups (Shown with Industrial Land and
High-Income Communities)
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Chicago's past industrial land use patterns look a lot like their current industrial zoning, which
continue to hug the city's rivers (see Appendix 11 for map of industrial investments in the 1940s).
Current industrial corridors and zoning might in some areas be a good proxy for recent industrial use.
Looking just at one measure, the percentage of land zoned industrial in the community area; the
correlation coefficient of 0.126 is relatively weak. Of the 77 community areas, 54 followed the general
pattern where areas with a below (or above) average amount of industrial land use had a below (or above)
average number of clean-ups. (See Appendix 3 for figure showing this relationship). Twenty three
community areas, however, do not fit this pattern, 10 have more than their share of sites enrolled in the
SRP, and 13 have less than one would expect. The results are shown in Table 4.5.
Table 4.5 Community Areas with Irregular Clean-up Trends Given Industrial Zoning
Where One Would Not Expect to See Clean up: Industrialized acreage below City Mean
Area % of Land # of % of Sites Average Median %White
Zoned Clean-ups Home HH (City:
Industrial (City Sale Price Income 43.23%)
(City Mean Mean 13) (132,400) (City
21.09%) Median:
38625)
Loop - 14 1.34% 202,476 65,128 67.24%
Albany Park 2.16% 16 1.53% 171,741 40,711 53.11%
West Ridge 4.38% 25 2.39% 189,474 41,144 60.87%
Portage Park 7.90% 16 1.53% 163,899 45,117 84.19%
Lakeview 10.08% 26 2.48% 392,967 53,881 86.03%
East Garfield Park 12.69% 16 1.53% 98,699 24,216 1.30%
Irving Park 13.78% 16 1.53% 174,816 42,037 67.16%
Near South Side 13.94% 30 2.87% 335,101 34,329 26.76%
Lincoln Park 15.31% 31 2.96% 518,063 68,613 88.73%
West Pullman 15.42% 17 1.62% 82,281 40,478 2.61%
Where One Would Expect to See Clean up, But Doesn't: Industrialized acreage above City Mean
Area % of Land # of % of Sites Average Median % White
Zoned Clean- Home Income (City:
Industrial (City ups (City Sale Price (City 43.23%)
Mean 21.09%) Mean 13) (132,400) Median:
38625)
Riverdale 21.43% 1 0.10% 54,601 13,178 0.96%
South Chicago 23.82% 10 0.96% 85,045 28,279 13.29%
Montclare 31.45% 5 0.48% 156,963 46,636 74.13%
Gage Park 33.37% 10 0.96% 97,790 36,463 49.43%
East Side 34.66% 3 0.29% 90,758 39,724 57.92%
Pullman 50.64% 8 0.76% 82,881 30,966 12.15%
Burnside 51.36% 7 0.67% 78,900 34,790 1.44%
Clearing 53.96% 5 0.48% 132,280 45,533 87.98%
O'Hare 57.87% 5 0.48% 228,265 43,542 88.07%
Forest Glen 58.81% 3 0.29% 266,688 68,269 88.61%
Garfield Ridge 65.29% 9 0.86% 135,222 45,436 78.97%
West Lawn 65.40% 5 0.48% 119,816 47,017 65.64%
Hermosa 83.82% 10 0.96% 132,002 38,159 43.07%
Figure 4.2 Community Areas with Above or Below "Average" SRP activity
-L--I 1 Miles
0 1.25 2.5 5 7.5 10
Of these 23, a few outliers are worth noting. The Loop, the central downtown area of Chicago,
though historically industrial and port land, currently has no land zoned industrial, but as the site of the
highest real estate values in the city. With the likelihood of contaminated soil there, it makes sense that
developers and owners in this area would have enrolled properties in the SRP. The 14 SRP sites in the
Loop are just over the city's average. Albany Park has almost no industrial land, but as a neighborhood
with relatively high purchasing power, almost all of its remediation has been on commercially zoned land.
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The sites were registered as former dry cleaners, auto uses, and as new schools and residences. West
Ridge's 25 clean-ups mimic Albany Park's patterns. Portage Park's small Knox Industrial District is
adjacent to the Kennedy Expressway and just under three miles from O'Hare Airport, making its
industrial and commercial land valuable and the intensity of site investigation clean-up (16 sites) activity
likely. Irving Park borders the Knox corridor to the east, and the north branch of the Chicago River to the
west. Its clean-ups are mostly industrial and a few are commercial. The Eisenhower Expressway runs
right through East Garfield Park (the blighted area just south of the Chicago Center for Green
Technology). The area is relatively close to downtown. Three of its clean-ups were industrial, and its
other clean-ups were residentially, commercially or institutionally zoned sites.
The Near South Side, traditionally industrial, has been the site of intense redevelopment activity
in the last twenty years, with thousands of units of housing added and land values that have skyrocketed.
Lincoln Park is one of the wealthiest areas in the city; it is close to the Lake and contains a large stock of
high-priced lakefront condos. Its average income is nearly double that of the rest of the city, and its
average home price is over four times that of the rest of the city. Lincoln Park has been the location of
intense real estate investment over the last twenty years. The North Branch of the Chicago River and its
industrial corridor forms the western border of Lincoln Park and Lakeview. This industrial corridor
between has been the site of a significant number of brownfields clean-ups, for both commercial and
industrial uses and will be discussed at the end of this chapter. The final community with below average
industrial zoning and above average SRP activity could not be more different from the Near South Side or
Lincoln Park. West Pullman, a relatively low-density community area on southern border of the city,
with relatively small industrial land coverage (though a 150-years-old industrial history), has been the site
of City efforts to invest in brownfields remediation and redevelopment, with modest results. The West
Pullman case will also be discussed below.
There are two ways to categorize the 13 communities with above average industrial area and
below average SRP activity. They are either more newly industrialized areas along the edges of the city
that haven't yet seen redevelopment, and associated with development around Midway or O'Hare
Airports and are largely in industrial use. The other set of communities, like Eastside, Pullman, and
Burnside, are located in and around Lake Calumet, the heavily industrialized area on the southeast side of
the city. Efforts for clean-up and reuse in these communities have been long, contentious and limited. A
discussion of the Calumet area also follows at the end of the Chapter.
Environmental Justice
The extent to which brownfield policy and the SRP process in general have countered a legacy of
environmental injustice and uneven development in Chicago can also be measured by community area.
Using five indictors attributed to each community area using data from the 2000 Census, one might
describe eighteen community areas as "low income and low opportunity," which compared with the rest
of the city, have above average unemployment, above average non-white population and above average
residents without a high school diploma. Residents have below city average income and home value. Of
these eighteen neighborhoods, ten have an above average percentage of their land devoted to industrial
clean-up, which is consistent with the well-known studies that poor and minority populations
disproportionately live near heavy industrial and polluted land uses. These eighteen areas are shown
below in Table 4.6 Five of these communities have had some of the highest numbers of sites listed with
the state program, New City, Humboldt Park, South Lawndale, Austin and South Deering. These are areas
with significant industrial zoning.
Table 4.6 - Communities with High Unemployment, Minority Residents, Low Levels of Education,
Income and Home Value in 2000 Census by Percentage of Industrial Zoning
Expected Median
Amount % Non- % less Median Home
of Unemp. white than HS Income Value
Clean- Number % of % (City (City (City (City, (City
Area up? of Sites Sites Industrial 10.1) 43.2%) 28.18%) 38,625) 132,400)
Hermosa Less 10 0.96% 83.82% 11.5 56.93% 49.85% 38,159 132,002
Burnside Less 7 0.67% 51.36% 18.4 98.56% 28.50% 34,790 78,900
New City Yes 23 2.20% 49.85% 14.9 64.50% 53.04% 25,647 81,706
Humboldt Park Yes 26 2.48% 34.58% 17.8 80.10% 49.72% 28,728 95,270
South Yes
Lawndale 22 2.10% 33.00% 11.7 69.42% 62.71% 32,320 105,201
Austin Yes 25 2.39% 30.34% 17.4 93.78% 33.77% 33,663 109,937
South Deering Yes 28 2.67% 27.81% 11.9 78.83% 28.82% 34,789 75,629
South Chicago Less 10 0.96% 23.82% 18.2 86.71% 34.06% 28,279 85,045
North Yes
Lawndale 17 1.62% 23.79% 25.8 97.44% 39.53% 18,342 81,473
Riverdale Less 1 0.10% 21.43% 33.5 99.04% 37.55% 13,178 54,601
West Garfield Yes
Park 5 0.48% 13.70% 22.1 99.30% 42.05% 23,121 87,676
East Garfield More
Park 16 1.53% 12.69% 22.9 98.70% 39.40% 24,216 98,699
Fuller Park Yes 3 0.29% 11.94% 16.4 98.64% 34.75% 18,412 65,536
Englewood Yes 5 0.48% 8.57% 25.8 99.39% 40.72% 18,955 63,889
West Yes
Englewood 10 0.96% 7.04% 24.5 99.38% 37.23% 26,693 69,558
Chicago Lawn Yes 11 1.05% 6.71% 15.7 75.62% 34.74% 35,983 91,411
Washington Yes
Park 1 0.10% 5.56% 24.8 99.32% 39.76% 15,160 86,217
Woodlawn Yes 7 0.67% 3.15% 19.8 96.93% 32.29% 18,266 84,160
The distressed areas that have seen below average clean-ups, Hermosa, Burnside, South Chicago,
and Riverdale are of most concern because they have a significant amount of industrial zoned property,
and likely considerable contamination. West Garfield Park, Fuller Park, Englewood, and Washington
Park have seen few clean-ups. This underscores that there has been less SRP activity in low income
areas, and that it is more likely to be clustered in those community areas with high property value and
high purchasing power. This is consistent with studies in other cities as well, that have found that a
majority of the successful brownfields redevelopments were not located in low income communities of
color.2 2 9
Chicago is a segregated city. In looking at its demographic data by community area, there are 22
community areas that were over 90% African-American in 2000, and 33 communities that were under
10% African American in 2000 (14 are less than 2%). The nearly all-African American community areas,
account for 18% of the City's SRP clean-ups, though 27% of the City's land area. Just under half of all
Department of Environment clean-ups were in all-African American neighborhoods. The all-white
communities account for 46% of the clean-ups for 45% of the land area. All-African American areas
have had a less of remediation and redevelopment investment given their land area size, though this may
229 Paull 2008,. 7
not be disproportionate given that their industrial corridors are only 16 square miles, while all-white
communities contain 26 square miles worth of industrial corridor. This isn't to say that these areas are
not lacking in overall investment. Six of the 10 communities that have the highest incidence of tax
foreclosed property are all-African American communities. In addition, 56% of all buildings recorded as
being built since 1990 were in the all-white communities, while only 21% have been built in all-African
American communities.
Community Areas - Publicly Initiated Projects
In the context of a privately-driven clean-up framework, the city policy has tried to correct for
market failures by targeting low incomes areas. A third (48 of 144) of all of the city-enrolled SRP sites
were in these neighborhoods of low income and opportunity. About 40% (27/68) of the Department of
Environment initiated clean-ups have occurred in these areas of distress, indicating redevelopment
attention and activity throughout the city, but no clear policy preference for these areas. (21% of Private
clean-ups, by contrast, were located in such communities.) The community areas that show up with
"above average clean-up" have generally had a high number of city agency or Department of
Environment SRP enrollment there. As for the Department of Environment's activities in general, they
have at least 1 SRP site in 35 of the community areas, slightly less than half. Seventeen community areas
have more than one SRP site and five community areas have more than 2 sites (shown in Table 4.7).
Three of these areas fall into the category of low opportunity and two others, West Pullman and New
City (the old stockyards industrial area), have been the site of intense industrial redevelopment attention.
Table 4.7 - Department of the Environment's SRP Activity in the Community Areas
Community Count
West Pullman 10
New City 5
East Garfield Park 4
North Lawndale 4
West Garfield Park 3
Ashburn 2
Edgewater 2
Greater Grand Crossing 2
Lake View 2
Lincoln Park 2
Loop 2
Near North Side 2
Near West Side 2
South Chicago 2
South Lawndale 2
Uptown 2
Woodlawn 2
Figure 4.3 shows the all City Agency SRP sites (schools, parks, police stations) and all
Department of Environment's SRP sites (dedicated redevelopment projects). Starred on the map are 14
sites that the Department of the Environment highlighted in their 2003 publication along with the amount
of investment used, the details of remediation and the jobs created. Ten appear on the list of Department
of Environment remediated sites, while two others were privately remediated, and two (a former press
building on the Chicago River and a daycare on a former automotive use site) were not entered into the
SRP at all. Three were industrial parks (Chicago Avenue, West Pullman and Gateway Park), five were
industrial-type sites: a union hall, an Aramark facility at the site of the former International
Amphitheater, the Chicago Center for Green Technology mentioned in Chapter 1, an airline training
center, and infrastructure for the privately-remediated Ford Supplier Park. Two were large mixed use
sites: one was the 600-acre South Works mixed use site, and another the 17.5 acre Job Corps site. The
final four were smaller neighborhood uses: a daycare, a safe home for kids, a townhome development in
the distressed Woodlawn neighborhood, and another housing development in Bronzeville. The majority
of Chicago's highlighted sites are on the south or west sites of the city and nearly all are in distressed
community areas.
Of all the Department of Environment SRP, some appear to have been wise investments, like the
site of the new Chicago Sun Times production facility on the Lower West Side, or day care and infill
housing in New City. Others, like the sculpture park in Lincoln Park, are questionable. There is also a
remediated parcel in the Stockyards Industrial Park that has been vacant for two years since it's the posted
completion date on the project sing, has become a de facto dumpsite for truck tires.
Figure 4.3 Public Clean-ups By Department and Community
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Outcomes by Targeted City Policy and Incentives
One measure for determining the effectiveness of Chicago's program is the connection between
SRP sites and other city incentives, the extent to which Brownfields clean-ups with the SRP are tied to
local economic development incentives and systems such as Tax Increment Financing (TIF) districts,
Enterprise and Empowerment Zones, industrial corridors and zoning.
TIF districts are one of the City of Chicago's major economic and redevelopment tools, and the
city's authority to create TIFs was greatly expanded in the late 1990s to help finance industrial
redevelopment across separate TIF districts. In Chicago, land acquisition, site preparation, environmental
remediation, building rehabilitation, job training, public improvements, studies and surveys, relocation
and other development costs are all eligible for TIF funding and any TIF allocations must be approved by
the City Council.230 There are 158 TIF districts across the city of Chicago. Of these, 14 of these are
commercial, 36 are industrial, 92 are mixed-use and 16 are residential. These TIFs vary widely in
revenue and expenditures; the City does not detail expenditures by environmental clean-up, though this is
one of the designated uses of the funds, so it's difficult to know exactly how many site clean-ups
benefitted from TIF funding. Some TIFs are prohibited from making new investments (in anything other
than fire stations and libraries) until the district begins generating property increment. 231 TIF funding has
helped the city repay the Section 108 loan for environmental remediation in sites in the city that are
located in TIFs.232
In total, 666 (63%) of the SRP sites fall inside of TIF districts, suggesting a fairly wide
application for brownfields clean-ups, for a tool that only covers 30% of the City's land area (69 square
miles). The land that TIF districts cover, however, is largely commercial and industrial. These TIF SRP
sites encompass many different types of land-use: 267 (40%) were in industrial TIFs, 29 were in
commercial TIFs, 350 (52.6%) were in mixed use TIFs and 20 were in residential TIFs. The four TIF
districts with the most clean-ups were all industrial: Pilsen (35), Kinzie (31), Lake Calumet (31), and
Northwest (26). In addition, 55 of the 68 city-initiated sites were located within a TIF district, suggesting
a coordinated use of public redevelopment tools. The City, however, has been criticized for using the
program too liberally and draining public resources.233
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There are three federal empowerment zones in Chicago - South, West and Pilsen - totaling of 14
square miles, and covering 6% of the City. Empowerment zones are designated by HUD to promote
community and job development in low-income neighborhoods by reducing the cost of doing business
there. One might imagine that given these inducements, those developing businesses in these zones might
also be remediating brownfields. A slightly higher proportion, 116 (11%) of the remediated sites were
located in Empowerment Zones. Often a counterpart to Empowerment zones, Enterprise Zones, also
encourage redevelopment in low-income neighborhoods through tax credits and other incentives. They
have a much larger coverage, at 30% of the city area. The Empowerment zones are almost entirely
contained with the Enterprise zones. 487 (46%) of the sites are located in areas covered by Enterprise
zones in the City. Both types of zones account for a higher proportion of the remediated sites than at least
their land area coverage would suggest.
Outcomes - Development
As Joe Dufficy described, the implied outcome of site remediation is some type of capital
investment or development. There were just 103 SRP sites that intersected with the parcels that contained
one of the 28,337 buildings built after 1990 (the date of the first brownfields clean-up in Chicago). This
constitutes a 10% redevelopment rate for properties enrolled in the SRP. This finding might be
understated because only half of the building records from the city's file have a year-built attributed to
them. The number of remediated parcels that also have a building on them is larger, 486, which would
put the upper estimate of new or rehabilitated buildings on brownfields parcels at 46%. Judging from the
fact that 58% of the SRP sites have a No-Further Remediation letter, not all remediated or investigated
sites have needed the full protections required for redevelopment.
Sites that were issued a No Further Remediation Letter are the most likely to be redeveloped, as
such a letter is a prerequisite for bank financing and for a transfer of ownership of the site. Of the 614
sites issued a No Further Remediation Letter, just over half were for industrial/commercial end uses, 324
(53%). Just under half of the No Further Remediation Letters were issued for residential properties, 290
(47%), suggesting the strictest attention to clean-up, and the need for liability relief for residential use.
The environmental reporter for the Chicago Tribune speculated that much of the recent big box
development in Chicago has been located on former brownfields.234 The evidence from the SRP database
is less clear, a query of sites named for national retail chains such as Jewell-Osco, Home Depot, Aldi and
Costco only yielded 12 results. It may be that these sites have not been enrolled in the SRP program, or
were done in the name of the developer. But the reporter's conjecture is supported by the fact that sites in
areas zoned commercial have equal weight in brownfields clean-ups, as shown in Table 4.2.
Conclusions from the SRP
Chicago's thousand SRP brownfields would have been unimaginable 15 years ago. SRP clean-
ups are for all practical purposes how brownfields clean-ups are achieved in a city like Chicago. What is
clear from the above findings, though, is that this undertaking has been a largely private, market driven
program, favoring smaller commercial and industrial sites and mirroring larger real estate investment in
the City of Chicago, which of course is uneven. It has likely helped facilitate the transition of newly
redeveloped areas in the City that were historically industrial and have seen redevelopment, like the near
South and West side. Nearly all of the low income and opportunity areas have seen only modest amounts
of clean-up, certainly less than the kind of investment that is needed
Though conceived as tool for industrial property, the SRP has faciltiated the redevelopment of a
large number of commercial sites as well, which have been concentrated on the north and west sides of
the city. It's redevelopment outcomes have been less strong, and so the aggregate benefit of the program
in terms of the commonly measured outcomes might be less certain. The commonly used success-
measures: jobs, large private investment, and tax base contribution, which result from development, are
unknown without access to city tax records and sales data. The SRP database shows that City-initiated
SRP sites have been relatively better distributed throughout the City than private ones, and have been
234Hawthorne, Michael. Telephone interview by author.
concentrated in a few community areas. The city has also focused equal attention on Tier I sites in
affluent or developing neighborhoods. The SRP looks as if it has enhanced development in TIF districts
and planned industrial districts.
As many knew at the outset, the brownfields program could not work on its own, and where it has
been successful, there was an end-user, and clean-up and redevelopment might have occurred anyway. It
has certainly been a tool for development in parts of the city that are certainly not unraveling, but less so
in communities in the city that are unraveling. Brownfields policy is an incomplete tool, incapable of
reversing disinvestment as was envisioned by many.
Many estimated the number of Chicago brownfields at 2,000. If 1,047 sites to date have been
remediated within the City limits, a 50% remediation rate is a substantial success, especially given that
early brownfields literature focused on decades-long horizons. However, defining brownfields is tricky.
It is uncertain if the city originally "counted" the sites that were cleaned up. The 2,000 number is likely
low - given that much of the city is built on contaminated fill, and that the EPA's current list of hazardous
activities for the City numbers 6,859 discrete sites. At the very least, the subset of this list, the 454
Chicago sites for toxic chemical releases and waste management activities, suggesting a subset of
immediate concern. 235
If the City's planning staff guesses that there are 55,485236 vacant parcels in the city, (of which
the city owns 15,273 parcels and 2,691 acres) the potential inventory starts to look more daunting. Of the
city-owned parcels, over 3,200 alone were zoned industrial or commercial in 1990 - another potential
inventory. In parcel numbers, the number of clean-up sites in Chicago versus the number of individual
vacant lots is less than 2%. In acreage terms, according to the SRP, the remediated sites represent 2,841
acres of city land, 20% of the city's acreage estimated to be vacant in the CitySpace plan. Though these
numbers are very rough, it suggests that Chicago's brownfields program has made only a small dent in
the problem. Chicago has never established and published a brownfields inventory as other cities have,
235 United States Environmental Protection Agency. "Envirofacts" http://www.epa.gov/enviro/ (accessed 13 Mar
2009)
236 City of Chicago, "CitySpace Plan" 1998
and so there has never been a public attempt to define the dimensions of the problem. This alone makes
it difficult to know what the City has accomplished.
Clean-up and Redevelopment at a Finer Scale
This section looks at SRP sites more closely at a community area scale, where clean-up has
transpired differently given the characteristics of that area, or targeted policies. The following are three
different brownfields stories that mirror the three categories that Bjelland sets out: voluntary clean-up,
sites of economic distress, and Superfund sites. They were chosen because they were "outliers" in the
above analysis, and had seen more or less clean-up than expected based on their industrial land use, and
where the City of Chicago has had a unique history of involvement.
Clybourn Corridor - High Value Area & High Volume of Voluntary Private Clean-up
Clybourn Avenue runs parallel to the industrial North Branch of the Chicago River, and is located
less than a mile from Lake Michigan and the Loop, and right off the Kennedy Expressway. The Clybourn
corridor has an important place in Chicago's recent community development history, as it served as the
impetus for the City of Chicago's creation of planned manufacturing districts. As discussed in Chapter 2,
the LEED Council, a Near North Side community development corporation associated with the YMCA,
sought to protect properties in the industrial areas close to downtown from residential zoning conversion
and variances, which was causing firm and job loss and undermining investor confidence. The LEED
Council argued that the industrial uses preserved more economic benefit than other land uses might. The
Clybourn Corridor was designated as a planned manufacturing district in 1988. In part through the
advocacy of the LEED Council, the city evenutally established an additional 13 districts. As of 2002, the
Clybourn corrdor and nearby Elston corridor and Goose Island had 36 firms that employed 5,000 people,
having gained service, wholesale, warehousing and light manufacturing jobs over the years, while losing
its many of its heavy manufacturing uses. 237 The area around the manufacturing district, espeiclally to the
237 De Sousa 2008, 240-245
east of Clyboum where industrial zoning protections weren't in place, continues to be the under intense
commercial development pressure. In addition, the Chicago Housing Authority's redevelopment of the
former Cabrini Green housing project to the east of the area has further placed development pressures on
the area.238
The corridor is the home to the highest concentration of SRP sites in the city, which have been
mostly private, and evenly split between land zoned industrial and commercial in 1990. The corridor is
bordered by relatively affluent and white communities: Lincoln Park has nearly twice the city's median
income and is 88% white, Lakeview has over 130% of the median income and is 86% white. The Near
North Side has an average of 150% of the City's median income and is 72% white. Logan Square, to the
west, has the city's median income and is 51% white (and only 6% African America). Each of these
four communities areas have more than double (Lakeview and Lincoln Park) or triple (Logan Square and
Near North Side) the city's average number of clean-ups per community area. In the neighborhoods
surrounding the corridor, there has been clean-up on many major commercial street comers. Of the 100-
some clean-ups in the corridor, only a handful were undertaken by the city. It is interesting to note in the
maps of the area, even though likely an undercount, the large number of new buildings built in the area
since 1990. The Clybourn area signifies the dominant pattern for brownfields clean-ups in the City of
Chicago, a strong real estate market and private-sector development and reuse driven on a site by site
basis.
Figure 4.4 The Clybourn Avenue Commercial Corridor
Figure 4.5 Clybourn Avenue Corridor and Brownfields Clean-ups
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West Pullman - If You Clean It They Won't Come
City staff are quick to name West Pullman as the area that signifies the shortcomings of its own
Initiative. The Department of Environment has invested tens of millions of dollars in clean up and
infrastructure across the 200-acre West Pullman industrial corridor in the last 12 years and there has been
little to show for it. Much of the land is still contaminated, hulking structures sit decaying, projects have
fallen through or stalled, the land has negative value. These are the "dog sites" explain brownfields staff.
Some redevelopment has occurred; including the Christ Universal Temple at 119" Street and Racine
(whose founder Rev. Dr. Johnnie Coleman owned several industrial parcels over the years). The site at
120 th & South Loomis is planned for a $150 million Salvation Army Ray Kroc Community Center made
possible by a large gift from Joan Kroc. City leaders and businesspeople scratch their heads at the lack of
development for the city's earnest, though "unsystematic" efforts. "Even in the height of real estate
market, nothing got built there; likely tenants or developers came and went. It is a well-located area,
close to the highway and to rail lines."239 On the southern city limits, it is served by commuter rail,
Interstate 57, and has about 15% industrial land coverage. West Pullman had industrial activity at its
industrial sites dating back 150 years. The area is about half a mile west of the heavily industrialized
Lake Calumet.
West Pullman was 94% African American according to the 2000 Census. The neighborhood to
the west, Morgan Park, has some of the highest incomes in the city. West Pullman has had higher rates of
homeownership and longer rates of tenure, but this may be unraveling, the community area is home to
many city-owned parcels and has been pummeled with to over 700 foreclosures in the last two years.
Boarded up homes mark this trend.240 The area's residential stock and wide tree-covered streets had 20
years ago been recognized as an asset in the city.
Although the South Side has lost many industrial firms, the Pullman, West Pullman, South Shore,
Sheldon Heights and Morgan Park neighborhoods continue to thrive. These working-class
239 Culler, Mary. Telephone interview with author.
240 Wilson, Chester. Telephone interview with author. and the Woodstock Institute, "Mapping Foreclosure Filings,"
http://www.woodstockinst.org/ (accessed 1 May 2009).
communities have a housing stock of brick and frame cottages, bungalows, ranches, bi-level and
tri-level homes. 241
Figure 4.6 West Pullman Brownfields Clean-ups
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Prior to brownfields programs, sites in West Pullman were known to be contaminated for at least
ten years. One might trace early brownfields clean-ups on behalf of the City and the IEPA to incidents
surrounding the Dutch Boy Paint Factory (12000 S. Peoria). In 1986, six cases of severe lead poisoning
among people who had come into contact with the property were discovered.242 The EPA and the Cook
County state's attorney's office tested the plant site after the Chicago Sun-Times reported that both the
City and the IEPA had ignored reports of hazardous substances and refused to inspect the site when the
241 Richardson 1987
242 Ritter 1986 ("People Unaware")
factory closed and again in 1984, after reports of a strange substance on the ground and in underground
tanks. They had even declined to inspect it demolition permit violations and frequent fires.243 The site
had been unsecured, without warning signs posted and the owner permitted metal recyclers access to the
plant. The site was donated to and briefly owned by Goodwill Industries, and subsequent string of local
businesspeople and investors. It had also been the site of a suspected arson. High levels of lead and
asbestos were found, and the IEPA undertook removal of these and underground storage tanks as part of
an emergency effort.244 Originally estimated to cost around $200,000 in early phases, the final bill
mounted to $1 million. Discovery of the toxic dust on the site also prompted the city to test 2,000 West
Pullman residents for lead poisoning. 245 Despite six years of resistance, the City was only beginning to
wrestle with the neglected administrative and planning burdens of its industrial past.
"I'm sure there are many other old, abandoned industrial sites with material that could become
hazardous if it was exposed or burned," said John Evanoff, who runs the city's 35-man
environmental division. "But we just don't have the staff to find them."246
After the Brownfields Forum, the City started convening residents and planned to initiative clean-
up in West Pullman in 1996. Today, there have been 17 clean-ups in West Pullman, and 10 initiated by
the Department of the Environment, four in the summer of 1999, one in the summer of 2001, four in the
summer of 2003 and one in the summer of 2004. In addition to investing $20 million for site clean-up
across 200 acres over the years, the city put $7 million into two miles of new roadways.2 47 The city
financed legal action against owners of the adjoining Dutch Boy and International Harvester plants.248
The City also put a $950,000 settlement against Sherwin Williams went toward remediation in the West
Pullman Industrial Corridor. This was controversial because Sherwin Williams plant was actually located
243 Nelson 1986 ("How toxic mess")
244 Ritter 1986 ("6 Poisoned")
245 Nelson 1986 ("Cleanup at")
246 Nelson 1986 ("How toxic mess")
247 Strausberg 2002
248 Kerrill 1996
in the Pullman neighborhood and the residents living around it had hoped the settlement would help make
the actual Sherwin Williams site a park. 249
The City used West Pullman as a staging ground for several press conferences related to new
brownfields policy tools and to announce new manufacturers willing to locate to the area. The City
Council considered an ordinance in 2002 to help Quality Croutons, a Black-owned food processing plant,
build a new $13 million facility for expansion in West Pullman (which due to the firm's own decisions,
never transpired.). According to the Chicago Defender, the new facility for Quality Croutons:
Would have been the first new industrial buildings in the area in forty years, and could prove that
the program was truly resurrecting entire districts, supporting businesses and strengthening
neighborhoods.25
The West Pullman TIF District was also underwater. Crains Chicago Business reported in 2002 that the
West Pullman TIF district hadn't generated any tax increment in the four years since it was established,
that the property values had decreased, rather than increased, and that the city was holding the bag for $20
million dollars, but were hopeful that Quality Croutons would locate on the site (with a $600,000 land
write-down from the City) and that another developer would follow through with plans to build a
warehouse.
In recent years, the City has maintained focus on West Pullman, bringing in a National
Brownfields Association team to suggest strategies for moving clean-up at the sites forward. The team
recommended considering parcels differently according to their level of contamination. They also
suggested that work on clean-up of the area's properties might be better tackled individually and not as a
unit or an "Industrial Park." They also proposed that all the sites not be redeveloped for industrial uses.25'
249 Hill 1997
250 Strausberg 2002
251 Colangelo, Robert. Telephone interview by author.
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Figure 4.7 1 1 9 th Street, West Pullman
Despite its difficult past, Alderwoman Carrie Austin's staff is optimistic about the area today.252
Her office still convenes the city's advisory board twelve years later to address the area's brownfields to
monitor the progress of remediation. The board consists of 6-8 residents who meet every two months and
whose goals are jobs, economic development. They are also interested in the construction of a new first
station on 119th Street. According to the Alderwoman's office, there are currently four businesses in the
TIF district that employ about 250 people, including a sanitation company, a heating plant, a welding
shop and a print shop. New developments that are coming include a plumbing distribution plant and the
Salvation Army Center. (Though currently stalled because of fundraising difficulties, the Alderwoman's
office said the center is scheduled to begin construction in October). The Exelon Corporation has also
announced a "brightfield" on a 39-acre site in the area which would include 32,800 panels; the largest
project in a U.S. urban center. 25 3 The US EPA is working on clean-up of the 22-acre International
Harvester site and has already invested $3 million dollars there. The Alderwoman's office also says that a
movie studio has had interest in the parcel. There is also a 35-acre TIF-supported commercial area under
redevelopment about a half a mile north of the corridor at 11 5f and Halsted that will open this summer.
252 Wilson, Chester. Telephone interview by author.
253 Boak 2009
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The development includes a Target, a grocery store, a big-box office supply store and a number of
restaurants and retail businesses. Though it is a former industrial site, environmental remediation was not
extensive, and the most expensive site preparation was demolition and excavation of concrete and
foundations. The Alderwoman's office describes a good relationship with the Department of the
Environment and the Illinois EPA. The ward, some suggest, is closer to the Mayor and more politically
connected than others.
The experience with West Pullman illustrates three things: first, that the City of Chicago has tried
to dedicate a comprehensive set resources to the clean-up and infrastructure of brownfields in a more
challenging area of the city. Second, the scale of clean-up and cost of demolition at the West Pullman
sites still exceeds market value despite many resources dedicated to the area over the years, suggesting
that it is not just contamination at issue. Finally, the case illustrates that the traditional site by site
strategies of clean-up and redevelopment and brownfields in areas like West Pullman, of which there are
hundreds in the City of Chicago, are neither cost effective, nor effective at achieving clean-up and
redevelopment.
South Chicago & Calumet - Steel Mills and Land Fills Going to Seed
Chicago has a Superfund-type landscape (though none of its sites on the National Priorities list),
and it is concentrated around the lakefront and Lake Calumet at the far southeastern side of the city.
Chicago State University professor Mark Bouman explains that the areas has been the subject of study on
everything from on ecological succession, industrial organization, water transportation,
deindustrialization, hazardous waste disposal and community development. He says:
Each of these studies capture one share of the regional reality with crystal clarity: Their jarring
juxtaposition is what makes the region both unique and archetypal when industrial meets nature
in a relatively large slice of urban America.254
The Calumet area abuts the Indiana border to the east at the southern tip of Lake Michigan. The Calumet
River connects Lake Michigan to the inland Lake Calumet, which been reshaped over the decades to
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254 Bouman 2001, 104
handle industrial uses. Industrial waste, municipal solid waste, steel industry waste (slag most notably),
dredge spoils from the dredging of the harbors and the channelization for the river, biological sludge,
ashes and cinders from coking operations, construction debris, and natural materials have all filled in
wetlands in the region.255 The Calumet River connects to the Cal-Sag channel, which connects south to
the Illinois River. The area is crisscrossed by railroads. Canadian National, a major investor in the area,
has recently received approval to acquire the EJE railroad line which leads to the mouth of the Calumet
River. This has led to speculation that Canadian National might also invest in infrastructure for container
shipping on the Great Lakes.
The Calumet area has five shuttered steel mills, four closed and one active landfill, a golf course
built on a landfill, four thousand acres of protected wetlands, the regional waste treatment facility.256 and
many other active and vacant industrial sites - 1000 of which are available for new development. The
area is also home to the Illinois International Port District of Chicago, (a state-sanctioned, independent
municipal corporation that owns the land surrounding the 700-acre lake and has proposed to develop a
marina on the lake 25 7), two lakes and two waterways mentioned above and a forest preserve. Calumet's
Wolf Lake has also been the subject of its own multi-stakeholder partnership and planning for
conservation.
Half a dozen Chicago neighborhoods are interwoven with in the area: their community area
demographics are shown in Table 4.8. These were the communities most hurt by the loss of steel
manufacturing in previous decades.
Table 4.8 Demographics for 7 Community Areas within the Calumet Industrial Area
Home
Une owner Rental Pct Median Median
No. Pet of Pet mpl Vacan Vacan without househol Home
SRP Total Industria oym cy cy Pet HS d income Value
Area sites City SRP 1 ent Rate Rate Black Diploma (dollars) (dollars)
South 28 2.67% 27.81% 11.9 1.9 8.4 62.48% 28.82% $34,789 $75,629
255 City of Chicago, Department of Planning and Development. "The Calumet Land Use Plan,"
http://egov.cityofchicago.org/webportal/COCWebPortal/COC ATTACH/Calumet Area Land Use Plan.pdf,
(accessed 12 Mar 2009).
256 Padgett 1987
257Tita 2002
103
Deering
South
Chicago 10 0.96% 23.82% 18.2 3.2 10.3 70.73% 34.06% $28,279 $85,045
Pullman 8 0.76% 50.64% 17.2 3.5 4.8 82.71% 27.23% $30,966 $82,881
Burnside 7 0.67% 51.36% 18.4 4.6 7.8 98.19% 28.50% $34,790 $78,900
Calumet
Heights 5 0.48% 16.59% 9.2 1.2 7.1 94.45% 17.04% $46,326 $104,659
East Side 3 0.29% 34.66% 12.5 1.4 6.2 1.39% 39.43% $39,724 $90,758
Riverdale 1 0.10% 21.43% 33.5 3.0 7.5 97.50% 37.55% $13,178 $54,601
The area was also an ill-fated site for the long discussed third Chicago airport, a project that
Representative Jesse Jackson is now pushing for the south suburbs. Opposition to the airport in the 1990s
galvanized the environmental community in the area, which a long history of vigorous environmental
activism against the aggressive actions of Waste Management and other waste companies in the area, as
well as to restore the wetland ecology of the region. The Southeast Environmental Task Force, cofounded
by Marion Byrnes in the late 1970s in opposition to the siting of a bus barn in the area, has been
organizing against Waste Management and polluting companies for over twenty years. The organization
leads regular "Toxics to Treasures" tours through the area's the marshes, the landfills and past the gates of
shuttered steel mills and the firms that participate in "good neighborhood dialogues" with the Task Force.
The area has another prominent environmental leader. Altgeld Gardens resident Hazel Johnson, who
founded the organization People for Community Recovery, has become a nationally known
environmental justice advocate. Her daughter, Cheryl described Altgeld Gardens' location as: "the 'Toxic
Doughnut' because everywhere you look, 360 degrees around us, we're completely surrounded by toxics
on all sides." 258
The Calumet is the subject of sharp environmental concern. The IEPA has a daily presence in the
region, monitoring its landfills.25 9 A 1996 Chicago Sun-Times article described the Paxton Avenue
lagoons in South Deering as:
A "horror story," this oozing 20-acre wetland near Paxton and East 122nd Street is surrounded by
two landfills and an incinerator and filled with toxic waste that would cost tens of millions of
dollars to remove. In 1989, the federal Environmental Protection Agency burned 30,000 tons of
258 Pellow 2002, 69
259 Shepherd, Tom. Telephone interview by author.
104
tarlike muck at the lagoons in a $7 million cleanup attempt [only to have the lagoons polluted
again.]
While there is severe pollution, there has been significant land conservation and hopes of
environmental restoration. A recent article in Chicago Wilderness Magazine explains the history of land
preservation in the area, beginning with the moratorium on new landfills and continuing with public
purchase of Indian Ridge Marsh, Heron Pond, Hyde Lake, Van Vlissengen Prairie, and Hegewisch Marsh
from waste companies and industrial users. There has been significant land conservation on the Indiana
side of the border as well. The cross-state area, despite heavy industrial use and environmental damage,
is considered to contain "more high-quality biodiversity, more rare and special plants, animals, and other
organisms, than anywhere else in the Chicago region." 260 There is a lot of revaluing going on. Tom
Shepherd with the Southeast Environmental Task Force explains it in these terms:
Our work as an environmental organization in the area has been enhanced by taking abandoned
properties with no value and a great degree of pollution and turning them back into reusable
properties for wildlife conservation and the restoration of native species.261
Calumet and its surrounding neighborhoods require a clean-up and redevelopment policy far different
from sites in the rest of the city. The fact that its economic base has shifted dramatically is made obvious
by the shuttered steel mills and abandoned grain elevators. Calumet therefore, is the subject of many
plans. The City worked on the Calumet Land Use Plan with a sustainable challenge grant through the
Clinton administration and published a plan in 2001 that sought to conserve 4,800 acres as open land for
recreation and natural ecosystem and dedicate the rest to industrial use (including approximate 1000
vacant industrial acres) and published design guidelines for new development to incorporate green
infrastructure and storm water retention. The city won't grant new permits for storm water systems. The
approach to brownfields clean-up is tied to this, because new users must investigate and manage
contaminated land through site development, that might allow the user to put parking on land that's most
260Greenberg 2009261 Shepherd, Tom. Telephone interview by author.
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contaminated. Though the city hasn't had many new users undertake these types of site developments,
they are confident in the model.262
There is an enormous TIF district in place for the community, which contains 31 SRP sites.
Though the area is still in heavy industrial use, little new industrial development has come to the area
aside from the Ford Supplier Campus. The Ford Project used City brownfields clean-up dollars for
infrastructure and opened in 2003. The project was located on a large brownfield owned by a speculator,
next to an existing Ford Plant. Armed with the City's brownfields clean-up dollars and the State of
Illinois' $120 million grant for infrastructure to realign Torrence Avenue, Mayor Daley and then-
Governor Ryan got on a plane and flew to Dearborn to convince Ford to open the Supplier Campus in
Illinois and not Atlanta. 263 The City is touting another green showpiece in the area, the Ford-supported,
LEED-certified, Calumet Environmental Center. The project, in planning for several years, was
sponsored by Ford as a community benefit when it built the Ford Supplier Campus.
The region has been the subject of other types of projects. The South Chicago neighborhood to
the north at the mouth of the Calumet River, is home to active community and redevelopment efforts.
The area has an active Chamber of Commerce that recently started running a "streetcar" through the
neighborhood,264 and helped facilitate the LISC New Communities Plan for the area. The LISC plan is
anchored by the lakefront USX "brownfield" site.265 South Chicago has taken an active planning role for
the 600-acre former site of the U.S. Steel plant. The site was recognized from the beginning of the
Brownfields Forum as a site that had a high likelihood of redevelopment. Despite over ten years of
planning, and private remediation, the site has not yet been developed, despite rerouting Lake Shore Drive
to better serve the area, plans to connect public transport to the site, and a LEED Neighborhood
Development rating and possible state subsidy. Some say that the large project would have been entering
262 Dickhut, Kathy. Telephone interview by author.
263 Culler, Mary. Telephone interview by author.
264 Bosanko, Neil. Telephone interview by author.
265 Local Initiatives Support Corporation 2007
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the development stage now had the market not soured.266 According to area leaders, the site is under tight
control of the Mayor. The ward boundaries were redrawn in the last few years and Alderman John Pope,
who represents the ward, has close ties to the mayor.
In this region, the most SRP sites (28) are located in the South Deering community area that
covers Calumet. The SRP sites are both public and private clean-up, and concentrated near the USX site
near South Chicago and the new Ford Supplier Campus near 126th Street and Torrance as well as along
the Calumet River and west of the area in Roseland and Burnside. (See Figure 4.8.) Most clean-ups in
the area were on industrially zoned land. These SRP sites don't begin to tackle the amount and scale of
clean-up and redevelopment needed in the area, especially across the 4000 acres to be managed as open
space, and the 1000 acres for new industrial development delineated in the City's plan for the area. The
amount of SRP activity in Calumet has not been proportional to its challenges, and redevelopment has
been very limited. The area's most attractive site, the lakefront USX site, is still undeveloped.
The area, however, has accomplished a degree of planning and big-thinking about land
management as people recognize its contrasts and extremes and know the steel mills aren't coming back.
Even given this, it likely has not been ambitious enough. Many mentioned models for redevelopment like
the Ruhr in Germany as visions and uses more appropriate the Calumet area. Nevertheless, the degree of
systematic planning that the area has begun to undertake to shape demand around environment, economy,
transportation, culture and quality of life, is a model for the way Chicago must tackle its large inventory
of disinvested brownfields areas throughout the city.
266 Bosanko, Neil. Telephone interview by author.
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Figure 4.8 SRP sites in Calumet Area
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How do we judge Chicago's record?
These cases illustrate the extent to which the challenges of the Brownfields Initiative are
fundamental. The brownfields program works and stands on its own for clean-up in a place like the
Clybourn Corridor. But having more incentives, better techniques, and more staff capacity, are not going
to change the fortunes (or the brownfields "glass ceiling") of West Pullman or Lake Calumet. As those
two cases have shown, the City is home to challenging landscapes where land use has shifted, and there is
no private market or end user easily lining up to redevelop land. A site by site program isn't working.
Chicago's persistent racism has led to segregated and disinvested neighborhoods. The crime, lack of
transportation access and high rates of foreclosure in West Pullman and nearby Roseland are likely to
continue to fuel a cycle of disinvestment in these neighborhoods, that won't make them attractive to
industrial users any day soon. In addition, Chicago ward politics drive land use and development in these
areas for better or for worse. The market realities and environmental degradation of West Pullman or
Calumet areas defy any easy solutions. Things won't fit neatly back together. The city needs a systematic
program that addresses integrated investment in industrial corridors and community areas as a whole.
Though areas like Calumet and West Pullman may have fueled the Chicago Brownfields Forum
in the first place, and though the Forum's rhetoric may have imagined that brownfields programs would
address such landscapes, brownfields were never an appropriate policy for areas like these. Though
program organizers may have well recognized this and put disclaimers all over the principles of the
program, there was never a better policy put in place to address these types of places. The Chicago
Brownfields Initiative proceeded to pursue a Tier I policy - working on a site-by-site basis, engaging and
subsidizing end users - which may not have achieved more solid foundations to fit the market realities of
the area, achieve clean-up or improve the quality of life for residents.
On a positive note, what can also be seen in these cases are seeds of a new policy emerging on its
own. The investment in large anchor projects like the mega-church and proposed Ray Kroc center and in
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alternative energy generation uses on contaminated land in West Pullman, suggests what types of
planning and resource allocation may matter in brownfields-concentrated areas. This is true too for the
ecological restoration, cultural heritage projects and multi-faceted planning for Calumet. The more the
city Brownfields Initiative and non-profit institutions can do to facilitate and augment these types of
efforts along with environmental clean-up and a Tier III policy, the more hope Chicago has of achieving
the original goals of the brownfields project. Chapter 5 will consider how to do this.
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New directions
Given the evolution of the Chicago Brownfields Initiative, and the geography and outcomes of
Chicago clean-ups, this chapter considers the steps that Chicago should take to tailor its Brownfields
Initiative to shape future city growth and to renew a commitment to clean-up and quality of life
improvements in the city's signficant number of Tier III communities.
Why it's Worthwhile
A first question is whether local government policy for brownfields is still relevant for Chicago.
One might think the idea is outdated or overrated when talking to planners in Chicago, browsing through
the City's recent green plans, or in reading brownfields critiques. This is because the problem, narrowly
conceived and crafted as a real estate issue, has been solved. But the much wider problem of
disinvestment and contamination, which also existed in the early 1990s, abides. There are at least four
reasons why brownfields policy, conceived of more broadly, is still important to Chicago. The first is that
it provides a solid means of achieving the the city's robust green plans. While environmental urban
policy attention has shifted to climate change and sustainability, brownfields policy is central to these
"new ideas." The second is that is an appopriate tool for shaping the city's economic and population
growth. The third is because the problem, an inventory of disinvested land where contamination inhibits
clean-up, still exists. It is not only hurting the poor communities that surround these landscapes, but
compromising the first two goals of a greener, growing city. Fourth, brownfields has a significant
history in Chicago and a relatively robust and innovative policy foundation upon which practitioners can
build.267
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267 De Sousa 2008, 23
As addressed in Chapter 2, plenty of attention has been given to Chicago's green agenda.
Chicago's brownfields policy, however, is seen more as a milestone in this green agenda than a driving
part of its environmental policy. Its 2005 Environmental Action Agenda does not mention brownfields at
all, and the Chicago Climate Action Plan doesn't include brownfields as a crucial part of its plan. (One
might contrast this with PLANYC 2030, which made brownfields one of ten plan foci and has a goal of
accelerating the "cleanup of 7,600 acres of contaminated sites." 268) While the objective of this thesis is
not to offer a detailed evaluation of Chicago's environmental agenda, it does suggest that the agenda
might be strengthened by incorporating brownfields as a more central part of its strategy, as a program
that has considerable resources, public recognition, is needed for all redevelopment in Chicago, and can
lead the City to face difficult land use and redevelopment issues in a constructive way.
Simple realities of growth present opportunities in Chicago. The region is projected to add
800,000 new jobs and grow by 1.6 million in population by 2020, with 40% of the new households living
on redeveloped or infill land. 26 9 For this reason, viable land redevelopment strategies matter for all cities
in the region, and particularly for the City of Chicago, which has a large employment center and a public
transportation network. A lot of residential in-fill development is already occurring in Chicago. A failure
to direct that growth evenly within the City's boundaries serves to widen the already deep inequality of
Chicago's neighborhoods. Brownfields policy is fundamental to this project because it addresses the
redevelopment issues of disinvestment and contamination.
In addition, the inventory remains. Many areas of Chicago and other Great Lakes cities sit vacant.
In the words of Joe Dufficy, "I don't think it is good public policy to let a quarter of the nation's
infrastructure fall to pieces." 270 Henry Henderson sees the job unfinished. "There is still an incredibly
gigantic acreage of brownfields around the Great Lakes. It's not been fixed. The reported demise of the
268 City of New York 2007, 7269 Metropolis 2020, "The Metropolis Plan: Changes for the Chicago Region."
http://www.metropolisplan.org/plan.pdf (accessed 13 Apr 2009).270 Dufficy, Joe. Telephone interview by author.
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idea is false, the obituary is premature."271 The acreages they refer to are the Tier III sites: sites that don't
have an end user, are mothballed, privately or public owned, located in distressed neighborhoods, and that
SRP program hasn't and won't touch. If the Chicago Brownfields Forum and Initiative tempered its
commitment to such sites fifteen years ago, it was because the entire field was new and unproven. There
is no reason now why Chicago, the third largest city in the United States, the eighteenth largest economy
in the world, the city that helped create local brownfields policy fifteen years ago, couldn't put more
cracks in the brownfields glass ceiling and tie the city's growth to it.
As something like Homer Hoyt's historical maps have shown, the City of Chicago has always had
very valuable land, and land that is worthless, both shaped by the city's economy and its transportation
infrastructure. The City of Chicago also happens to currently own a lot of its "worthless" land. The city
holds about 15,000 tax-foreclosed properties, of which over three thousand are commercial and industrial
properties. These parcels have largely been acquired through tax reactivation and demolition liens. 272
While the City has dozens of initiatives and plans, (and divests of land in small batches through RFPs,
sealed bid auctions or individual transactions) an overarching policy to address its undervalued residential
or commercial and industrial land remains a challenge to implement. There are legitimate reasons for this:
Illinois does not yet grant cities the authority to establish landbanks,273 the City still struggles with
liabiltiy for contamination, site assembly presents a large challenge, especially with high land values in
some parts of the city, and the fact that the city's fifty aldermen each exert political control over vacant
land and city land sales in their ward. Large assembled parcels in a built-out city are an asset for siting
future development and are thus under tight political control.274 There are a number of competing public
authorities with an interest in Chicago's vacant land. Chicago doesn't own the nearly the amount of
vacant parcels that Cleveland or Detroit, or even the nearby suburb of Robbins, does, but its holdings and
those under corporate ownership, present obstacles to the city's development. A better Brownfields
271 Henderson, Henry. Telephone interview by author.
272 Wolf, Bob and Kimberly Worthington. Telephone interviews by author.
273 There is a coalition from the Chicago regions proposing legislation for cities and towns to create land banks in
the Illinois General Assembly this session, HB 1 195/SB2101 (Tappendorf 2009)274 Dickhut, Kathy, Telephone interview by author.
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Initiative could play a role in a larger strategy for the most challenging brownfields in the context of a
vacant land strategy.
Who takes the lead?
Given these three reasons for a renewed Brownfields Initiative, a fourth reason - the amount of
human and institutional capital that the city could bring to bear - suggests a means to undertaking such a
project. The question, however, of whether a city is still the appropriate leadership entity for brownfields
redevelopment is a valid one. Given that in the Chicago case, city politics undermined the strength of an
institutionalized brownfields program, independent initiatives start to look attractive.
A coalition consisting of the Delta Institute, New Partners for Community Revitalization in New
York, the Colorado Brownfields Foundation, and the Center for Creative Land Recycling in California are
pushing to the U.S. EPA to make assessment and revolving loan grants available to qualified non-
profits.2 75 One can also imagine that a brownfields tax credit might provide significant equity for
environmental or community development corporations to undertake brownfields work on the scale that
CDCs or non-profits have undertaken affordable housing production since the 1980s through use of
historic tax credits and the low income housing tax credits. However, because cities maintain the power
to acquire land through tax foreclosure, grant incentives and subsidies, and undertake master planning,
they still have a role to play in brownfields programs. At the same time, independent non-profits might
undertake the area-wide planning or the redevelopment of particularly tricky sites that the city won't
touch, and could hold the city accountable for better uses, better planning and a more equitable program
over all. The fact that the Brownfields Initiative arose both because of outside pressure and capacity and
through talent in key positions at the city and federal government, suggests that a hybrid model and a
"push" from the outside might lead to a new shift in the city's Brownfields Initiative again.
The city also has the potential again for this type of multi-stakeholder engagement. Many
separate actors are working on what might constitute a new brownfields strategy. For example, the
275 Ducharme, Donna. Telephone interview by author.
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City's newly organzied Community Development department is working on divesting of vacant land.
The Brownfields Initative at the Department of Environment has a skilled and commited technical staff,
who are willing to try new strategies. A new Presdential administration is allocating more power and
resources to the U.S. EPA. The U.S. EPA has recently given two grants to Chicago institutions, the
University of Illinois Chicago and the Delta Institute, to study the redevelopment of brownfields in
distressed neighborhoods and sustainability and brownfields.2 76 The City of Chicago's bid for the 2016
Olympics aims to invest resources in redevelopment of parts of the City's south side and lakefront. The
city may even benefit from the unconventional work of creative disciplines: a faculty member from the
School of the Art Institute of Chicago has joined the Brownfields Initaitive for several months this year as
an "embedded artist." The list goes on: the Chicago Metropolitan Agency for Planning is using
brownfields as one of their key strategies for regional planning with communities. The non-profit Chicago
Manufacturing Center is interested in rethinking industrial land use in Chicago for new energy and
transportation investments that will benefit the production sectors, and is also interested in encouraging
their clients to see land is an underutilized asset. The National Brownfields Association is headquartered
in Chicago and engaged with the city and others.
A remarkable asset that Chicago has for reviving its Brownfields Initiative is the continuity of
leadership. Over fifteen years, many of the same architects of the Brownfields Forum are either largely in
their same positions (including Mayor Daley, almost 20 years later), or are still active in environmental or
economic development work in the region. Plenty of new leadership has also emerged. Many people
would have an interest in seeing the Initiative succeed as they are deeply invested in economic
development and environmentalism in Chicago. They also have a certain familiarity with the Initiative's
successes and failures over the years. The City of Chicago and its leaders have incredible power to push
the state (with a new governor) toward adopting more progressive policies, and also have access to more
federal resources and attention given President Barack Obama's strong ties to the city. A policy shift in
Chicago might be gathering again.
276 Danna, Kimberly and Christine Slattery. Telephone interviews with the author.
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Where: Towards a Tier III Policy
Whereas the first brownfields program did not undertake a spatial planning component, a new
strategy must necessarily do so. As suggested in Chapter 2, a city program should dedicate a certain
proportion of its resources or staff to a "Tier III" policy. A non-profit brownfields plannning entity might
focus all of its attention on Tier III brownfields. The role of a new Forum here might be to foster another
"pilot" in weak market community areas that have "undercount" of SRP sites, such as Hermosa, Burnside,
South Chicago, and Riverdale around Calumet, or West Garfield Park, Fuller Park, Englewood, and
Washington Park community areas that seen the fewest number of SRP overall. The areas might also
identify one or two assets around which to build, such as waterfront, transportation projects, or green
infrastructure. Figure 5.1 suggests a how mapping might constitute a decision-making tool for target
areas where there is a convergence of needs: concentrations of tax-foreclosed properties and toxic release
incidents that overlap with low income communities that might benefit from new investment.
The outcomes measures for Tier III areas must not use the old brownfields metrics of jobs and tax
base. Those involved should recognize that the immediate outcomes might not necessarily be a major
development projects, but perhaps accomplish high impact short term projects and a visible plan to which
the City, the U.S. and Illinois EPA, and private and non-profit communities are accountable in the future.
Given a likely history of environmental injustice and the complex problems of disinvestment in these
areas, work on the Tier III areas must necsesarily involve a broad-based coaltion of stakeholders in the
planning process. For this reason, a renewed Brownfields Initiatiave might again need a neutral and
credible convener.
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Figure 5.1: Mapping to inform Tier III brownfields pilot areas: tax foreclosed industrial property,
toxic release sites and low income neighborhoods
City Owned Industrial Parcels --- ,
* City Owned Commercial Parcels
City Owned Residential Parcels
* EPA Toxic Release Invefry
Highest Frequency of City-Owned ParcelS
Low Income/Opportunity Community Areas
Less SRPThan Expected (Ind LU) RIE
Highest Foreclosure Rates 2007-09
I IMiles
0 1.25 2.5 5 7.5 10
117
How Part 1: Proceed with Care for Defining Role, Inventory and Partnerships
If Brownfields policy needs work, one thing that people often suggest is to bring back the
Brownfields Forum. Those involved with the Forum agree that it was successful for a lot of reasons that
could be replicated under the right conditions: it was independently funded and externally managed, it had
political capital, it was action-oriented, it had decicion-makers at the table, it convened diverse
stakeholders and held their trust to forge "a common ground of understanding among many of its
participants about the complex topic." 277 It was able to identify dozens of barriers to brownfields
redevelopment and to pose creative and complex solutions, many of which were implemented.
There is a danger, however, that a new Forum would continue to conceive of brownfields as site-
specific and real estate problem. A narrow focus on particular elements or uses like green building and
eco-industrial parks, though important, neglects the large landscapes of disinvestment and weak overall
demand that have undermined the brownfields project in Chicago. By 1998, the City had arrived at the
conlusion that brownfields "were inseperable from real estate in general." 278 They also concluded based
on interviews with key stakeholders that it wouldn't be efficient to reconvene such a large group to
address what would be better tackled by smaller groups and intiatives. 279 In essence, even though they
had lost the MacArthur funding, they had also lost momentum for "residual redevelopment issues," what
remained a decidedly more difficult (or "stickier") project, and didn't believe the Forum to be the
appropriate venue in which to solve it.
In contrast to the period when the Forum was launched, many of the environmental barriers to
brownfield resue have been addressed. The residual issues of the Forum are primarly
redevelopment challenges. The City could reconvene the Forum as a broad-based dialogue to get
at these residual redevelopment issues. On the other hand, various platforms are emerging to
address these challenges, and some of the stickier redevelopment issues will require careful,
small-group faciltiation that is not necessarily appropriate for a large group such as the Forum.280
The question today, eleven years later, would be how (a perhaps smaller) Forum could broaden the
brownfields project again, to address these same "stickier" issues. The problem is certainly complex
277 City of Chicago 1995
278 Ibid. 22
279 Ibid. 4.
280 Ibid., 27
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enough to warrant multi-stakeholder engagement. What might change is the way the problem is framed
and the scale of thinking from site to entire neighborhoods and communities. I have illustrated in Figure
5.2 what a new Brownfields Initiative might look like. Three interrelated tasks that constitute problem-
setting, whether achieved through a "Forum" or similar independent, high profile, resourced and multi-
stakeholder effort, must necessarily happen first. After this three-pronged task, integrated, demand-based
planning must be the manner of undertaking plans for clean-up and redevelopment of Chicago's Tier III
areas - or "geographies of distress." Finally, the traditional focus of brownfields policy: on finance and
regulatory tools, is a project that follows more integrated planning. It must focus beyond a site by site
view and use an area-wide, a city-wide and even a regional strategy to take on the task it left behind:
framing a more comprehensive redevelopment policy.
The first important thing that Chicago must create is a unique vision and identity around
brownfields programming, and the sense of its importance to the interconnected goals of the city's green
agenda, its growth and its quality of life. The "problem" it defines thus follows from this identity and
role. Any new brownfields planning effort won't work without a vision of what it ought to achieve. As
Christine Slattery said, "If you're focusing on brownfields, the world looks pretty bleak." 281 Whereas the
first Chicago Brownfields Initiative envisioned restoring brownfields to productive use, a new Forum
might imagine a certain type of quality of life or environment in the city, and the way it wants its land to
be used, and its environment preserved. It would focus on the kind of city that people will want to live in
50 years, and an affordable and accessible place to do business, and find creative ways to achieve that
through brownfields programming and land redevelopment.282 Instead of focusing on brownfields per se,
the Chicago Brownfields Initiative might then think in terms of a vision for better land use, for a growing
and sustainable city, while staying committed to remediation the city's distressed and contaminated areas.
A second part of a problem-setting process is to build partnerships to ensure that the program is
strong enough to survive and is diverse enough to ensure that it can truly meet the "stickier" issues of
281 Slattery, Christine. Telephone interview by author.282 Furio, Brooke. Telephone interview by author.
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disinvestment in the city. Chicago's rich network of environmental groups could give this urgency. The
relationships and "shared engagement" are key. Henry Henderson reflected that the Forum and
subsequent Initiative: "Never rose to the level of shared engagement. People spent time doing their
primary assignments and there were so many different interests." Whatever entity convenes this group,
could involved many actors, the city's universities, its non-profits, its workforce and sector
intermediaries. They could benefit from new and shared information, creating an agenda for future work.
Related to partnerships, the first Brownfields Forum never addressed racial segregation and
uneven development in Chicago in a meaningful way. It didn't have participants from low income
communities of color and it swept something like the controversy that Dan McGrath's study caused in the
Chicago Defender under the rug. A new Forum or process should directly address brownfields in the
context of the "stickier issue" of a dramatically divided city, where the lines of poverty and disinvestment
and crime in the city are often drawn by race. A disproportionate and "visible" number of Chicago's poor
are African American or Latino. Poor people live in neighborhoods with low value. Private brownfields
clean-ups do not systematically occur in areas where there is low land value. There is a downward spiral
of disinvestment, complicated by poverty and race. Chicago is the city that famously warehoused its
African American poor in hellish public housing projects, sometimes built in the middle of toxic areas.
Its Police Department to this day continues to be brutal and corrupt. It may sound misplaced for a
brownfields agenda, but something like a "truth and reconciliation" process moving forward might be the
most important thing that Chicago could do put its future development on a better foot. A public process
like this may never happen, but any hope of "smart growth" or a green future to the city may in part hinge
on coming to terms with its painful and complicated history. The involvement of artistic disciplines with
a brownfields project is a start: it may help equalize power relationships and provide energy and resources
for meaningful dialogue to occur.
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Figure 5.2 Towards a New Chicago Brownfields Intiative
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The third task of the three-pronged strategy is inventory and information. One of the most
substantial barriers to an effective brownfields policy is a lack of inventory. While it's true that most of
Chicago might well be termed a brownfield, requiring at least Phase 1 assessments and some level of
remediation, the City should still create some type of inventory that uses its own definition and
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classification system so that appropriate goals, policy and benchmarks can be built around it. The city
should know its assets and liabilities. Having an inventory of contaminated sites is an idea that has been
around a long time. In the aftermatch the Dutch Boy incident in 1986, the advocacy group Citizens for a
Better Environment proposed that a city coordinator for hazardous sites might develop a list of target
sites by crosschecking building department records of vacant factories with fire department records of
factory chemical inventories.283
Ten years later, the Forum still hadn't done any kind of an inventory and was reluctant to
establish one, as the 1998 report reflects:
There is still no quick and easy way to pull together publicly available site data. To help the City
identify brownfields, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers assembled a database of publicly available
information. The City subsequently determined that maintaining such a database for other users
would be too costly. The City is concerned about stigmatizing sites that might appear on a
"brownfields" database. Some private developers and their advisors are opposed for similar reasons
and also because their knowledge of governmental data sources is a competitive advantage to doing
business.284
It seems remarkable that the City came out of the one-year Forum process with no more than a rough
estimate that it had 2,000 brownfields. Though they didn't open up pilot site selection to the public in the
beginning to ensure a successful pilot outcome, it never went any further. Any inventory would
necessarily have been shaped by politics, but it would have provided an information system to build a
plan around and measure benefit. (Chicago's entries on the U.S. Conference of Mayors Brownfields
Surveys over the years consistently state that the city had "2,000" brownfields - which may call the
accuracy of the survey into question as well.)
Another ten years later, the Brownfields Initiative still doesn't have an inventory, though they
have taken steps toward establishing one. The most recent work that the current staff have done to try to
estimate brownfields owned by the city was for Accounting and Financial Reporting for Pollution
Remediation Obligations, required by GASB Statement 49. The Brownfields Initiative compiled a list of
properties from its general services and tax foreclosure databases and cross-referenced it with anything it
283 Nelson 1996 ("How Toxic")
284 City of Chicago 1998, 10
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had inspected, and assigned costs to these sites. They know it isn't exhaustive, but it captured the most
difficult properties that they own. They hope to build on the information to create a better inventory, and
digitially interface it with other city data. Brownfields policy in other states such as Michigan has
focused on the use of GIS to map brownfields.285 Inventories are a political and planning process as
well286 and might serve as a project for a new Forum, while involving and engaging diverse stakeholders
and helping to frame the identiy of the program and the problem that it addresses.
A Forum might also work to describe its brownfields in ways meaningful for new policy, either
through something like the geographic classifications that Bjelland uses: Superfund-scale sites, sites of
economic distress, or sites that have a likelihood of being addressed privately through the SRP in the
coming years. They might also classify sites by ownership: and the opportunities presented by clusters of
city-owned commercial or industrial property, corporately owned sites or sites own by smaller active
industrial uses, who might be able have incentive to use their land as an asset for their business, or do
small things which will improve site contamination, the quality of environment and strengthen the
surrounding area.287
In a 2005 article, the New York Times quoted Mark A. Izeman, a lawyer at the Natural Resources
Defense Council as saying, "In order to solve a problem you have to agree on what the problem is, and
when it comes to brownfields, there is no agreement on what the problem is. Every person you speak to
has a different reason for why sites are not being cleaned up." 288 Articulating the problem, then, which is
different today than it was in 1994, is a very useful first step for the Chicago Initiative, and a product of
the three functions of vision/identity, partnerships and inventory. The processes that reenergize the
Initiative, the inventories, the identity and problem-setting, the coalition-building could also help to
institutionalize it and keep the program accountable. Institutionalizing a program at the City of Chicago
might pose challenges as we have seen, but the recommendation of finding a way to keep the program
285 Thomas 2002286 Leurig 2007
287 Giannisis, Demetria. Telephone interview by author.
288 Steinhauer 2005
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adapted to the goals of successive development regimes in the City's departments is crucial. Housing it
with an independent non-profit organization might also be a viable strategy. The extent to which the
program establishes its own unique identity and importance moving forward and its relationships to a
variety of partners inside and outside of the city government will be crucial to its staying power and
political cachet.
How Part 2: Integrated Demand-Based Planning For Geographies of Distress
Whereas the first Brownfields forum focused on barriers, a second forum might focus on
opportunities. The City of Chicago should bring its Brownfields Initiative out of a regulatory role and use
brownfields as a framework around which to plan for redevelopment, especially for its most distressed
areas. This type of planning ought to focus on how to "reorganize values and investment."289 The
following are levers for demand-based planning, drawn from efforts already in progress in Chicago and
from the wider brownfields literature.
Rethinking industrial policy - Just as was the case in the early 1990s, the reuse of brownfields
today is tied to the City's industrial policy. Much of Chicago's industrial land patterns are long outdated.
Joe Dufficy points to the Calumet area as proof of this:
The industrial geography of the Northeast and Midwest during and after World War II could
never be sustainable. We were never going to supply all the widgets for the entire planet. The
whole thing was bad. There was too much sugar. This shake-out is going to continue. It's the
whole question of what you do in a country where you replace your heavy-based industry with a
service-based economy. 290
Manufacturing itself, however, continues to be an important part of Chicago's economic base and an
undeniable driver of brownfields re-use. The Chicago Manufacturing Renaissance Council estimates that
the industry is directly and indirectly responsible for over 1.7 million jobs in Chicago.291 While
manufacturing accounts for a smaller portion of the gross regional product than it once did (from 18.5%
289 Furio, Brooke. Telephone interview by author.
290 Dufficy, Joe. Telephone interview by author.
291
"Manufacturing in Chicago." http://www.chicagomanufacturing.org/,(accessed April 19, 2009).
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in 1983 to a forecasted 11.5% in 2010), the industry is still critical to the city's future.292 Meeting land,
transportation and infrastructure needs of its firms continues to drive the region's reuse of brownfields,
though with careful attention to changing needs. Crain's Chicago Business warned in 1998 that
suburban-style industrial development in the city was still less attractive there in the suburbs and they
recommended that the city strengthen and heavily market the brownfields program, and link potential
industrial redevelopment sites to public transit, workforce housing and job training.293 These
recommendations are still valid.
The biggest thrust around planning for sites in distressed industrial areas is increasingly to
identify new drivers of demand for industrial land. The Delta Institute established a Redevelopment Fund
in the late 1990s to capitalize brownfields projects, first using funding from the MacArthur Foundation,
and later allocations of New Market Tax Credits. Faced with increasing difficulty in finding end users for
redevelopment loans and incentives, they've shifted more of their focus to research about new ecocnomic
sectors, and to identify new users and strengthen the viability of existing producers. With a grant from
the EPA, they have started to research supply chains for renewable energy and how existing Chicago
businesses could get take advantage of growth areas, as a starting point for business retention and
expansion. Chicago's Brownfields Intiative has always been seen as a part of its industrial strategy, and
this vein of work, though similar, is an attempt to talk about using land to shape market demand, as much
as tailoring its land to what the market wants, which constitutes a shift in industrial policy. Chicago
Manufacturing Center's Demetria Giannisis talks about how new transporation investments will change
as the region upgrades its intermodal infrastructure and especially as it confronts climate change, which
will in turn change patterns of industrial land use.
The vitality and future of manufacturing in Chicago is also tied to the reuse of brownfields.
Those in the manufacturing sector anticipate systematic shifts related to energy infrastructure, renewable
sources and centralized eco-industrial models. These new trends have entirely different land use needs
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that may not be suitable for the land and corridors that have been industrial for the past 150 years.
Policymakers need to pay attention to the pace of competitive changes in manufacturing. 294 There are
models of new industrial land configuration and investment in Chicago. Centerpoint Properties developed
an entirely new industrial area, the California Business Park, creating the jobs that brownfields programs
so often seek. The project, Fred Reynolds explains, was "time consuming," given the costs and difficulty
involved in land assembly and that the area was severely disinvested and facing difficult crime problems.
While looking at how to retain its existing base and support the changing needs of its manufacturing
sectors, the city should also look at strategically supporting projects similar to the California Business
Park, which a private developer won't undertake unless it has an end user. It might also look to rezone
industrial land that has lost its value, as it creates new industrial areas that are more marketable in other
areas of the city, to preserve jobs. City should undertake market studies, to see where industrial use may
no longer be viable. An analysis of the SRP clean-ups and industrial investment and redevelopment by
industrial corridor may also help measure the health of industrial corridors and where new investment and
planning may be needed.
Green Infrastructure for Climate Change & Storm water Management - A large
paradigm shift in demand and growth for the Chicago region is around climate change.
Chicago's Climate Action Plan, published in 2008, calls for dramatic changes in Chicago's built
form, infrastructure, renewable energy and transportation. It is one of the major priorities of the
Department of the Environment and Mayor Daley, and will likely drive initiatives that can tap
into it. These areas of investment have large direct and indirect implications for brownfields -
even though brownfields are not mentioned as one of the Plan's strategies. The Climate Action
Plan has implications for industrial land: reducing industrial pollution to prevent the creation of
new brownfields by recycling and diverting industrial waste, and incentivizing more sustainable
industrial uses, like eco-industrial parks.
294 Giannisis, Demetria. Telephone interview by author.
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Its recommendations also call for a change in the way that all land is used, for storm water to be
captured on site, better enforcing the city's landscaping plan and green urban design guidelines, planting
thousands of trees to prevent urban heat islands and improve quality of life. To this end, the city has
proposed an Urban Tree Farm Initiative, to plant non-buildable lots, rail and road transportation corridors
with trees, to provide a low maintenance understory, community open space, and have the parks
department and quasi-public agencies set up to own community managed pocket parks. Under the
Chicago Gateway Green Initiative, the City is also working with the Illinois Department of Transportation
to plant 50 acres of trees along major transportation corridors to improve air quality and appearance. 295
They are also interested in planting grassland, using fast-growing species as a tall grass understory carbon
sink.
Not only do "green infrastructure" uses for brownfields and other interstitial sites contribute
aesthetically to a neighborhood, they are also a solution for brownfields without an end-user, and they can
create value and save public resources. Brooke Furio, who worked for the City of Cleveland under the
Intergovernmental Personnel Act through the U.S. EPA, has proposed to help the Cleveland and the
Northeast Ohio Sewer District meet its expensive obligations to fix its combined sewer overflow problem
in part by using its brownfields. He has proposed that the Sewer District acquire and manage 100 acres of
tax-foreclosed brownfields for storm water retention and treatment. He suggests that a brownfields
strategy ought to look at what pressure the government is under and figure out how its land plays into
that. The City of Chicago is certainly under enormous financial obligation for its storm water
infrastructure (the Department of Water Management spends $50 million per year to clean and upgrade its
4,400 miles of sewer lines and 340,000 related structures) and is already working to develop green
infrastructure as a way of managing its storm water. 296 Chicago is also the site of a 30-year $3 billion
dollar civil engineering project known as the "Deep Tunnel" to reduce flooding and combined sewer
overflow into Lake Michigan. Overseen by the Metropolitan Water Reclamation District, the project is
295 Mehaffey, Scott. Telephone interview by author.
296 City of Chicago, (2003) "Chicago's Water Agenda"
http://www.citvofchicago.org/webportal/COCWebPortal/COC EDITORIAL/wateragenda 1I.pdf (15 Mar 2009).
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supposed to be completed in 2019.297 The winning Chicago proposal for the History Channel's City of
the Future competition is related to these themes as well and imagines extensive use of green
infrastructure. Urban Lab's "Growing Water" plan proposes a network of "eco-boulevards" that purify
waste and storm water so that it is clean enough to flow into Lake Michigan. They then recommend
repurposing the Deep Tunnel for a subway system.298 If this plan was to acquire any traction, the city's
tax foreclosed properties and brownfields might come into play.
Parks and Waterfront - Many have studied the value created when brownfields are turned into
greenspace or parks, and that communities often express a preference for such uses. 29 9 Other have noted
the positive social networks and benefits that ensue in planning for new parks and open space. 3 00
CitySpace, the City of Chicago's 1998 open space plan prioritizes the conversion of vacant lots as
neighborhood open space, and set up an intermediary, NeighborSpace, , the city's non-profit that manages
pocket parks and community gardens on former vacant lots throughout the city, in order to facilitate this.
NeighborSpace focuses on smaller, former residential parcels, and tend to shy away from projects where
remediation is needed.301 The CitySpace plan also recommended the transfer of over 600 acres of land
publicly owned by the Metropolitan Water Reclamation District to the Park District for the creation of
park amenities and green infrastructure.
Related to "green infrastructure," alternative technologies for brownfields clean-ups include phyto-
remediation, the use of carefully chosen plants to remove contaminants "in an aesthetic, natural and
passive way," that may also bring a quality of life benefits to those who live around them.30 2 The use of
plants and microorganisms to mitigate contamination is not often feasible for sites with an immediate end
297 Ibid.
298 Urban Lab. "Growing Water." http://www.urbanlab.com/h2o (accessed 25 Apr 2009).
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user, because its results are not guaranteed and take anywhere from 3-8 seasons to take effect. 30 3
Westphal and Isebrands, however, see phyto-remediation as a good option for the Calumet region, where
the city already encourages green infrastructure in "a rustbelt landscape with brownfields, active industry,
and natural habitat occurring side by side." 304 The team is currently testing the ability of cottonwood and
black willow seedlings to remove contaminants from the region's soil and groundwater and believe that a
larger scale phyto-remediation project can improve the image and environment in the area, though they
also suggest that such interventions may be problematic for the surrounding public because they may be
temporary and restrict public access.
The Chicago Brownfields Initiative could plan for and focus on waterways. The CitySpace Plan
also prioritizes the use of land along inland waterways for trails and greenways. (In many ways, this is an
old proposal in Chicago. Daniel Burnham's 1909 Plan of Chicago recommended de-industrializing the
north branch of the Chicago River and replacing it with park space.) As sites of former industry, many
waterfront properties are brownfields, and the resources of brownfields programs ought to be
systematically applied to riverfront projects. The South Suburban Mayors and Managers Association's
work around the Calumet River is an example of river planning. Two other regional examples also come
to mind. The City of Aurora, a satellite community west of Chicago and the second largest city in Illinois
was settled along the Fox River. A progressive mayor has made clean-up of the waterway a central goal
of his administration. The city has worked with Region 5 of the U.S. EPA to stop illegal dumping and to
clean up the River through legal action and planning.30 5 They see it as related to quality of life and the
rebirth of the core of Aurora. As many cities have done, focusing on a river is a way of establishing a
saleable core, and using it as a fulcrum for larger and more powerful city transformation. 30 6 Another city
to the north of Chicago on Lake Michigan, Waukegon, Illinois, has received several EPA assessment and
clean-up grants and focused its own considerable resources on its cleaning up Waukegan Harbor, and
303 Reynolds, Fred. Telephone interview by author.
304 Westphal and Isebrands 2001, 2305 Henderson, Henry. Telephone interview by author.
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surrounding brownfields, to create new residential communities and regional recreational amenities along
its harbor. Lake County also dedicates money out of its general funds for brownfields clean-ups grants,
which require a one to one match of recipients. It is the only such locally funded pool in the region. 30 7
The City spun off a Chicago River Program to meet the goals of the CitySpace plan, to acquire
land, set new zoning policy for private developments to require public access and landscaping in
preparation of a continuous path along the river. To date the City has developed one major site along the
South Branch of the Chicago River as its Job Corps campus. If the Chicago Brownfields Initiative were
to focus on waterways and its existing plans to clean up the South Branch of the Chicago River or its
"Bubbly Creek" segment, the impact would create tremendous value. The Army Corps of Engineers is
usually assigned to these projects, and the Brownfields Initiative has already reviewed their plans for
capping the banks and riverbed of segments of the South Branch of the Chicago River.30 8 The Army
Corps also brings considerable financial resources. The more synergy the brownfields project can find
with such major infrastructure projects, the better.
Renewable Energy - Another initiative promoted in the Chicago Climate Action Plan is
increasing Chicago's reliance on renewable energy sources, which includes, among other things, an
increase in distributed technology and house-level energy generation, as well as building renewable
energy sources and trading carbon credits. While alternative energy generation is more efficient for large-
scale brownfield sites on former mines and military bases, there could be some use for urban-scale
brownfields for alternative energy generation, such as the location of co-generation plants, or moveable
solar-infrastructure, like the Exelon Corporation's proposed solar field in West Pullman. Industrial sites
are attractive for these uses because of their size, and because clean-up might not have be as stringent as it
would be for a residential, mixed use or open space site.
307 Slatterly, Christine. Telephone interview by author.
308 Worthington, Kimberly. Telephone interview by author.
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The City has come under fire recently for its poor progress on renewable energy. Instead of
shifting a percentage of its electricity purchases from coal-fired power plants to wind energy, it offset its
coal-source electricity by buying carbon credits that benefited a North Carolina power plant that burned
biomass. Though the purchase put Chicago onto the EPA's Green Power Partnership list, it did little to
provide environmental or economic development benefits to the city itself.309 Staff at Region 5 of the
EPA are also investigating what uses - whether larger scale green infrastructure, urban greenhouses or
alternative energy sources - that the city could invest in to meet its carbon offset goals, benefit its own
neighborhoods and achieve some form of brownfields clean-up or mitigation. If the utility company can
generate value from using these lands for profit, the value could flow back to the land's owner, whether
the taxpayers of the City of Chicago, or a cooperative trust of neighborhood residents. Environmental
justice and community groups ought to put pressure for such community benefits on the City and
corporations like Exelon. NeighborSpace has said there might be a role for their organization to play in
owning or managing land that hosts a wind turbine or solar panels. 310 Aesthetic trade-offs and community
sensitivity to such uses are subjects for further study.
Transportation investment - The Climate Action Plan calls for more investments in transit, transit-
oriented development, improved walking and biking environments, intercity rail and freight
improvements, among other plans to reduce dependence on car travel and fossil fuel use. These plans can
improve the value of land in Chicago. While the Brownfields Forum recommendations connected
regional transportation patterns to the creation of brownfields and saw the importance of supporting
stronger regional transportation planning, it saw less of an opportunity to make its own brownfields more
valuable by influencing rail or road transportation investments in the city. Brownfield are often clustered
in corridors where their land has been made invaluable by obsolete or inefficient transportation systems.
As part of a brownfields strategy, new transportation infrastructure might serve to make old corridors
309 Hawthorne 2009310 Helphand, Ben. Telephone Interview by author.
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valuable again or create new areas of value. Amekudzi uses case studies to argue that transportation can
be a driver for brownfields redevelopment, and formally integrating brownfields redevelopment into
transportation planning and using the considerable financial resources for transportation improvements
for brownfields remediation and clean-up. 311
The Metropolis 2020 organization and plan has done a good job of drawing attention to and
organizing improvements for the city's freight infrastructure. The Chicago region is the third busiest
intermodal port in the world, behind Hong Kong and Singapore.312 The region, however, faces economic
loss in the technical delays on its rail corridors and congestion delays on its roadways: rail freight moves
through the city at an average of nine miles per hour.3 13 The amount of time spent in highway congestion
in the Chicago region, has tripled in the last twenty years. Given this, the region plans to invest in freight
centers and intermodal facilities many of which exist along currently underutilized industrial corridors,
but that also require hundreds of acres of land. The freight plan recommends dedicating funds to
improving scores of low-grade viaduct crossings concentrated in the City of Chicago - many of them in
brownfields areas. The plan also gives consideration of obsolete transportation areas provides for new
planned development or amenities such as trails.
Transportation plans and investments are a viable strategy for demand-side planning for
brownfields, as transportation is a large driver of the region's economy and Chicago is poised to invest
large resources into the improvement of existing road and rail corridors. The Chicago Department of
Planning, in addition, has a plan to improve commercial corridors along which the Chicago Transit
Authority has plans to implement Bus Rapid Transit. 314 Several thoroughfares in the city have dense
corridors of tax-foreclosed commercial properties, and the city might focus BRT investments where it
also could capture the value generated by a market for redevelopment. Finally, federal proposals in the
2009 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act to put a "down payment" on the high-speed rail corridors
311 Amekudzi and Fomunung 2004, 210-11
312 Chicago Metropolis 2020, (December 2004) "Metropolis Freight Plan, Delivering the Goods."
http://www.chicagometropolis2020.org/documents/MetropolisFreightPlan.pdf (accessed 13 Apr 2009).5
313 Ibid. 8314 Dickhut, Kathy. Telephone interview with the author.
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between U.S. cities such as Chicago and St. Louis might change value and patterns of development in the
city.
Cultural heritage -Natural systesms and cultural history are other assets around which to build a
brownfields strategy. This type of strategy has long been a part of the planning for the Calumet Region,
to recognize the slag heaps, steel mills, and grain elevators as part of the history of the area and a worthy
target of preservation. The Calumet Ecological Park Association has sponsored feasibility studies for
securing National Park status for the Calumet region of Northeastern Illinois and Northwest Indiana.
They frame the unique assets of the region in this way:
The Calumet is a prime example of the spectacular rise of American industry during the
previous century and the corresponding growth of the American labor movement,
becoming the home of diverse populations. It is, at the same time, a recreation area and a
wetland and prairie haven. 315
In addition, the former site of Acme Steel has been proposed for museum in recent years. A coalition is
fundraising to purchase and clean-up the site, and have it designated as a landmark in the state of Illinois
and an "endangered place."316 Cultural heritage is also a unique fulcram upon which to undertake
planning in community area of the city. An oral history or museum project might create value,
relationships, generate buy-in and shift the balance of a power in a community. Seeing these
possibilities in Chicago's brownfields landscape is the principle objective of artist Frances Whitehead,
who has previously designed a project in a former industrial areas of Cleveland.317 In Chicago, her
objective is: "To change the story and perceive of brownfields as "cultural heritage." She starts from "the
premise that everything is cultural." These cultural uses might drive new demand and value for Chicago's
brownfields areas.
315The Burnham Centennial. "Calumet Ecological Park Association."
http://burnhamplanlOO.uchicago.edu/partner/detail/Calumet+Ecological+Park+Association, (accessed 6 May 2009.)
316Chicagoist. (December 2004). "Acme Steel Mill To Become a Museum."
http://chicagoist.com/2004/12/28/acme steel mill to become a museum.php, (accessed 6 May 2009.)The Illinois
Department of Public Health found in February 2007 that the hazardous materials currently posed a public health
hazard on the site. http://www.atsdr.cdc.iov/HAC/pha/AcmeSteelCokePlant/ACMESteelCokePlantHC8-24-
2007.pdf (accessed 6 May 2009.)317 "Superorg.net." www.superorg.net (accessed 1 May 2009).
133
Other plans - The City is also constructing mulitple plans for the city's rivers, lakefront, and areas
around the facilities for the proposed 2016 Olympics, that the Brownfields Initiative might leverage to
create value an achieve clean-up at difficult sites. The city also has a nature and wildlife plan to
strengthen its park space and the natural habitat within the city, its green infrastructure, and its
transportation corridors. The private community development intermediary, the Local Initiatives Support
Corporation (LISC), has undertaken neighborhood planning in the city. It is funded by the MacArthur
Foundation to formulate and implement fourteen "New Communities" plans for its neighborhoods in
partnership with area development corporations. None of these plans explicitly consider the reuse of
brownfields as a planning or implementation strategy 318 and could be strengthened by doing so.
Further commercial development, though it may have already creamed more lucrative
brownfields properties, remains an attractive residual use for brownfields properties in the City, given
land needs for new commercial development. (Large big box stores can use large individual or contiguous
brownfields parcels and chain drugstores and small retailers look to former gas stations and automotive
uses.) Additionally, commercial development requires less intensive clean-up of contaminated parcels. As
Chris De Sousa points out from other studies, the suburban retail market is saturated, and major retailers
increasingly look to cities for new markets. 319 The City of Chicago is also experienced at regulating the
quality of the jobs and the environments that these developments bring, trying to incentivize parking lot
and landscaping design guidelines and setbacks, pedestrian walkways, pervious paving and the much
touted green roof. The highly publicized and contentious battle to keep Wal-Mart out of the city, and to
regulate wages for employees at large retailers are also part of making these developments more
sustainable.
These six areas - new industrial policies, green infrastructure, parks and waterfront,
transportation investments, cultural heritage and hybrid plans for everything from the 2016 Olympics to
318 Lindwall, Jeanne. Telephone interview with the author.319 De Sousa 2008, 232
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commercial development - can shape new demand, planning for clean-up and redevelopment in
Chicago's areas of distress. It is by thinking about what new demand might be created in an area, and not
how individual sites might be restored, that a policy can begin to break through the glass ceiling of
untouched and intractable brownfields landscapes. Those undertaking planning should consider which of
these or other demand and value drivers might be incorporated into a more powerful and comprehensive
plan for these areas.
How Part 3: Implementation Using Finance and Policy Tools
Brownfields tools must be adapted to be effective for different demand-driven strategies. There
is still much "tweaking" to be done with brownfields tools, but this is a secondary project to the type of
planning described above, especially with distressed neighborhoods. Many express frustrations with
brownfields financing tools, because an end user is the only thing that makes such sites available for TIF
funding, Section 108 loan funds, New Market Tax Credits, revolving loans, and tax abatement and
incentives. Many of the tools governing clean-up are framed by redevelopment, in the Tiered Approach
to Corrective Action scheme, end use dictates clean-up standards. Approval processes may be slower
and more cumbersome, but if a project is planned, the develper knows such tools are available and is able
to access them. The biggest gap for brownfields projects is for pre-development assessment, and
remediation planning. Tools for blanket assessment or clean-up of multiple parcels would be useful here.
Having a discretionary fund through which to fund clean-up grants may be less of a benefit, without
criteria, a plan, or a competitive process. Chicago had such funds in the mid-to-late 1990s with the $2
million in General Obligation Bonds, the $74 million Section 8 Loan Guarantee, $691,000 in the
Brownfields Showcase Community Designation and $500,000 from the Brownfields Clean-up Revolving
Loan Fund.320 Jim Van der Kloot argues that the such Section 108 funds weren't well employed, the city
went from a carefully planned demonstration pilot using $2 million dollars of General Obligation Bonds
that staff managed like it was their own money, to a $74 million advance from HUD was "too much, the
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320 ity of Chicago 2003, 3
city couldn't handle the growth involved to spend that kind of money."321 Without careful criteria and
strategy for use of such funds, the funds didn't have the same impact that they could have.
Vehicles to protect investors from liabilitity by securing multiple brownfields properties of
varying degrees of contamination is a promising idea in circulation for capitalizing brownfields projects,
but it isn't likely to invest in low-return sites in distressed areas. The California Environmental
Redevelopment Fund also provides a pool of private sector financing for brownfields projects that have
low internal rates of return, that provide their investors with Community Reinvestment Act credit. These
funds, however innovative, are also likely to only kick in when brownfields have an end user and
development moves forward. The planning efforts, however, to work on site assembly, or to increase
confidence in an area help to make brownfields projects more cost effective, and helps share the risks
inherently involved these projects.
Technical solutions are evolving as well, site engineering, barriers, choices about building location
and foundations can all lesson the cost of clean-up. Technical solutions, however, can't be applied before
work is done to address the market dynamics of an entire area.
How Part 4: A New Model of a Great Lakes Brownfields Policy
If a Tier III policy is tailored to special planning in a particular community area or commercial or
industrial corridor, then this constitutes the "micro" scale of new brownfields planning (and is still bigger
than a site). Citywide or regional policy might constitute the meso-scale. A major trend in brownfields
work is to take a regional strategy: pooling local capacity to work across municipal, county and state
boundaries to focus clean-up around common assets. The South Suburban Mayors and Managers
Associaton in Chicago has received grants from the Citi Foundation and the U.S. EPA to focus on
planning and prioritizing brownfields clean-ups. 322 It is targeting resources around the clean-up of the
Calumet River which is seen as an asset common to the towns of Robbins, Blue Island, Calumet Park,
Riverdale, Dolton, Calumet City, and Burnham. They have also focused planning with the help of
321 Van der Kloot, Jim. Telephone interview by author.
322 Slattery, Christine. Telephone interview by author.
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Chicago's Center for Neighborhood Technology on 180 sites in 44 communities south of Chicago, that
are seen as enhanced by freight infrastructure, a skilled workforce and existing industry.323 Chicago
could look establish a similar regional strategy in areas of the city where it has a large concentration of
firms, or at its edges with particularly resource-poor inner ring suburbs.
Finally, considering the Chicago metropolitan area as part of the "Great Lakes" region is the
macro scale. Brownfields programs were born in the Great Lakes region, with early local planning
efforts in Cleveland and Chicago and the leadership in the Region 5 Office of the U.S. EPA.
Minnesota and Illinois were early innovators for state voluntary clean-up programs and the use of TIF
funding for brownfields, and Milwaukee has undertaken district-wide and green space brownfields
projects and sustained university partnerships to work on these issues.324
The brownfields problems faced in 2009 by these same Great Lakes cities is also a common
one: how to address contaminated sites in their most distressed areas, how to clean-up lake front and
waterways, how to use the brownfields problem as a way of creating new markets, quality of life, and
a fiscal environment that will attract new investment and new populations. Chicago might work as
part of a large regional effort to address brownfields reuse alongside larger infrastructure, economic
and transportation investments, for which the decisions are made at a regional level.
The Brookings Institution recently published a report about the Great Lakes region, which
described the region's metropolitan areas as "economically stagnant, old and beat up, and plagued by
severe racial divisions." 325 There is a sense, from this and other plans and coalitions around the Great
Lakes, that new and creative strategies can only come out of such challenges.
One of the things that the plan suggests is to "forge a Great Lakes energy independence
compact that commits significant new investments for research in clean energy sources and
323 Orr, Deborah, EPA Region 5 and Center for Neighborhood Technology. (August 18, 2008) "Brownfields
Prevention Transformed." Presentation. http://www.clu-
in.org/conf/tio/r5bfsouthsuburb/prez/SSMMA BF%20 Prevention %20Cluinbw.pdf (accessed 15 Mar 2009).324 De Sousa 2008
325 The Brookings Institution. 4
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sustainable transportation." 326 The plan suggests that to strengthen the economies of the region's
metropolitan areas, the region's states and the federal government should implement competitive
transportation policy with high-speed rail, greater access to ports and freight hubs, better maintenance
of existing highways and transportation systems. The region's metropolitan areas should also rebuild
crumbling water and sewer infrastructure that considers regional needs and prioritizes existing
systems, targeting infrastructure. They should steer economic development funding to catalytic urban
projects and revamp federal policies that concentrate the poor in decaying urban neighborhoods.32 7
The Plan finally recommends that they should enhance preservation of natural areas and public access
to shorelines as drivers of the region's economic development.328 Many of these recommendations
dovetail with a demand-driven strategy for distressed brownfields.
While there may be a lack of momentum for these strategies at this point, the region's cities
have strong institutions to align with, such as the regional offices of HUD, the EPA and the Federal
Reserve Bank. In addition, the Delta Institute has a Great Lakes focus, and the Great Lakes and St.
Lawrence Cities Initiative, which though founded to work on issues of water quality and
conservation, could take an economic and redevelopment focus for its cities. To not think in terms of
regional economic development, in the words of Henry Henderson, "is dumbing down the
opportunity" of brownfields redevelopment. 329
A regional strategy also lends credibility, influence and support to a new policy area, and
perhaps might ease the technical burden placed on individual governments. New Brownfields
Initiatives operating at multiple scales might also be easier with a storm of regional activity and a
regional framework.
326 Ibid. 5
327 Ibid
328 Ibid. 40.
329 Henderson, Henry. Telephone interview by author.
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This chapter has attempted to suggest the importance of a new brownfields strategy in
Chicago, the parties that might provide leadership and where Chicago might focus its attention. It
also suggests a series of strategies through which a new Brownfields Initiative might undertake
planning and approach clean-up in redevelopment a comprehensive manner that fits the city's
landscapes of disinvestment and contamination. With these and similar elements, Chicago is poised
create a new model for cleaning up contaminated surplus land.
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Conclusions
Chicago's Brownfields Forum is always understood to have been innovative and to have
generated strong outcomes. While this was surely the case, no one has said that the program has been a
model lately. Fifteen years ago, those working with the Brownfields Forum and Initiative created the
tools in the national brownfields toolbox and set the stage to achieve a broad array of private clean-up in
the City of Chicago. However, its organizers knew the limits of Brownfields Initiative at the time, and
institutionalized a program that focused on real estate development. This narrow focus has come back to
haunt to program in the form of cost overruns and lack of visibility and political support. It has also
undermined the efficacy and legitimacy of the project of cleaning up contaminated and disinvested land in
Chicago, a project that is linked to the city's long-term vitality.
The Chicago case shows the difficulty of institutionalizing a program in city government in
Chicago, where priorities and leadership are always changing. It also shows the earnest but limited
efforts of a City applying a Tier I policy in what is in many ways, a Tier III city, working on a site-by-site
basis in complicated areas, without a larger strategy. The Chicago case suggests what understanding
brownfields and potential brownfields in Chicago by type, and tailoring an appropriate strategy to them
might accomplish. Brownfields are embedded in broader, disinvested urban environment. Any efforts to
address the brownfields problem without a multi-faceted strategy are doomed to fail, as the Chicago case
illustrates.
The challenges posed by brownfields lead into a bigger conversation about economy and the
meaning of a city. Though a confusing conversation to have, it's an important conversation. However, as
this case shows, local government policy as it exists in Chicago, or even at the level of the U.S. EPA, is
inadequate to facilitate it. What is clear, however, is that cities must begin to deliberately rethink the
brownfields project, its terminology, its expectations and its opportunities.
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Chicago will continue to provide a rich case for other studies of brownfields policy: a deeper
analysis to uncover a new "inventory" and alternative schemes of prioritization, according to different
landscapes or typologies. To study Chicago's brownfields programs raises the need to reexamine the
City's industrial policy and assess the viability of its various industrial corridors. This thesis' analysis of
the SRP has been crude, and it identifies more questions than it can answer. More advanced statistical
techniques, coupled with better data to measure property redevelopment and investment, remediation
dollars spent and technologies used, can draw better conclusions and predict the characteristics of the
parcels and areas where private developers have invested in SRP investigation and clean-up.
This study has merely touched on Chicago's redevelopment policy, but brownfields also begs a
policy, political and social analysis of the City's high profile environmental agenda, which in this case,
looks unintegrated, unplanned, and unwilling to touch the "sticker" issues of uneven development,
poverty and the environmental degradation that development has left in its wake.
The politics of the Brownfields Forum may also warrant further study. Region 5 of the U.S. EPA
has boxes filled with the notes, transcripts and reports written for the work that the nine recommendation
and implementation teams did, that might be analyzed in greater detail for a future planning effort or for
further study. Someone with better knowledge of Chicago city politics might analyze public and private
SRP investigation and clean-up by ward, to test whether SRP activity occurs in areas with particularly
influential or connected alderman. The environmental and health protection trade-offs of the city's
groundwater policy, or its tiered clean-up are critically important and should be studied as well.
As "embedded artist" Frances Whitehead understands, non-traditional brownfields projects also
beckon: projects that create a deeper cultural understanding of the built form in the city, and its industrial
and natural heritage. Other design projects for Chicago are the large scale implementation of green
infrastructure, riverfront redevelopment where it makes sense, the ongoing ecological restoration and
management of areas like Calumet. Enormous creativity and planning is also needed to imagine what
disinvested Chicago neighborhoods might look like in 10 or 15 years, to study where transportation
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investments would do the most good, to plan with communities for the economic health of their residents
and their areas.
The brownfields project is about planning. If the city wants to see clean-up and redevelopment
progress on difficult sites, it must have a coherent, unified, multi-faceted urban revitalization strategy to
mobilize public and private resources. There must be systematic mechanisms and market studies in place
to examine what might drive reuse, new demand and a better quality of life across an entire area of
disinvested and contaminated land.
In the end, the Chicago Center for Green Technology, the little green gem stranded in a sea of
blight, seems to come by its paradox honestly. Its development followed the site-based and opportunistic
pattern of city-driven clean-ups. Though the current brownfields program may have provided for sixteen
clean-ups in East Garfield Park, it doesn't begin to provide the tools to address disinvestment in this and
similar areas. The Center for Green Technology is an accidental "demonstration project" in this way, and
perhaps an even more important one than a LEED platinum demonstration one. It holds a mirror up to the
City as a call to action for a better brownfields policy and a better way of structuring and supporting
redevelopment and using the land to affect the future growth of the city. Next to a planning and
development task like this, a green roof looks easy.
It's not clear that the private sector would ever undertake a challenge of this magnitude on its
own or a city government absent a multi-stakeholder and non-profit coalition should "thrash it out alone"
either. The brownfields project, in theory, is a cumulative one with long horizons and the City has only
just begun. The brownfields story has been one about timing and policy evolution and the time has
perhaps come for another shift.
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Appendix 1 - Pilot sites33°
Pilot Sites
1. 4532 West Adams, with Scott Peterson Meats - 1-acre site, Former CTA bus barn turned illegal
garbage transfer station, piled high with tires and scrap metal. 331 Building demolished, cleaned up
and site became paved for secured parking for the plant across the street. Isolated industrial site
surrounded by a neighborhood. The city decontaminated the property and razed the building at a
cost of $350,000. The city still owns the property. 1.8 acres, $400,000 in demolition costs,
$303,000 in clean-up costs, $23,500 in new tax revenues. 300 jobs created or preserved.
2. 3114 W. Carroll with Madison Equipment - Abandoned industrial building becomes neighboring
firm's warehouse. Two and half miles from the West Adams site. Firm apparently still there, makes
machines for food packaging. 2.1 acres, no demolition, $2,800 in clean-up costs, $62,000 in
new tax revenues. 32jobs created or preserved.
3. 92nd & Kimbark - removal of hazardous waste at a former foundry benefits Verson Corporation next
door, which made stamping presses for the auto industry. With the help of the local industrial
commission, the city was able to identify infrastructure improvements that also benefited Verson.
Firm's current address is not at this parcel and phone is disconnected. Actual site recently had
redevelopment activity. 7 acres, $350,000 in demolition costs, $211,000 in clean-up costs,
$209,000 in tax revenue. 650 jobs created or maintained.
4. 14th & Union - Attractive site with feared contamination. None found, slated for redevelopment.
Adjacent to the Dan Ryan Expressway, site became part of the University Village residential
redevelopment for the Univerity of Illinois -Chicago. 14th & Union, 2.5 acres, no demolition,
$4,000 for investigation.
5. 4601 W. Van Buren, with Blackstone Manufacturing - Hazardous waste site, underground storage
tanks, quick clean-up and landscaping, for secured parking and campus-like environment. Across
railroad tracks from junkyard, close to Eisenhower Expressway on the far west side. "$200,000 will
get rid of a burned-out wire factory which will allow an auto parts company across the street to build
a secure parking lot. That will allow the company, which is buying the land from the city to put on a
night shift, creating 50 new jobs332 Reported a decrease in car theft. Blackstone Manufacturing is
still there. 3.3 acres, no demolition, $592,000 in clean-up, $43,000 in new taxes, 207 jobs
created or retained.
Total: $750,000 in Demolition Costs, $1.1 million in clean-up costs, $337,500 tax revenues, 1200 jobs
created or preserved.
330 Numbers, slightly higher than those in other documents, taken from Rafson 1999, 100
331 May 1996.
332 Sun Times, March 1995.
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Appendix 2- Chicago SRP Clean-ups by Year
Appendix 3 - Proportion of Industrial Land and Number of Clean-ups in
Correlation coefficient = of 0.126
Relationship between Industrial Zoning and Number of Clean-ups
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Year Just Number of Number Total sites Brownfields
Depart. Sites of Total as fraction "Phase"
of Env. Enrolled Sites of All
SRP by Enrolled Chicago
City SRP
1990 0 0 2 0.2% Pre-Forum,
1991 0 0 8 0.8% State VCP
1992 0 0 8 0.8%
1993 0 0 19 1.8%
1994 0 1 10 1.0% Forum and
1995 0 1 12 1.1% New DOE
1996 2 2 31 3.0%
1997 5 6 58 5.5% Showcase
1998 2 2 41 3.9%
1999 8 17 80 7.6%
2000 9 20 73 7.0%
2001 4 8 69 6.6%
2002 9 21 82 7.8%
2003 10 19 95 9.1%
2004 7 13 101 9.6% Technical
2005 3 9 107 10.2% Assistance
2006 3 5 90 8.6%
2007 2 7 76 7.3%
2008 4 12 76 7.3%
2009 0 1 9 0.9%
Total 68 144 1047 100%
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Appendix 4 - Map: Community Areas with the Most Commercially Zoned SRP sites
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Appendix 8 - Map: SRP Clean-ups by 5-year Periods (Including Pilot Sites)
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Appendix 9- Map: EPA Toxic Release
Inventory
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Appendix 11 - Industrial Investment in Chicago, 1940s
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